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Introduction
Where did the future go? For much of the twentieth century, the future held 
sway over our dreams. On the horizons of the political left a vast assortment 
of emancipatory visions gathered, often springing from the conjunction of 
popular political power and the liberating potential of technology. From 
predictions of new worlds of leisure, to Soviet-era cosmic communism, to 
afro-futurist celebrations of the synthetic and diasporic nature of black 
culture, to post-gender dreams of radical feminism, the popular imagination 
of the left envisaged societies vastly superior to anything we dream of today.1 
Through popular political control of new technologies, we would collec-
tively transform our world for the better. Today, on one level, these dreams 
appear closer than ever. The technological infrastructure of the twenty-fi rst 
century is producing the resources by which a very different political and 
economic system could be achieved. Machines are accomplishing tasks that 
were unimaginable a decade ago. The internet and social media are giving a 
voice to billions who previously went unheard, bringing global participative 
democracy closer than ever to existence. Open-source designs, copyleft crea-
tivity, and 3D printing all portend a world where the scarcity of many prod-
ucts might be overcome. New forms of computer simulation could rejuve-
nate economic planning and give us the ability to direct economies rationally 
in unprecedented ways. The newest wave of automation is creating the possi-
bility for huge swathes of boring and demeaning work to be permanently 
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eliminated. Clean energy technologies make possible virtually limitless and 
environmentally sustainable forms of power production. And new medical 
technologies not only enable a longer, healthier life, but also make possible 
new experiments with gender and sexual identity. Many of the classic 
demands of the left – for less work, for an end to scarcity, for economic 
democracy, for the production of socially useful goods, and for the liberation 
of humanity – are materially more achievable than at any other point in 
history.
Yet, for all the glossy sheen of our technological era, we remain bound by an 
old and obsolete set of social relations. We continue to work long hours, 
commuting further, to perform tasks that feel increasingly meaningless. Our 
jobs have become more insecure, our pay has stagnated, and our debt has 
become overwhelming. We struggle to make ends meet, to put food on the 
table, to pay the rent or mortgage, and as we shuffl e from job to job, we 
reminisce about pensions and struggle to fi nd affordable childcare. Automation 
renders us unemployed and stagnant wages devastate the middle class, while 
corporate profi ts surge to new heights. The glimmers of a better future are 
trampled and forgotten under the pressures of an increasingly precarious and 
demanding world. And each day, we return to work as normal: exhausted, 
anxious, stressed and frustrated.
At a planetary level, things appear even more ominous. The breakdown of 
the global climate continues unabated, and the ongoing fallout from the 
economic crisis has led governments to embrace the paralysing death-spiral 
of austerity. Buffeted by imperceptible and abstract powers, we feel incapable 
of evading or controlling the tidal pulsions of economic, social and environ-
mental forces. But how are we to change this? All around us, it seems that the 
political systems, movements and processes that dominated the last hundred 
years are no longer able to bring about genuinely transformative change. 
Instead, they have forced us onto an endless treadmill of misery. Electoral 
democracy lies in remarkable disrepair. Centre-left political parties have 
been hollowed out and sapped of any popular mandate. Their corpses 
stumble on as vehicles for careerist ambitions. Radical political movements 
bloom promisingly but are quickly snuffed out by exhaustion and repression. 
Organised labour has seen its power systematically taken apart, leaving it scle-
rotic and incapable of anything more than feeble resistance. Yet, in the face 
of these calamities, today’s politics remains stubbornly beset by a lack of new 
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ideas. Neoliberalism has held sway for decades, and social democracy exists 
largely as an object of nostalgia. As crises gather force and speed, politics 
withers and retreats. In this paralysis of the political imaginary, the future has 
been cancelled.2
This book is about how we got here, and where we might go next. Using 
an idea we call ‘folk politics’, we offer a diagnosis of how and why we lost the 
capacity to build a better future. Under the sway of folk-political thinking, the 
most recent cycle of struggles – from anti-globalisation to anti-war to Occupy 
Wall Street – has involved the fetishisation of local spaces, immediate actions, 
transient gestures, and particularisms of all kinds. Rather than undertake the 
diffi cult labour of expanding and consolidating gains, this form of politics has 
focused on building bunkers to resist the encroachments of global neoliberal-
ism. In so doing, it has become a politics of defence, incapable of articulating 
or building a new world. For any movement that struggles to escape neoliber-
alism and build something better, these folk-political approaches are insuffi -
cient. In their place, this book sets out an alternative politics – one that seeks 
to take back control over our future and to foster the ambition for a world 
more modern than capitalism will allow. The utopian potentials inherent in 
twenty-fi rst-century technology cannot remain bound to a parochial capitalist 
imagination; they must be liberated by an ambitious left alternative. 
Neoliberalism has failed, social democracy is impossible, and only an alter-
native vision can bring about universal prosperity and emancipation. 
Articulating and achieving this better world is the fundamental task of the left 
today.
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Chapter 1
Our Political Common Sense: Introducing Folk Politics
The next move was ours, and we just stood there, waiting for something to 
happen, like good conscientious objectors awaiting our punishment after our 
purely symbolic point had been made.
Dave Mitchell
Today it appears that the greatest amount of effort is needed to achieve the 
smallest degree of change. Millions march against the Iraq War, yet it goes 
ahead as planned. Hundreds of thousands protest austerity, but unprece-
dented budget cuts continue. Repeated student protests, occupations and 
riots struggle against rises in tuition fees, but they continue their inexorable 
advance. Around the world, people set up protest camps and mobilise against 
economic inequality, but the gap between the rich and the poor keeps grow-
ing. From the alter-globalisation struggles of the late 1990s, through the anti-
war and ecological coalitions of the early 2000s, and into the new student 
uprisings and Occupy movements since 2008, a common pattern emerges: 
resistance struggles rise rapidly, mobilise increasingly large numbers of 
people, and yet fade away only to be replaced by a renewed sense of apathy, 
melancholy and defeat. Despite the desires of millions for a better world, the 
effects of these movements prove minimal.
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6 INVENTING THE FUTURE
A FUNNY THING HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO THE PROTEST
Failure permeates this cycle of struggles, and as a result, many of the tactics 
on the contemporary left have taken on a ritualistic nature, laden with a 
heavy dose of fatalism. The dominant tactics – protesting, marching, occupy-
ing, and various other forms of direct action – have become part of a well-
established narrative, with the people and the police each playing their 
assigned roles. The limits of these actions are particularly visible in those 
brief moments when the script changes. As one activist puts it, of a protest at 
the 2001 Summit of the Americas:
On April 20, the fi rst day of the demonstrations, we marched in our thou-
sands towards the fence, behind which 34 heads of state had gathered to 
hammer out a hemispheric trade deal. Under a hail of catapult-launched 
teddy bears, activists dressed in black quickly removed the fence’s supports 
with bolt cutters and pulled it down with grapples as onlookers cheered 
them on. For a brief moment, nothing stood between us and the conven-
tion centre. We scrambled atop the toppled fence, but for the most part we 
went no further, as if our intention all along had been simply to replace the 
state’s chain-link and concrete barrier with a human one of our own 
making.1
We see here the symbolic and ritualistic nature of the actions, combined with 
the thrill of having done something – but with a deep uncertainty that appears 
at the fi rst break with the expected narrative. The role of dutiful protestor had 
given these activists no indication of what to do when the barriers fell. 
Spectacular political confrontations like the Stop the War marches, the 
now-familiar melees against the G20 or World Trade Organization and the 
rousing scenes of democracy in Occupy Wall Street all give the appearance 
of being highly signifi cant, as if something were genuinely at stake.2 Yet 
nothing changed, and long-term victories were traded for a simple registration 
of discontent.
To outside observers, it is often not even clear what the movements want, 
beyond expressing a generalised discontent with the world. The contempo-
rary protest has become a melange of wild and varied demands. The 2009 
G20 summit in London, for instance, featured protestors marching for issues 
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that spanned from grandiose anti-capitalist stipulations to modest goals 
centred on more local issues. When demands can be discerned at all, they 
usually fail to articulate anything substantial. They are often nothing more 
than empty slogans – as meaningful as calling for world peace. In more recent 
struggles, the very idea of making demands has been questioned. The Occupy 
movement infamously struggled to articulate meaningful goals, worried that 
anything too substantial would be divisive.3 And a broad range of student 
occupations across the Western world has taken up the mantra of ‘no 
demands’ under the misguided belief that demanding nothing is a radical 
act.4
When asked what the ultimate upshot of these actions has been, partici-
pants differ between admitting to a general sense of futility and pointing to 
the radicalisation of those who took part. If we look at protests today as an 
exercise in public awareness, they appear to have had mixed success at best. 
Their messages are mangled by an unsympathetic media smitten by images 
of property destruction – assuming that the media even acknowledges a form 
of contention that has become increasingly repetitive and boring. Some 
argue that, rather than trying to achieve a certain end, these movements, 
protests and occupations in fact exist only for their own sake.5 The aim in this 
case is to achieve a certain transformation of the participants, and create a 
space outside of the usual operations of power. While there is a degree of 
truth to this, things like protest camps tend to remain ephemeral, small-scale 
and ultimately unable to challenge the larger structures of the neoliberal 
economic system. This is politics transmuted into pastime – politics-as-drug-
experience, perhaps – rather than anything capable of transforming society. 
Such protests are registered only in the minds of their participants, bypassing 
any transformation of social structures. While these efforts at radicalisation 
and awareness-raising are undoubtedly important to some degree, there still 
remains the question of exactly when these sequences might pay off. Is there 
a point at which a critical mass of consciousness-raising will be ready for 
action? Protests can build connections, encourage hope and remind people 
of their power. Yet, beyond these transient feelings, politics still demands the 
exercise of that power, lest these affective bonds go to waste. If we will not act 
after one of the largest crises of capitalism, then when?
The emphasis on the affective aspects of protests plays into a broader trend 
that has come to privilege the affective as the site of real politics. Bodily, 
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emotional and visceral elements come to replace and stymie (rather than 
complement and enhance) more abstract analysis. The contemporary land-
scape of social media, for example, is littered with the bitter fallout from an 
endless torrent of outrage and anger. Given the individualism of current 
social media platforms – premised on the maintenance of an online identity 
– it is perhaps no surprise to see online ‘politics’ tend towards the self-
presentation of moral purity. We are more concerned to appear right than to 
think about the conditions of political change. Yet these daily outrages pass as 
rapidly as they emerge, and we are soon on to the next vitriolic crusade. In 
other places, public demonstrations of empathy with those suffering replace 
more fi nely tuned analysis, resulting in hasty or misplaced action – or none 
at all. While politics always has a relationship to emotion and sensation (to 
hope or anger, fear or outrage), when taken as the primary mode of politics, 
these impulses can lead to deeply perverse results. In a famous example, 
1985’s Live Aid raised huge amounts of money for famine relief through a 
combination of heartstring-tugging imagery and emotionally manipulative 
celebrity-led events. The sense of emergency demanded urgent action, at the 
expense of thought. Yet the money raised actually extended the civil war 
causing the famine, by allowing rebel militias to use the food aid to support 
themselves.6 While viewers at home felt comforted they were doing some-
thing rather than nothing, a dispassionate analysis revealed that they had in 
fact contributed to the problem. These unintended outcomes become even 
more pervasive as the targets of action grow larger and more abstract. If poli-
tics without passion leads to cold-hearted, bureaucratic technocracy, then 
passion bereft of analysis risks becoming a libidinally driven surrogate for 
effective action. Politics comes to be about feelings of personal empower-
ment, masking an absence of strategic gains.
Perhaps most depressing, even when movements have some successes, 
they are in the context of overwhelming losses. Residents across the UK, for 
example, have successfully mobilised in particular cases to stop the closure of 
local hospitals. Yet these real successes are overwhelmed by larger plans to 
gut and privatise the National Health Service. Similarly, recent anti-fracking 
movements have been able to stop test drilling in various localities – but 
governments nevertheless continue to search for shale gas resources and 
provide support for companies to do so.7 In the United States, various move-
ments to stop evictions in the wake of the housing crisis have made real gains 
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in terms of keeping people in their homes.8 Yet the perpetrators of the 
subprime mortgage debacle continue to reap the profi ts, waves of foreclo-
sures continue to sweep across the country, and rents continue to surge across 
the urban world. Small successes – useful, no doubt, for instilling a sense of 
hope – nevertheless wither in the face of overwhelming losses. Even the most 
optimistic activist falters in the face of struggles that continue to fail. In other 
cases, well-intentioned projects like Rolling Jubilee strive to escape the spell 
of neoliberal common sense.9 The ostensibly radical aim of crowdsourcing 
money to pay the debts of the underprivileged means buying into a system of 
voluntary charity and redistribution, as well as accepting the legitimacy of the 
debt in the fi rst place. In this respect, the initiative is one among a larger 
group of projects that act simply as crisis responses to the faltering of state 
services. These are survival mechanisms, not a desirable vision for the future.
What can we conclude from all of this? The recent cycle of struggles has 
to be identifi ed as one of overarching failure, despite a multitude of small-
scale successes and moments of large-scale mobilisation. The question that 
any analysis of the left today must grapple with is simply: What has gone 
wrong? It is undeniable that heightened repression by states and the increased 
power of corporations have played a signifi cant role in weakening the power 
of the left. Still, it remains debatable whether the repression faced by work-
ers, the precarity of the masses and the power of capitalists is any greater than 
it was in the late nineteenth century. Workers then were still struggling for 
basic rights, often against states more than willing to use lethal violence 
against them.10 But whereas that period saw mass mobilisation, general 
strikes, militant labour and radical women’s organisations all achieving real 
and lasting successes, today is defi ned by their absence. The recent weakness 
of the left cannot simply be chalked up to increased state and capitalist 
repression: an honest reckoning must accept that problems also lie within the 
left. One key problem is a widespread and uncritical acceptance of what we 
call ‘folk-political’ thinking.
DEFINING FOLK POLITICS
What is folk politics? Folk politics names a constellation of ideas and intui-
tions within the contemporary left that informs the common-sense ways of 
organising, acting and thinking politics. It is a set of strategic assumptions that 
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threatens to debilitate the left, rendering it unable to scale up, create lasting 
change or expand beyond particular interests. Leftist movements under the 
sway of folk politics are not only unlikely to be successful – they are in fact 
incapable of transforming capitalism. The term itself draws upon two senses 
of ‘folk’. First, it evokes critiques of folk psychology which argue that our 
intuitive conceptions of the world are both historically constructed and often 
mistaken.11 Secondly, it refers to ‘folk’ as the locus of the small-scale, the 
authentic, the traditional and the natural. Both of these dimensions are 
implied in the idea of folk politics.
As a fi rst approximation, we can therefore defi ne folk politics as a collec-
tive and historically constructed political common sense that has become out 
of joint with the actual mechanisms of power. As our political, economic, 
social and technological world changes, tactics and strategies which were 
previously capable of transforming collective power into emancipatory gains 
have now become drained of their effectiveness. As the common sense of 
today’s left, folk politics often operates intuitively, uncritically and uncon-
sciously. Yet common sense is also historical and mutable. It is worth recall-
ing that today’s familiar forms of organisation and tactics, far from being natu-
ral or pre-given, have instead been developed over time in response to specifi c 
political problems. Petitions, occupations, strikes, vanguard parties, affi nity 
groups, trade unions: all arose out of particular historical conditions.12 Yet the 
fact that certain ways of organising and acting were once useful does not 
guarantee their continued relevance. Many of the tactics and organisational 
structures that dominate the contemporary left are responses to the experi-
ence of state communism, exclusionary trade unions, and the collapse of 
social democratic parties. Yet the ideas that made sense in the wake of those 
moments no longer present effective tools for political transformation. Our 
world has moved on, becoming more complex, abstract, nonlinear and global 
than ever before.
Against the abstraction and inhumanity of capitalism, folk politics aims to 
bring politics down to the ‘human scale’ by emphasising temporal, spatial 
and conceptual immediacy. At its heart, folk politics is the guiding intuition 
that immediacy is always better and often more authentic, with the corollary 
being a deep suspicion of abstraction and mediation. In terms of temporal 
immediacy, contemporary folk politics typically remains reactive (responding 
to actions initiated by corporations and governments, rather than initiating 
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actions);13 ignores long-term strategic goals in favour of tactics (mobilising 
around single-issue politics or emphasising process);14 prefers practices that 
are often inherently fl eeting (such as occupations and temporary autono-
mous zones);15 chooses the familiarities of the past over the unknowns of the 
future (for instance, the repeated dreams of a return to ‘good’ Keynesian 
capitalism);16 and expresses itself as a predilection for the voluntarist and 
spontaneous over the institutional (as in the romanticisation of rioting and 
insurrection).17
In terms of spatial immediacy, folk politics privileges the local as the site of 
authenticity (as in the 100-miles diet or local currencies);18 habitually chooses 
the small over the large (as in the veneration of small-scale communities or 
local businesses);19 favours projects that are un-scalable beyond a small 
community (for instance, general assemblies and direct democracy);20 and 
often rejects the project of hegemony, valuing withdrawal or exit rather than 
building a broad counter-hegemony.21 Likewise, folk politics prefers that 
actions be taken by participants themselves – in its emphasis on direct action, 
for example – and sees decision-making as something to be carried out by 
each individual rather than by any representative. The problems of scale and 
extension are either ignored or smoothed over in folk-political thinking.
Finally, in terms of conceptual immediacy, there is a preference for the 
everyday over the structural, valorising personal experience over systematic 
thinking; for feeling over thinking, emphasising individual suffering, or the 
sensations of enthusiasm and anger experienced during political actions; for 
the particular over the universal, seeing the latter as intrinsically totalitarian; 
and for the ethical over the political – as in ethical consumerism, or moralis-
ing critiques of greedy bankers.22 Organisations and communities are to be 
transparent, rejecting in advance any conceptual mediation, or even modest 
amounts of complexity. The classic images of universal emancipation and 
global change have been transformed into a prioritisation of the suffering of 
the particular and the authenticity of the local. As a result, any process of 
constructing a universal politics is rejected from the outset.
Understood in these ways, we can detect traces of folk politics in organisa-
tions and movements like Occupy, Spain’s 15M, student occupations, left 
communist insurrectionists like Tiqqun and the Invisible Committee, most 
forms of horizontalism, the Zapatistas, and contemporary anarchist-tinged 
politics, as well as a variety of other trends like political localism, the 
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slow-food movement, and ethical consumerism, among many others. But no 
single position embodies all of these dispositions, which leads us to a fi rst 
qualifi cation: as an uncritical and often unconscious common sense, folk 
politics comes to be instantiated to varying degrees in concrete political posi-
tions. That is to say, folk politics does not name an explicit position, but only 
an implicit tendency. The ideas that characterise this tendency are widely 
dispersed throughout the contemporary left, but some positions are more 
folk-political than others. This brings us to a second important qualifi cation: 
the problem with folk politics is not that it starts from the local; all politics 
begins from the local. The problem is rather that folk-political thinking is 
content to remain at (and even privileges) that level – of the transient, the 
small-scale, the unmediated and the particular. It takes these to be suffi cient 
rather than simply necessary moments. Therefore, the point is not simply to 
reject folk politics. Folk politics is a necessary component of any successful 
political project, but it can only be a starting point. A third qualifi cation is 
that folk politics is only a problem for particular types of projects: those that 
seek to move beyond capitalism. Folk-political thinking can be perfectly well 
adapted to other political projects: projects aimed solely at resistance, 
movements organised around local issues, and small-scale projects. Political 
movements based around keeping a hospital open or preventing evictions are 
all admirable, but they are importantly different from movements trying to 
challenge neoliberal capitalism. The idea that one organisation, tactic or 
strategy applies equally well to any sort of struggle is one of the most pervasive 
and damaging beliefs among today’s left. Strategic refl ection – on means and 
ends, enemies and allies – is necessary before approaching any political 
project. Given the nature of global capitalism, any postcapitalist project will 
require an ambitious, abstract, mediated, complex and global approach – one 
that folk-political approaches are incapable of providing.
Combining these qualifi cations, we can therefore say that folk politics is 
necessary but insuffi cient for a postcapitalist political project. By emphasising 
and remaining at the level of the immediate, folk politics lacks the tools to 
transform neoliberalism into something else. While folk politics can undoubt-
edly make important interventions in local struggles, we deceive ourselves 
when we think these are turning the tide against global capitalism. They 
represent, at best, temporary respite against its onslaught. The project of this 
book is to begin outlining an alternative – a way for the left to navigate from 
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the local to the global, and synthesise the particular with the universal. Such 
an alternative cannot simply be a conservative reversion to the working-class 
politics of the last century. It must instead combine an updated way of think-
ing politics (a shift from immediacy to structural analysis) with an upgraded 
means of doing politics (which directs action towards building platforms and 
expanding scales).
OVERWHELMED
Why did folk politics arise in the fi rst place? Why is it that folk political 
tendencies, for all their manifest fl aws, are so seductive and appealing to the 
movements of today? At least three answers present themselves. The fi rst 
explanation is to see folk politics as a response to the problem of how to inter-
pret and act within an ever more complex world. The second, related expla-
nation involves situating folk politics as a reaction to the historical experi-
ences of the communist and social democratic left. Finally, folk politics is a 
more immediate response to the empty spectacle of contemporary party 
politics.
Increasingly, multipolar global politics, economic instability, and 
anthropogenic climate change outpace the narratives we use to structure and 
make sense of our lives. Each of these is an example of what is termed a complex 
system, which features nonlinear dynamics, where marginally different inputs 
can cause dramatically divergent outputs, intricate sets of causes feedback on 
one another in unexpected ways, and which characteristically operates on 
scales of space and time that go far beyond any individual’s unaided perception.23 
Globalisation, international politics, and climate change: each of these systems 
shapes our world, but their effects are so extensive and complicated that it is 
diffi cult to place our own experience within them. The global economy is a 
good example of this. In simple terms, the economy is not an object amenable 
to direct perception; it is distributed across time and space (you will never meet 
‘the economy’ in person); it incorporates a wide array of elements, from property 
laws to biological needs, natural resources to technological infrastructures, 
market stalls and supercomputers; and it involves an enormous and intricately 
interacting set of feedback loops, all of which produce emergent effects that are 
irreducible to its individual components.24 In other words, the interaction of an 
economy’s parts produces effects that cannot be understood just by knowing 
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how those parts work in isolation – it is only in grasping the relations between 
them that the economy can be made sense of. While we might have an idea of 
what an economy consists of, we will never be able to experience it directly in 
the same way as other phenomena. It can only be observed symptomatically 
through key statistical indexes (charting changes in infl ation or interest rates, 
stock indexes, GDP, and so on), but can never be seen, heard or touched in its 
totality.
As a result, despite everything that has been written about capitalism, we 
still struggle to understand its dynamics and its mechanisms. Most impor-
tantly, we lack a ‘cognitive map’ of our socioeconomic system: a mental 
picture of how individual and collective human action can be situated within 
the unimaginable vastness of the global economy.25 Recent decades have 
seen an increasing complexity in the dynamics that impinge upon politics. 
We might consider the imminent threat of anthropogenic climate change as 
a new kind of problem – one that is unamenable to any simple solution and 
that involves such intricately woven effects that it is hard to even know where 
to intervene. Equally, the global economy today appears signifi cantly more 
complex in terms of the mobility of capital, the intricacies of global fi nance 
and the multiplicity of actors involved. How well do our traditional political 
images of the world map onto these changes? For the left at least, an analysis 
premised on the industrial working class was a powerful way to interpret the 
totality of social and economic relations in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, thereby articulating clear strategic objectives. Yet the history of 
the global left over the course of the twentieth century attests to the ways in 
which this analysis failed to attend to both the range of possible liberating 
struggles (based in gender, race or sexuality) and the ability of capitalism to 
restructure itself – through the creation of the welfare state, or the neoliberal 
transformations of the global economy. Today, the old models often falter in 
the face of new problems; we lose the capacity to understand our position in 
history and in the world at large.
This separation between everyday experience and the system we live 
within results in increased alienation: we feel adrift in a world we do not 
understand. The cultural theorist Fredric Jameson notes that the prolifera-
tion of conspiracy theories is partly a response to this situation.26 Conspiracy 
theories act by narrowing the agency behind our world to a single fi gure of 
power (the Bilderberg Group, the Freemasons or some other convenient 
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scapegoat). Despite the extraordinary complexity of some of these theories, 
they nevertheless provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who is behind it 
all’, and what our own role is in the situation. In other words, they act precisely 
as a (faulty) cognitive map.
Folk politics presents itself as another possible response to the problems of 
overwhelming complexity. If we do not understand how the world operates, 
the folk-political injunction is to reduce complexity down to a human scale. 
Indeed, folk-political writing is saturated with calls for a return to authentic-
ity, to immediacy, to a world that is ‘transparent’, ‘human-scaled’, ‘tangible’, 
‘slow’, ‘harmonious’, ‘simple’, and ‘everyday’.27 Such thinking rejects the 
complexity of the contemporary world, and thereby rejects the possibility of a 
truly postcapitalist world. It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas 
what is truly terrifying is the generally asubjective nature of the system. The 
faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same. The turn towards 
localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of 
direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capi-
talism into concrete fi gures and moments.
In this process, folk politics often reduces politics to an ethical and 
individual struggle. There is a tendency sometimes to imagine that we simply 
need ‘good’ capitalists, or a ‘responsible’ capitalism. At the same time, the 
imperative to ‘make it local’ leads folk politics to fetishise immediate results 
and the concrete appearance of action. Delaying a corporate attack on the 
environment, for instance, is lauded as a success – even if the company 
simply waits out public attention before returning once again. Moreover, as 
Rosa Luxemburg pointed out long ago, the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ 
leads to an empty pragmatism that struggles to maintain the present balance 
of power, rather than seeking to change structural conditions.28 Without the 
necessary abstraction of strategic thought, tactics are ultimately fl eeting 
gestures. Finally, the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal 
case for markets. One of the primary arguments made against planning has 
been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided.29 The only 
alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and 
reject any attempt to guide it rationally.30 Considered in all these ways, folk 
politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be 
thinkable – and at the same time, to articulate how to act upon this restricted 
image of capitalism. By contrast, the argument of this book is that 
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folk-political tendencies are mistaken. If complexity presently outstrips 
humanity’s capacities to think and control, there are two options: one is to 
reduce complexity down to a human scale; the other is to expand humanity’s 
capacities. We endorse the latter position. Any postcapitalist project will 
necessarily require the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, 
technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective 
control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of 
humanity.
OUTDATED
While the response to increasing complexity goes some way towards explain-
ing the rise of folk-political thinking, it must also be situated in terms of the 
particular history of left politics in the twentieth century. In many respects, 
folk-political tendencies are understandable (if inadequate) responses to the 
challenges faced in the last fi fty years – challenges that have emerged both 
within the left and in competition with conservative and capitalist forces.31 In 
particular, folk politics emerged as a response to the collapse of the postwar 
social democratic complex that knitted together working-class institutions, 
social democratic parties, and the hegemony of embedded liberalism.32 The 
breakdown of this social democratic bloc occurred across multiple lines of 
confl ict and in various spheres: in the emergence of new forms of work, asso-
ciated with the affective and cognitive; in the emergence of energy crises that 
disrupted geopolitical certainties; in the increasing diffi culties capitalist 
enterprises faced in achieving profi tability; in the proliferation of neoliberal 
ideology through the institutional networks of think tanks and university 
departments; in the explosion of new forms of political subjectivities, projects 
and demands; and in the widespread discrediting of nominally communist 
states. Each of these factors served to disrupt the foundation of the postwar 
social system in Europe and America. In this process, there was both an 
outdating of old left paradigms and an outmanoeuvring of the new ones.
Perhaps the most signifi cant point in this destabilisation of the postwar 
settlement was in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The global revolts of 1968 
gave both new prominence and new inspiration to a series of left movements 
that rejected the coordinates of struggle articulated by labour unions and 
political parties. These movements were driven partly by the emerging history 
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of Stalinist repression, and when combined with the Soviet regime’s suppres-
sion of democratising currents in Eastern Europe, this meant that communist 
parties were increasingly discredited in the eyes of young European leftists. 
This called into question the strategic validity of the Leninist programme of 
state-takeover by a revolutionary party leading a coalition of forces centred on 
the industrial working class.33 If even ‘successful’ revolutions led to sclerotic 
technocracy and political repression in the long term, what then was to be 
the properly emancipatory course of action? Hierarchy and vanguardism in 
the communist party increasingly appeared opposed to the aims of the emerg-
ing social movements.
Beyond the diffi culties of transitioning to postcapitalism under a commu-
nist administration, the prospects for state-takeover in the developed nations 
in the 1960s and 1970s seemed slight, especially given the divisions emerging 
on the left. The uprisings in France in May 1968, in which the French 
Communist Party notably failed to back the unionists and student groups, 
seemingly brought to an end any prospect of a political revolution. In addi-
tion, social democracy and its Keynesian-corporatist solutions to social ineq-
uity appeared increasingly content with the existing order, and unable or 
unwilling to move towards an emancipatory socialism. Though social democ-
racy was capable of offering signifi cant gains to certain groups, it retained an 
authoritarian establishment and a paternalistic cast, generally exclusive of 
women and ethnic minorities, and was dependent upon a mode of capitalist 
organisation (Fordism) that generated unusual levels of social cohesion. It 
was this social cohesion that was eroded in the late 1960s and early 1970s by 
the emergence of new mass desires (for increased fl exibility in work, for 
example) and newly insistent demands (for racial and gender equality, for 
nuclear disarmament, for sexual freedoms, and against Western imperialism). 
By the late 1960s, these new problems could no longer be resolved with the 
existing set of leftist political agents, and electoral pressures were beginning 
to transform the social democratic party from a mass party of the working 
class into an increasingly coalition-based party of the middle class.34 The 
remaining radical elements of social democratic parties were being slowly 
hollowed out.
The ongoing decline of the party form can be traced partly to the disastrous 
realities of rule in the nominally communist states and the disappointment 
of social democracy. At the same time, a series of well-founded critiques 
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were marshalled from within the new left, prompted partly by the experiences 
of women in activist groups, who found their voices continued to be 
marginalised even in allegedly radical organisations. More hierarchical 
organisational forms, such as parties or traditional union organisations, 
continued to entrench the predominant patriarchal and sexist social relations 
prevalent in broader society. Considerable experimentation was therefore 
conducted to produce new organisational forms that could work against this 
social repression. This included the use of consensus decision-making and 
horizontal debating structures that would later come to worldwide fame 
with the Occupy Wall Street movement.35 Outside of feminist groups, the 
new student left of the university campuses, while diverse in its manifestations, 
was often explicitly anti-authoritarian, anti-bureaucratic, and even anti-
organisational.36 Many of the tactics espoused by these groups emphasised 
the benefi ts of direct action and drew their infl uences from African-American 
civil rights movements and earlier student movements, as well as from the 
ideas of European Situationism, anarchist political currents, and the 
incipient environmental movement.37 Here we can see the emergence of 
folk politics’ basic strategic orientation and the modes of action that 
characterise it: from the occupation, sit-in, or squatted commune through to 
carnivalesque street protests and ‘happenings’. Each of these tactics emerged 
in this period as a way to disrupt the functioning of everyday power, suspend 
the ‘normal’ forms of social regulation and promote egalitarian spaces for 
discussion. Beyond trying to change society, these interventions aimed at 
transforming the participants themselves and embodying the new forms of 
sociality to come.
The movements that crystallised in the period were therefore diverse in 
their makeup and outlook, operating across various subjectivities, territorial 
locations, and tactical and strategic forms. But each of them, in its own 
way, articulated new desires that could not readily be accommodated 
within the old forms of left-wing politics. One way to consider these 
movements is as part of a generalised ‘antisystemic’ political phenomenon 
of the time.38 Across the globe, there was a tendency towards challenging 
and taking apart the power of bureaucratic hierarchies in favour of new 
modes of direct action, extending from the student, feminist and black 
power movements of the United States, through to the Situationist 
movement, student and allied labour movements of Europe, Prague’s 
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anti-Stalinists, the student revolts of Mexico and Tokyo, and China’s 
Cultural Revolution.39 At its most extreme, however, this antisystemic 
politics led towards the identifi cation of political power as inherently 
tainted by oppressive, patriarchal and domineering tendencies.40 This 
leaves something of a paradox. On the one hand, it could choose some 
form of negotiation or accommodation with existing power structures, 
which would tend towards the corruption or co-optation of the new left. 
But on the other hand, it could choose to remain marginal, and thereby 
unable to transform those elements of society not already convinced of its 
agenda.41 The critiques many of these antisystemic movements made of 
established forms of state, capitalist and old-left bureaucratic power were 
largely accurate. Yet antisystemic politics offered few resources to build a 
new movement capable of contending against capitalist hegemony.
The legacy of these social movements was therefore two-sided. The ideas, 
values and new desires articulated by them had a signifi cant impact on a 
global level; the dissemination of feminist, anti-racist, gay-rights and anti-
bureaucratic demands remains their strongest achievement. In this, they 
represented an absolutely necessary moment of self-critique by the left, and 
the legacy of folk-political tactics fi nds its appropriate historical conditions 
here. Simultaneously, however, an inability or lack of desire to turn the more 
radical sides of these projects into hegemonic ones also had important conse-
quences for the period of destabilisation that followed.42 While capable of 
generating an array of new and powerful ideas of human freedom, the new 
social movements were generally unable to replace the faltering social demo-
cratic order.
OUTMANOEUVRED
Just as the new social movements were on the rise, the economic basis of the 
social democratic consensus was beginning to fall apart. The 1970s saw surg-
ing energy prices, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the growth of 
global capital fl ows, persistent stagfl ation and falling capitalist profi ts.43 This 
effectively ended the basic political settlement that had supported the post-
war era: that unique nexus of Keynesian economic policy, Fordist–corporatist 
industrial production and the broadly social democratic consensus that 
returned a part of the social surplus back to workers. Across the world, the 
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structural crisis presented an opportunity for the forces of both the broad left 
and the broad right to generate a new hegemony that could resolve it.
For the right, the challenge was to restore capital accumulation and 
profi tability. This challenge was eventually answered by the emergence of 
neoliberal thought on the global stage; but even before that, right-wing forces 
in the UK and the United States were experimenting with new ways to 
outmanoeuvre both the old and new left. One particularly important 
approach was a political-economic strategy to link the crisis of capitalism to 
union power. The subsequent defeat of organised labour throughout the core 
capitalist nations has perhaps been neoliberalism’s most important 
achievement, signifi cantly changing the balance of power between labour 
and capital. The means by which this was achieved were diverse, from 
physical confrontation and combat,44 to using legislation to undermine 
solidarity and industrial action, to embracing shifts in production and 
distribution that compromised union power (such as disaggregating supply 
chains), to re-engineering public opinion and consent around a broadly 
neoliberal agenda of individual freedom and ‘negative solidarity’. The latter 
denotes more than mere indifference to worker agitations – it is the fostering 
of an aggressively enraged sense of injustice, committed to the idea that, 
because I must endure increasingly austere working conditions (wage freezes, 
loss of benefi ts, a declining pension pot), then everyone else must as well. 
The result of these combined shifts was a hollowing-out of unions and the 
defeat of the working class in the developed world.45
While the right successfully faced the structural crisis by consolidating its 
political and economic power, the movements of the old and new left were 
unable to confront this new confi guration of forces. In the 1970s, socialist 
and even communist political parties were gradually able to gain increasing 
ground in elections in Western Europe; but the old left simply tried to resolve 
the crisis by doubling down on the traditional corporatist agenda.46 But the 
old Keynesian policy formulations were unable to kick-start growth, restrain 
unemployment or reduce infl ation under these new economic conditions. As 
a result, left-wing governments coming to power in the 1970s, such as the 
British Labour Party, often ended up having to implement proto-neoliberal 
policies in frustrated attempts to foster a recovery.47 The traditional labour 
movement, decrepit and stagnant, was by now being bested and co-opted by 
the forces of the right. In this context, the new left was a necessary critique 
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that was essential to the left’s revitalisation and progress. Yet, as we saw in the 
previous section, if the old labour organisations were in many senses bereft of 
ideas, the new left was unable to institutionalise itself and articulate a counter-
hegemony. The result was a left that became increasingly marginalised.
As neoliberalism expanded and consolidated its common sense, the 
remaining social democratic parties increasingly came to accept neoliberal-
ism’s terms. With most major parties effectively signed up to its political and 
economic programme, and increasing numbers of public services being 
taken into private hands, the ability to achieve signifi cant change at the ballot 
box was dramatically reduced. Widespread cynicism began to accompany a 
hollowed-out party politics that came to resemble the public relations 
industry, with politicians being reduced to the role of shopkeepers hawking 
undesirable wares.48 Mass participation in electoral politics declined in 
tandem with the gradual acceptance of the neoliberal coordinates, and the 
age of post-politics was upon us. Mass voter disaffection is the result today, 
with voter turnout routinely at historic lows. Under these circumstances, the 
folk-political insistence on immediate results and small-scale participatory 
democracy has an obvious allure.
The position of the new social movements in this context was more ambig-
uous. By the 1990s, the positioning of the working class as privileged political 
subject had been fully broken down, and a much wider array of social 
identities, desires and oppressions had gained recognition.49 Increasingly 
sophisticated attempts were made to develop the analysis of interacting power 
structures, giving rise to ideas of intersectional oppressions.50 As a result of 
cultural dissemination and mainstream political endorsement, large parts of 
the programmes of feminist, anti-racist and queer political movements had 
become enshrined in law and embraced on a social level. But despite these 
successes, there had been a rollback from the kind of radical demands outlined 
in the 1970s, which envisaged a much more thorough transformation of 
society. Feminists, for example, have made signifi cant gains in terms of pay 
equality, abortion rights and childcare policies, but these pale in comparison 
to projects for the total abolition of gender.51 Similarly, for many black 
liberation movements, while anti-racist employment policies and anti-
discrimination laws were widely enacted, they had not been accompanied by 
other radical programmes espoused by earlier movements.52 Much of the 
success seen by the new social movements today is confi ned within the 
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hegemonic terms established by neoliberalism – articulated around market-
centred claims, liberal rights and a rhetoric of choice. What have been 
sidelined in the process are the more radical and anti-capitalist elements of 
these projects.
Looking back, we have the collapse of the traditional organisations of the left, 
and the simultaneous rise of an alternative new left predicated upon critiques of 
bureaucracy, verticality, exclusion and institutionalisation, combined with an 
incorporation of some of the new desires into the apparatus of neoliberalism. It 
was against this backdrop that folk-political intuitions increasingly sedimented as 
a new common sense and came to be expressed in the alter-globalisation 
movements.53 These movements emerged in two phases. The fi rst, appearing 
from the mid 1990s through to the early 2000s, consisted of groups such as the 
Zapatistas, anti-capitalists, alter-globalisers, and participants in the World Social 
Forum and global anti-war protests. A second phase began immediately after the 
2007–09 fi nancial crisis and featured various groups united by their similar 
organisational forms and ideological positions, including the Occupy movement, 
Spain’s 15M and various national-level student movements. Both phases of the 
newest social movements sought to counter neoliberalism and its national and 
corporate avatars, with the fi rst phase targeting global trade and governance 
organizations, and the latter focusing more on fi nancialisation, inequality and 
debt.54 Drawing infl uence from the earlier social movements, this latest cycle of 
struggles comprises groups that tend to privilege the local and the spontaneous, 
the horizontal and the anti-state. The apparent plausibility of folk politics rests on 
the collapse of traditional modes of organisation on the left, of the co-optation of 
social democratic parties into a choice-less neoliberal hegemony, and the broad 
sense of disempowerment engendered by the insipidness of contemporary party 
politics. In a world where the most serious problems we face seem intractably 
complex, folk politics presents an alluring way to prefi gure egalitarian futures in 
the present. On its own, however, this kind of politics is unable to give rise to 
long-lasting forces that might supersede, rather than merely resist, global 
capitalism.
LOOKING FORWARD
The critique of folk politics advanced in this book is as much a warning as it 
is a diagnosis.55 The existing tendencies in the mainstream and radical left are 
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moving towards the folk-political pole, and we seek to reverse this trend. The 
aim of the fi rst half of the book is therefore to disrupt an increasingly dogmatic 
set of principles about how to strategise and do politics today. Beginning with 
a critical take on existing politics, Chapter 2 seeks to diagnose and outline the 
limits of contemporary folk-political thinking. While the left has rejected the 
project of hegemony and expansion, Chapter 3 shows how neoliberalism 
successfully took the opposite path. In the place of folk politics, the second 
half will suggest an alternative leftist project organised around global and 
universal emancipation. Chapter 4 argues that a future-orientated left needs 
to reclaim the initiative for modernisation and its emphasis on progress and 
universal emancipation. Chapter 5 sets out an analysis of the tendencies of 
contemporary capitalism, emphasising the crisis of work and social reproduc-
tion. These tendencies demand a response, and our argument is that the left 
should begin mobilising a political project to direct these forces in a progres-
sive manner. In contrast to today’s dominant focus on debt and inequality, 
Chapter 6 envisions a post-work world. Chapters 7 and 8 examine some of 
the steps that will need to be taken to achieve this vision, which include 
building a counter-hegemonic movement and rebuilding the capacities of 
the left. Finally, the Conclusion takes a step back to examine the project of 
modernity from the perspective of a future-orientated left guided by the goal 
of universal emancipation. This book is predicated on a simple belief – that a 
modern left can neither continue with the current system nor return to an 
idealised past, but must instead face up to the task of building a new future.
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Chapter 2
Why Aren’t We Winning? A Critique of Today’s Left
Goldman Sachs doesn’t care if you raise chickens.
Jodi Dean
A key challenge facing the left today is to reckon with the disappointments 
and failures of the most recent cycle of struggles. From the anti-
globalisation to the Occupy movements, we have seen a high point of folk-
political practice. Why, despite a considerable mobilisation of people and 
passions, did these movements fail to achieve any signifi cant change in the 
political status quo? Some writers have argued that the incapacity of 
contemporary leftist movements can be explained by their class basis, such 
as their alleged lack of a working-class component, or the infi ltration of 
reformist liberal interests.1 Others have argued that the problem lies with 
the nature of the system and the hurdles placed in front of any transformative 
project. Yet as we argued last chapter, this only partly explains the recent 
failures. By contrast, the argument of this chapter is that the problems lie 
more with the folk-political assumptions that shape the strategic horizon of 
recent left politics. We seek here to diagnose the limits posed by contemporary 
folk politics.
As was argued in Chapter 1, folk politics emerges at the junction between 
a generalised reaction to increasing social complexity and a specifi c history 
of leftist movements in the twentieth century. This chapter examines how 
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the folk-political intuitions that were formed in the process have come to 
shape some of the dominant strands of contemporary leftist politics. We 
make no claim to cover the entire fi eld of social movements here, but 
simply focus on what have been the most politically popular and signifi cant 
moments of the radical left in the past fi fteen years. We also do not claim 
that any of the particular political tactics used by these movements are 
inherently problematic. The merits of particular tactics are only legible 
when seen in the context of both the broader historical horizon and the 
strategy aimed at transforming it. It is in our current setting – of a world 
overwhelmingly determined by the imperatives of global capitalism, 
combined with folk-political strategies focused on the local and the 
spontaneous – that we locate the fundamental weakness of the contemporary 
left. We begin by examining one of the most popular political tendencies of 
the past fi fteen years – horizontalism – before turning to widespread ideas 
centred on localism, and the general reactive thrust of most mainstream 
and radical leftist politics.
HORIZONTALISM
Crystallising in 1970s US social movements and thrust into prominence by 
the Zapatistas, alter-globalisation activists and the movement of the squares, 
horizontalism has become the dominant strand of today’s radical left.2 
Responding to the twentieth-century failures of state-led political change, 
horizontalist movements instead advocate changing the world by changing 
social relations from below.3 They draw upon a long tradition of theory and 
practice in anarchism, council communism, libertarian communism and 
autonomism, in order to – in the words of one proponent – ‘change the world 
without taking power’.4 At the heart of these movements lies a rejection of the 
state and other formal institutions, and a privileging of society as the space 
from which radical change will emerge. Horizontalism rejects the project of 
hegemony as intrinsically domineering, putting forth an affi nity-based politics 
in its stead.5 Rather than advocating an appeal to or takeover of the vertical 
power of the state, horizontalism argues for freely associating individuals to 
come together, create their own autonomous communities and govern their 
own lives. In broad terms, we can summarise these ideas in terms of four 
major commitments:
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1. A rejection of all forms of domination
2. An adherence to direct democracy and/or consensus decision-making6
3. A commitment to prefi gurative politics
4. An emphasis on direct action
Embedded within this set of commitments is a series of problems that 
constrain and limit their potential in the struggle against global capitalism.
Horizontalism’s focus on domination in all its forms is perhaps its signal 
contribution.7 Moving beyond the old left’s traditional focus on the state and 
capital, it emphasises the various ways in which other types of domination 
continue to structure society (racial, patriarchal, sexual, ableist, and so on). It 
is a signifi cant advance that many of today’s radical left have adopted these 
ideas and centred their practice upon the complete removal of all forms of 
oppression – a commitment that we believe any serious leftist politics must 
adopt. Yet the means by which horizontalist movements attempt to overcome 
domination and oppression often end up being bound by the limits of folk 
politics. In seeking the direct and unmediated cancellation of social relations 
of domination, these movements either tend to ignore the more subtle forms 
of domination that persist, or else fail to construct persistent political struc-
tures able to maintain the new social relations in the long term.
The commitment to avoiding all forms of domination is closely tied to a 
critique of representation – both conceptual and political. In practice, this 
has led to a rejection of the more hierarchical structures that characterise 
representative politics.8 Having experienced the history of corrupt trade 
unions and rapidly eroded liberal democracies, representation is seen as inev-
itably leading to self-serving and dominant elites. These structures are to be 
replaced by direct forms of democracy that privilege immediacy over media-
tion, invoking a more personal sense of politics.9 The idea here is that a ‘face-
to-face democracy’ is presumably more natural and authentic, and less prone 
to the emergence of hierarchies.10 Political decisions are to be made not by 
representatives, but instead by individuals representing themselves in 
person.11 Direct democracy ends up being taken as a basic value, under-
pinned by the folk-political intuition that what is immediate is better than 
what is mediated. Rather than majority rule, parliamentary procedure, or 
dictates from a central committee, it is consensus that is often the major aim 
of discussions.12 Debate and governance should therefore be maximally 
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inclusive, and the process of deliberation itself, as opposed to just its outcomes, 
is something to be valued.13 Participatory democracy is understandably a 
major attraction for many people, particularly in light of the empty, ritualistic 
gestures of contemporary representative democracies.14 Many participants 
speak of the feelings of empowerment they derive from participating in 
consensus decision-making processes.15 Maximal inclusivity and consensus 
are therefore valorised, and the importance of tactics and process is placed 
above strategic objectives.
Direct democracy, consensus and inclusivity all form part of horizontalism’s 
commitments to prefi gurative politics, which aims to create in the here-and-
now the world they would like to see. Prefi gurative politics is a longstanding 
tradition on the left, from the anarchism of Kropotkin and Bakunin onwards, 
but it has only recently come to characterise the leading edges of left-wing 
politics. The earlier promise that, after the revolution, hierarchies and 
exclusions would evaporate was little consolation to the women and people of 
colour whose concerns were ignored by yet another white male leader. Rather 
than wait for a purported revolution, prefi gurative politics attempts to instantiate 
a new world immediately – again relying on an implicit sense that immediacy 
is inherently superior to more mediated approaches. At its best, prefi gurative 
politics attempts to embody utopian impulses in bringing the future into 
concrete existence today.16 Yet at its worst, an insistence on prefi guration 
becomes a dogmatic assertion that the means must match the ends, 
accompanied by ignorance of the structural forces set against it.17
If the aim is to create the world we want in the here-and-now, and if 
recourse to mediating institutions is forbidden (or at least disavowed), then 
the appropriate form of practice has to be direct action. This is a form of 
practice that encompasses a wide range of possible tactics, ranging from 
theatrical protests in the vein of the Situationists, to wildcat strikes, to 
blockading ports, to burning down luxury housing developments. In these 
practices we can again see hints of folk politics – the privileging of the direct, 
the immediate and the intuitive. To be sure, direct action can sometimes be 
more effective and useful than protests – such as pouring concrete to destroy 
anti-homeless spikes, or using slow-down methods in workplace struggles.18 
Yet, as we will see, direct action often remains insuffi cient to secure long-
standing change, and in isolation, is typically only a temporary impediment 
to the powers of state and capital.
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Direct democracy, prefi gurative politics and direct action are not, we 
hasten to add, intrinsically fl awed.19 Rather than being denounced in them-
selves, their utility needs to be judged relative to particular historical situations 
and particular strategic objectives – in terms of their ability to exert real power 
to create genuine lasting transformation. The reality of complex, globalised 
capitalism is that small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable 
actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic 
system. As we suggest in the second half of this book, the tactical repertoire of 
horizontalism can have some use, but only when coupled with other more 
mediated forms of political organisation and action. Following this broad 
overview of horizontalism’s theoretical commitments and the general issues 
associated with them, we can now turn to two important sequences in twenty-
fi rst-century politics to highlight both the practical possibilities and the strong 
folk-political limits built into these models. In what follows, we examine two 
of the strongest cases for horizontalism: the Occupy movement emerging after 
the 2008 fi nancial crisis and the Argentinean experience in the wake of the 
country’s 2001 default. In each case, we can see both the real successes and 
the palpable limits of these approaches.
Occupy
The most signifi cant recent embodiment of horizontalist principles occurred 
in the ‘movement of the squares’. While occupations do not require horizon-
talist governance (indeed, the precursors to the tactic originally came from 
the military),20 the vast majority of post-2008 occupations have been organ-
ised along such lines. This wave of occupations of public spaces spread 
rapidly to over 950 cities worldwide in 2011, each infl ected with local politi-
cal, economic, cultural and class concerns. Here we want to examine the 
failure of the Occupy movement in the Western world, in particular because 
it highlights the defi ciencies of folk-political thinking in the core capitalist 
countries.21 Notably, this failure occurred despite the vast range of approaches 
subsumed under the name of Occupy. In the United States, for example, 
from Occupy Wall Street to Occupy Oakland, this movement ranged from 
the dogmatically non-violent to the openly antagonistic, between an often 
confused liberalism and a militant libertarian communism.22 Adding to this 
regional variation was the mixed ideological make-up of the participants, 
which spanned the political spectrum and included reformist liberals, 
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anti-capitalists, insurrectionist anarchists, anti-state communists and union 
activists, along with a smattering of anti–Federal Reserve libertarians. In 
addition to this diversity, there was widespread resistance to the articulation 
of political demands, making the unity of the movement even more diffi cult 
to discern.
It is relatively easy to see why so many were motivated to join the move-
ment. The horizontalist nature of Occupy gave people a means to express 
themselves in the face of societies that barely registered their voices.23 
Particularly in America, the structure of electoral democracy around two 
large parties has meant the window of political discourse has become incred-
ibly narrow. The assortment of slogans and causes associated with Occupy 
testifi es to an explosion of suppressed anger and a proliferation of political 
demands that otherwise went unheard. Even among those who did not 
directly participate in the occupations, Occupy provided a platform for the 
excluded in websites such as the ‘We are the 99 Percent’ Tumblr, with a 
chorus of voices protesting against economic immiseration and social exclu-
sion.24 Beyond any direct political result, the opportunity for the frustrations 
of the excluded to be publicly aired was inspiring and empowering for many.
Occupy also worked to disrupt the ordinary lives of both participants and 
observers, and allowed people to participate together in a shared political 
project. In the words of one observer, ‘the practice of autonomy provides a 
lesson in one’s own power’.25 In places such as Oakland, activists frequently 
pushed towards more radical politics than the usual mediating organisations 
(such as non-profi ts) would have allowed. Occupy functioned, like many 
protest movements, as a way to radicalise those who were involved, especially 
when they were faced with disproportionately brutal police responses. 
Occupations were purported to prefi gure a new world; but even if that new 
world has yet to emerge, the movements certainly showed participants what 
was possible with political solidarity.26
Beyond these internal benefi ts, occupied spaces functioned as bases for 
actions against the political system (as in protest camps against the G8).27 The 
majority of these actions consisted of protest marches and rallies, with the 
spaces also operating as physical locations for collective decision-making. In 
relation to external actions, occupied spaces also worked as headquarters for 
skills training – for example, carrying out acts of civil disobedience, dealing 
with police repression or providing information on legal rights.28 In a general 
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sense, occupations worked as the most obvious real-world manifestation of 
the infrastructure for the overall movement. The occupations were also 
(though not always) a place for supporting the most marginal sections of soci-
ety, particularly the homeless.29 Perhaps most importantly, the occupations 
provided an insistent focal point for media attention – particularly the 
Zuccotti Park occupation in New York – and brought many otherwise side-
lined issues to the attention of the government and the wider public.30 At least 
for a limited time, Occupy was able to draw signifi cant mainstream press and 
television news attention to issues of economic justice – a real achievement 
in a heavily neoliberalised media environment.
But despite these successes, there are important ways in which the occupa-
tions failed. Numerous commentators from within the movement have 
already noted a number of these, including the ways in which Occupy’s rhet-
oric of inclusivity hid a series of exclusions based on race, gender, income 
and free time.31 Folk-political constraints were contained in the practices and 
ideas of the movement, and it was these tendencies that ultimately left it 
incapable of expanding spatially, consolidating temporally or universalising 
itself. To be sure, some of the movements that made up Occupy had no 
intention of scaling up, persisting in time or universalising themselves. Many 
(though not all) horizontalist thinkers place an emphasis on the particular 
dynamism of relatively short-lived, spontaneous politics, holding that ‘relative 
permanence is not necessarily a virtue’.32 But whether intended or not, the 
movement’s tendency in practice to prioritise spatial, temporal and concep-
tual immediacy weakened it collectively, leaving it unable to persist long 
enough to have a chance of seriously pursuing its basic objectives.
Drawing upon horizontalist principles, the Occupy movement was char-
acterised chiefl y by its adherence to direct democracy. While direct democ-
racy can exist in a variety of different forms – from workers’ councils to Swiss-
style canton democracy – under Occupy it took the general assembly as the 
dominant organisational form.33 In an era of declining democratic effective-
ness, a new way of doing democracy was one of the most common aspirations 
articulated by participants in these protests.34 Still, when fetishised as an end 
in itself, direct democracy inexorably imposes signifi cant constraints. In the 
fi rst place, the level of effort and involvement in politics that direct democracy 
demands leads to problems of sustainability. The participatory economics 
(Parecon) project, for instance, envisions direct democracy at every level of 
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society; but this vision for a postcapitalist world translates into endlessly 
ramifying staff meetings over every detail of life – hardly the inspiring stuff of 
utopian visions.35 Under Occupy, many general assemblies devolved into 
similar situations in which even the most mundane of issues had to be pains-
takingly addressed by a collective.36 The acrimonious debates over drummers 
making too much noise in the Zuccotti Park occupation are just one particu-
larly farcical example of this. The more general point is that direct democracy 
requires a signifi cant amount of participation and effort – in other words, it 
entails increasing amounts of work. During brief moments of revolutionary 
enthusiasm, this extra work can become inconsequential; yet after the return 
to normality it is simply added to the ordinary pressures of everyday life.37 The 
extra work of direct democracy is problematic especially because of the 
constitutive exclusions it entails – particularly for those who are unable to 
attend physically, those who do not feel comfortable in large groups and 
those who lack public speaking skills (with all the gendered and racialised 
biases inherent to these factors).38 As the Occupy movement went on, the 
general assemblies simply collapsed, often under the weight of exhaustion 
and boredom. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the problem of 
democracy today is not that people want a say over every single aspect of their 
lives. The real issue of democratic defi cit is that the most signifi cant decisions 
of society are out of the hands of the average person.39 Direct democracy 
responds to this problem, but attempts to solve it by making democracy an 
immediate and bodily experience that rejects mediation. Similar preferences 
for immediacy in democracy also hold back its spatial scalability. To put it 
simply, direct democracy requires small communities. It is notable that the 
hundreds of thousands in Tahrir Square in Egypt did not have a general 
assembly, and that even at Occupy Wall Street, the general assembly consisted 
of only a small proportion of the total number of participants.40 The very 
mechanisms and ideals of direct democracy (face-to-face discussion) make it 
diffi cult for it to exist beyond small communities, and make it virtually impos-
sible to respond to problems of national, regional and global democracy. The 
spatial constraints of direct democracy also overlook the regressive aspects of 
small communities. These ‘intimate’ communities are often home to the 
most virulent forms of xenophobia, homophobia, racism, pernicious gossip, 
and all other varieties of backward thinking. Small communities of the kind 
required by direct democracy are not a suitable goal for a modern left 
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movement. Moreover, participative democracy might well be constructed 
without them, particularly using the communications technologies available 
today.
Another folk-political constraint emerged with the emphasis on consensus 
as a basic goal of the process. The aim of consensus is to reach a decision that 
is acceptable to everyone, again reliant upon spatial immediacy. As anarchist 
David Graeber notes, ‘It is much easier, in a face-to-face community, to fi gure 
out what most members of that community want to do, than to fi gure out how 
to convince those who do not to go along with it.’41 Yet what works well on 
one scale (the face-to-face community) is much more diffi cult to make work 
on larger ones. Perhaps inevitably in the case of a relatively diffuse movement 
such as Occupy, consensus decision-making led to a lowest-common-
denominator set of demands, where they emerged at all. There was also 
much rhetoric glorifying the absence of determinate demands as somehow 
radical. These arguments from within the movement identifi ed the making 
of demands as alienating and divisive, as potentially reducing the role of the 
movement by appealing to outside powers – such as the state – and hence 
liable to lead towards the co-optation of the movement.42 As critics of such 
views have argued, however, the divisive nature of demands is also a positive: 
while putting some participants off, they may equally mobilise those 
committed to achieving the demand in question. Moreover, they work to 
clarify the real political differences contained in the movement – differences 
often elided in practice, even where they might prove to be insurmountable.43
Further problems with Occupy emerged with its nominal rejection of any 
forms of organisational verticality. Most notably, this led to problems emerg-
ing in the relations between the movement and other similarly minded 
groups. Whereas the movement of the squares in Egypt and Tunisia built 
strong connections with existing labour movements, the Western world’s 
Occupy movement largely rejected such associations.44 This led to three 
tendencies. The fi rst was a frequently paralysing decisional structure. When 
actions were taken by Occupy, they often came from a sub-group acting on 
their own, rather than from the general assembly making a consensus deci-
sion.45 Actions, in other words, did not come from horizontalism. Second, 
evidence shows that hierarchical organisations are crucial in defending move-
ments against the state. In Occupy, the maintenance of the occupied space 
against police repression was the result, not of horizontalism, but of vertical 
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institutions that mobilised their members to support the occupation.46 
Similarly, in Egypt, football supporters and religious organisations were 
central to the defence of Tahrir Square against the violence of the state and 
reactionaries.47 Finally, the rejection of verticality in all its forms meant a key 
mechanism for spatially and temporally expanding the movement was aban-
doned. Links to labour, social justice, and even political parties would have 
provided an infrastructure for Occupy to move beyond folk-political param-
eters. Organised workers, for instance, were crucial in Egypt for turning the 
general protest into a near general strike, shutting down the country as a 
result and providing the fi nal blow to the Mubarak regime.48 Links to political 
parties have also helped occupations in Iceland, Greece and Spain produce 
much broader successes. In the end, despite the clear desire to spread 
Occupy’s ideas – and the real success in garnering public attention – the 
moves necessary to transform the social fabric were never taken.
More fundamentally, though, Occupy constrained itself by enforcing a 
rigidly prefi gurative politics. The basic prefi gurative gesture is to embody the 
future world immediately – to change our ways of relating to each other in 
order to live the postcapitalist future in the present. The role of occupations 
is a classic example of this: they often self-consciously aim to enact the space 
of a non-capitalist world through mutual aid, rejections of hierarchy and 
rigorous direct democracy. Yet these spaces are understood and built as 
explicitly temporary – not spaces for sustained change or the working-out of 
concrete alternatives, let alone ambitious competitors to global capitalism. 
Instead they are short-term spaces containing the transitory experiences of an 
immediate community.49 A pamphlet from a precursor to the Occupy move-
ment makes this particularly clear:
[Students who insisted on no demands] saw the point of occupation as the 
creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrange-
ment that sketched the contours of a new society. We side with this anti-
reformist position. While we know these free zones will be partial and tran-
sitory, the tensions they expose between the real and the possible can push 
the struggle in a more radical direction.50
The acknowledgement that the occupation will be temporary is here 
combined with a naive belief that maybe this time it will spark a radical 
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change. Prefi gurative spaces face a continuous struggle against dissolution for 
good reasons. First, they require a variety of logistical supports, including 
housing, food, sanitation, healthcare, defence and legal advice. Most of this 
does not come from within the prefi gurative community, but instead relies 
upon existing capitalist networks.51 The social reproduction of encampments 
is diffi cult even under the most favourable conditions, and even established 
utopian communities (often religious in nature) typically fi nd it impossible to 
remain independent and self-sustaining.52 Second, prefi gurative spaces are 
often subject to state and corporate repression – and if they are not, it is typi-
cally because they pose no threat to the existing social order. The Zapatistas, 
for example, are permitted to exist in relative freedom simply because the 
state and capital do not see them as a threat.53 The moment a prefi gurative 
space becomes a threat is the moment when repression weighs down on it, 
and when its fetishisation of horizontalism becomes a serious liability. 
Prefi gurative politics, at its worst, therefore ignores the forces aligned against 
the creation and expansion of a new world. The simple positing and practis-
ing of a new world is insuffi cient to overcome these forces, as the repression 
faced by Occupy demonstrated.54
The immediate question that must be asked of any prefi gurative politics is 
therefore: How can it be expanded and scaled up?55 Even granting the prob-
lematic assumption that most people would want to live as the Occupy camps 
did, what efforts might be possible to physically and socially expand these 
spaces? When theorists face up to this question, vague hand-waving usually 
ensues: moments will purportedly ‘resonate’ with each other; small everyday 
actions will somehow make a qualitative shift to ‘crack open’ society; riots and 
blockades will ‘spread and multiply’; experiences will ‘contaminate’ partici-
pants and expand; pockets of prefi gurative resistance will just ‘spontaneously 
erupt’.56 In any case, the diffi cult task of traversing from the particular to the 
universal, from the local to the global, from the temporary to the permanent, 
is elided by wishful thinking. The strategic imperatives to expand, extend and 
universalise are left unfulfi lled.
If Occupy was unsuccessful in expanding prefi gurative spaces beyond the 
margins of society, these protest camps could still be useful as launching pads 
for direct action. Indeed, one of the most notable achievements of the Occupy 
movement was to establish a social and physical infrastructure that could act 
as a foundation for direct actions. In countries like Greece and Spain, debt 
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strikes have been organised and picket lines formed for workers without the 
right to strike. Other Occupy movements supported squatters, provided food 
for the homeless, set up pirate media, mobilised to prevent evictions, protested 
against government cuts and provided humanitarian relief after natural disas-
ters. But the infl uence of Occupy should not be overstated. For instance, 
many of the successful eviction and foreclosure movements have been exten-
sions of pre-existing work done by movements such as the black activist–led 
Take Back the Land.57 More broadly, the problem is that direct actions gener-
ally act on surface effects, patching the wounds of capitalism but leaving the 
underlying problems and structures intact. Foreclosures continue apace, 
consumer debt rises to new heights, workers are thrown out into the streets, 
and the homeless population surges. In the case of Occupy, what became 
apparent was the limits of a propaganda of the deed.58 While direct action can 
have real successes, it remains localised and temporary, and in this it remains 
folk-political. Direct action can be effective in mitigating the worst excesses 
of capitalism, but it can never address the diffi cult problem of attacking a 
globally dispersed abstraction, often focusing instead on intuitive targets.59 
The project of an expansive left – a left aiming to transform capitalism in 
fundamental ways – remains absent.
The image of Occupy that emerges here is of a movement that was 
wedded to certain assumptions about the benefi ts of local spaces, small 
communities, direct democracy and temporary autonomy at the margins of 
society. In turn, these beliefs rendered the movement incapable of 
expanding spatially, establishing sustainable transformations and 
universalising itself. The Occupy movements achieved real victories in 
creating solidarity, giving a voice to disenchanted and marginalised people, 
and raising public awareness. But they nevertheless remained an archipelago 
of prefi gurative islands, surrounded by an implacably hostile capitalist 
environment. The proximate cause for the movement’s failure was state 
repression, in the form of police clad in riot gear ruthlessly clearing the 
occupied spaces across the United States. But the structural causes were 
built into the assumptions and practices of the movement. Without the 
central focus of the occupied spaces, the movement dispersed and 
fragmented. Ultimately, the organisational form of these movements could 
not overcome the problems of scalability and construct a form of persistent 
power capable of effectively resisting the inevitable reaction from the state. 
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What may work quite well on one scale – perhaps up to a hundred people 
– becomes increasingly diffi cult to operate effectively when extended 
beyond that.60 If a truly ambitious left politics is to take on global actors – 
the neoliberal capitalist system and its governing institutions, leading 
governments and their armies and police forces, and an entire planet’s 
worth of corporations and fi nancial entities – then operating beyond the 
merely local is essential. While there is certainly much to learn from these 
movements, it is our contention that, on their own, they will remain 
ineffective at bringing about large-scale change.
Argentina
If any case from recent history offers hope for the suffi ciency of horizontal-
ism, it would appear to be Argentina, which achieved a large-scale national 
turn towards horizontalism and expansive worker control over factories. Yet a 
brief look at the Argentinean experience actually reveals new dimensions to 
the limits of folk-political approaches. In Argentina’s circumstances, the 
immediate imperative for new social organisations came from the collapse of 
the national economy. Struck by a massive recession in 1998, the economy 
buckled and lost over a quarter of its GDP by 2002. Tensions reached a peak 
in December 2001, with government restrictions and fi nancial chaos provok-
ing the people into mass protests. The result was the collapse of the govern-
ment and an eventual default on their debts. With the government both 
unable and unwilling to help its population, people were forced to fi nd new 
ways to provide for themselves.
In the wake of these challenges, many of the Argentinean people took it 
upon themselves to self-organise and create new political and economic 
structures. To a signifi cant degree, these responses were organised around 
explicitly horizontalist principles.61 As with Occupy, there are a variety of 
benefi ts that can be identifi ed in the horizontalist organising of Argentina. 
Perhaps most importantly, these movements were able to disrupt the 
common-sense norms of neoliberal society, moving beyond market individu-
alism and negative solidarity. The fostering of bonds between individuals 
helped to overcome the antagonism that most protests and strikes often face 
from other parts of society. Like Occupy, but on a broader scale, Argentina’s 
horizontal movements were also quickly able to provide the means for social 
reproduction under crisis conditions.62
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But while these experiments with horizontalism brought about a number 
of achievements, its experience also revealed several further problems. 
Principal among these is the limitations faced by neighbourhood assemblies 
as an organisational form. Modelled on horizontalist principles, the neigh-
bourhood assemblies arose in response to the immediate needs and possibili-
ties opened up by the crisis. Like the general assembly of Occupy, they 
enabled people to have a newfound voice. But even when joined together in 
inter-neighbourhood assemblies, they never approached the point of replac-
ing the state, or of being able to present themselves as a viable alternative. 
The functions of the state – welfare, healthcare, redistribution, education, 
and so on – were not about to be replaced by the horizontalist movement, 
even at its height of participation. It thus remained a localised response to the 
crisis. Further limitations surfaced as these assemblies could only function by 
either rejecting organised – which is to say, collective – interests, or incorpo-
rating them, and thus being overwhelmed.63 Collective interests were incapa-
ble of being brought into the decision-making process without breaking it, 
since they often took control over discussion and debate. Problematically, 
these assemblies operated best on an individualistic basis.
Other organisational experiments in Argentina involved the spread of 
worker-controlled factories. In the wake of the economic crisis, some shuttered 
businesses were taken over and maintained by their employees. These factories 
helped to keep workers in jobs, and there is some evidence that they provided 
better pay for their workers. Unfortunately, despite the attention given to them, 
the total number of people involved was relatively small: in the most optimistic 
estimates, there were around 250 factories incorporating just under 10,000 
workers.64 With a labour force of over 18 million, this means far less than 0.1 
per cent of the economy was participating in worker-controlled factories. Not 
only were these factories a minor part of the overall economy, but they also 
remained necessarily embedded within capitalist social relations. The dream 
of escape is just that: a dream. Tied to the imperative to create a profi t, worker-
controlled businesses can be just as oppressive and environmentally damaging 
as any large-scale business, but without the effi ciencies of scale. Such problems 
are widespread across the worker-cooperative experience, having arisen not 
only in Argentina, but also in the Zapatista model and across America.65
Beyond these organisational limits, the key problem with Argentina as a 
model for postcapitalism is that it was simply a salve for the problems of 
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capitalism, not an alternative to it. As the economy started to improve, 
participation in the neighbourhood assemblies and alternative economies 
drastically declined.66 The post-crisis horizontalist movements in Argentina 
were built as an emergency response to the collapse of the existing order, not 
as a competitor to a relatively well-functioning order. Indeed, the more 
widespread problem with contemporary horizontalism is that it often sees 
emergency situations – in the wake of a hurricane, earthquake or economic 
meltdown – as representative of a better world.67 It is a struggle, to say the 
least, to see how post-disaster conditions are an improvement for the vast 
majority of the world’s population. A politics that fi nds its best expression in 
the breakdown of social and economic order is not an alternative, so much as 
a knee-jerk survival instinct. Equally problematic is the tendency for 
horizontalists to fi nd political potential in the mundane ways we organise 
horizontally in everyday life – friends gathering together, parties, festivals, 
and so on.68 The problem is that such modes of organising are not scalable 
beyond a small community – and, more to the point, are not useful for certain 
political goals. As the Argentinean example shows, these modes of organising 
can be valuable for basic neighbourhood survival and for creating a sense of 
solidarity between people. But horizontalism struggles to compete against 
more organised interests, to sustain itself once a base level of normality 
returns, and to achieve long-term and large-scale political goals such as 
providing universal healthcare, high-level education and social security. 
These approaches remain useful in exceptional circumstances and for a 
small range of goals, but they will neither revolutionise society nor genuinely 
threaten global capitalism.
In the case of both neighbourhood assemblies and worker-controlled 
factories, we see that the primary organisational models of horizontalism are 
insuffi cient. They are often reactive tactics that fail to compete in the antago-
nistic environment of global capitalism. On a theoretical level, and in the 
actual experiences of Occupy and Argentina, the limits of horizontalism have 
repeatedly been made clear over the past decade. While recognising the 
important capacity of horizontalist tactics to provide small-scale support to 
communities and to temporarily disrupt certain exploitative practices, the 
commitment to fetishised versions of consensus, direct action, and particularly 
prefi gurative politics, constrains the possibilities of expanding and overtaking 
existing social systems.
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LOCALISM
Less politically radical than horizontalism, though no less ubiquitous, is local-
ism. As an ideology, localism extends far beyond the left, infl ecting the politics 
of pro-capitalists, anti-capitalists, radicals and mainstream culture alike, as a 
new kind of political common sense. Shared between all of these is a belief 
that the abstraction and sheer scale of the modern world is at the root of our 
present political, ecological and economic problems, and that the solution 
therefore lies in adopting a ‘small is beautiful’ approach to the world.69 Small-
scale actions, local economies, immediate communities, face-to-face interac-
tion – all of these responses characterise the localist worldview. In a time when 
most of the political strategies and tactics developed in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries appear blunted and ineffectual, localism has a seductive 
logic to it. In all its diverse variants, from centre-right communitarianism70 to 
ethical consumerism,71 developmental microloans, and contemporary anar-
chist practice,72 the promise it offers to do something concrete, enabling politi-
cal action with immediately noticeable effects, is empowering on an individ-
ual level. But this sense of empowerment can be misleading. The problem 
with localism is that, in attempting to reduce large-scale systemic problems to 
the more manageable sphere of the local community, it effectively denies the 
systemically interconnected nature of today’s world. Problems such as global 
exploitation, planetary climate change, rising surplus populations, and the 
repeated crises of capitalism are abstract in appearance, complex in structure, 
and non-localised. Though they touch upon every locality, they are never fully 
manifested in any particular region. Fundamentally, these are systemic and 
abstract problems, requiring systemic and abstract responses.
While much of the populist localism on the right can easily be dismissed 
as regressive macho fantasy (for example, secessionist libertarianism), sinister 
ideological cover for austerity economics (the UK Conservative Party’s ‘Big 
Society’) or downright racist (the nationalist or fascist blaming of immigrants 
for structural economic problems), the localism of the left has been less thor-
oughly scrutinised. Though undoubtedly well-meaning, both the radical and 
mainstream left partake in localist politics and economics to their detriment. 
In what follows we will critically examine two of the more popular variants 
– local food and economic localism – which in very different areas exemplify 
the problematic dynamics of localism in general.
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Local food
With a cachet that reaches far beyond typical political circles, localism has 
recently come to dominate discussions of the production, distribution and 
consumption of food. Most infl uential here have been the interlinked 
movements known as ‘slow food’ and ‘locavorism’ (eating locally). The slow-
food movement began in the mid 1980s in Italy, partly as a protest against the 
ever-increasing encroachment of fast-food chains. Slow food, as its name 
suggests, stands for everything McDonald’s does not: local food, traditional 
recipes, slow eating and highly skilled production.73 It is food that offers the 
most visceral embodiment of the benefi ts of the slow lifestyle, overcoming the 
vicissitudes of fast-paced capitalism by returning to an older culture of savouring 
meals and traditional production techniques.74 But even its proponents admit 
that there are diffi culties involved in living the slow-food lifestyle: ‘Few of us 
have the time, money, energy or discipline to be a model Slow Foodie.’75
Without an assessment of how our lives are structured by social, political 
and economic pressures that make it easier to eat pre-prepared food than 
embrace the slow-food lifestyle, the end result is a variant of ethical 
consumerism with a hedonistic twist. It is patently correct that taking one’s 
time to enjoy a well-prepared meal can be a pleasurable experience. Paying 
attention to a meal recasts the experience from one of pure utility into a 
more social and aesthetic experience. But there are structural reasons why 
we do not choose to do this often – reasons that are not the result of any 
individual moral failing. The structure of work, for example, is a primary 
reason why many of us are unable to enjoy slow eating, or meals prepared 
according to the ideals of the slow-food movement. Slow food might not 
always require money, but it always requires time. For those who have to 
work multiple jobs to support their families, time is at a premium. What is 
more, the gender politics of slow food are problematic, given that we live in 
patriarchal societies where the majority of food preparation is still presumed 
to be the task of wives and mothers.76 While ‘fast’ food or pre-prepared 
meals might be unhealthy, their popularity enables the freeing up of women 
to live lives that are less marked by the everyday drudgery of feeding their 
families.77 As innocent as it may at fi rst seem, the slow-food movement, like 
many other forms of ethical consumerism, fails to think in large-scale terms 
about how its ideas might work within the broader context of rapacious 
capitalism.
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Closely linked to the slow-food movement are locavorism and the ‘100-mile 
diet’ – a food politics that emphasises eating locally. Locavorism holds that 
locally sourced food is not only more likely to be healthy, but is also a vital 
component of our efforts to reduce carbon outputs, and hence our impact on 
the environment. It situates itself, therefore, as a response to a global issue. 
Moreover, locavorism claims to be one way to overcome the alienation of our 
relationship to food under capitalism. By eating food grown or produced in our 
locality, so this logic runs, we will be able to get back in touch with the 
production of our food and reclaim it from the dead hands of a capitalism that 
has run amok.78 Compared to the slow-food movement, locavorism positions 
itself more explicitly, and politically, against globalisation. In doing so, it appeals 
to a constellation of folk-political ideas relating to the primacy of the local as a 
horizon of political action, and of the virtues of the local over the global, the 
immediate over the mediated, the simple over the complex.
These ideas condense often complex environmental issues into questions 
of individual ethics. One of the most serious (and intrinsically collective) 
crises of our times is thus effectively privatised. This personalised environ-
mental ethic is exemplifi ed in localist food politics – in particular, in the 
moral (and price) premium placed on locally grown food. Here we fi nd 
ecologically motivated arguments (for reducing energy expenditure by reduc-
ing the distances over which food is transported, for example) combined with 
class differentiation (in the form of marketing designed to promote identifi ca-
tion with organic food). Similarly, complex problems are condensed into 
poorly formulated shorthand. For instance, the idea of ‘food miles’ – identify-
ing the distances that food products have travelled, so as to reduce carbon 
outputs – appears a reasonable one. The problem is that it is all too often 
taken to be suffi cient on its own as a guide to ethical action. As a 2005 report 
by the UK’s Department of Agriculture and Food found, while the environ-
mental impacts of transporting food were indeed considerable, a single indi-
cator based on total food miles was inadequate as a measure of sustainabil-
ity.79 Most notably, the food-miles metric emphasises an aspect of food 
production that contributes a relatively small amount to overall carbon 
outputs. When it is simply assumed that ‘small is beautiful’, we can all too 
easily ignore the fact that the energy costs associated with producing food 
locally may well exceed the total costs of transporting it from a more suitable 
climate.80 Even for the purpose of assessing the contribution of food 
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transportation, food miles are a poor metric. Air freight, for example, makes 
up a relatively small portion of total food miles, but it makes up a dispropor-
tionately large slice of total food-related CO2 emissions.
81 The energy 
consumption involved in putting food on our plates is important, but it 
cannot be captured in anything as simple as food miles, or in the idea that 
‘local is best’. Indeed, highly ineffi cient local food production techniques 
may be more costly than effi ciently grown globally sourced foodstuffs. The 
bigger question here relates to the priorities we place on the types of food we 
produce, how that production is controlled, who consumes that food and at 
what cost.
Localist food politics fl attens the complexities it is trying to resolve into a 
simplistic binary: global, bad; local, good. What is needed, by contrast, are 
less simplistic ways of looking at complex problems – an analysis that takes 
into account the global food system as a whole, rather than intuitive short-
hand formulae such as food miles, or ‘organic’ versus non-‘organic’ foods. It is 
likely that the ideal method of global food production will be some complex 
mixture of local initiatives, industrial farming practices, and global systems of 
distribution. It is equally likely that an analysis capable of calculating the best 
means to grow and distribute food lies outside the grasp of any individual 
consumer, requiring signifi cant technical knowledge, collective effort and 
global coordination. None of this is well served by a culture that simply values 
the local.
Local economics
Localism, in all its forms, represents an attempt to abjure the problems and 
politics of scale involved in large systems such as the global economy, politics 
and the environment. Our problems are increasingly systemic and global, 
and they require an equally systemic response. Action must always to some 
extent occur at the local level – and indeed some localist ideas, such as resil-
iency, can be useful. But localism-as-ideology goes much further, rejecting 
the systemic analysis that might guide and coordinate instances of local 
action to confront, oppose and potentially supplant oppressive instances of 
global power or looming planetary threats. Nowhere is the inability of localist 
solutions to challenge complex global problems more apparent than in move-
ments towards localised business, banking and economics. Since the 2008 
fi nancial crisis, there have been a number of trends on the broad left towards 
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reforming our economic and monetary systems. While much of this work is 
useful, one prominent strand has focused on transforming economic systems 
through localisation. The problem with big business, so the thinking goes, is 
not so much its inherently exploitative nature but the scale of the enterprises 
involved. Smaller businesses and banks would supposedly be more refl ective 
of the local community’s needs.
One popular recent campaign, the ‘move your money’ movement, centred 
on the idea that, if it was the scale of banks that was to blame for the fi nancial 
crisis, then customers ought to move their funds collectively to smaller, more 
virtuous institutions. Ethical-consumerist campaigns like this offer a 
semblance of effective action – they provide a meaningful narrative about the 
problems of the system and indicate the simple and pain-free action neces-
sary to resolve it. As with most folk-political actions, it has all the appearances 
and feeling of having done something. Major banks are positioned as the bad 
guys, and individuals can supposedly produce signifi cant effects just by 
moving their money into smaller, local banks and credit unions. What this 
model neglects is the complex abstractions of the modern banking system. 
Money circulates as immediately global and immediately interconnected 
with every other market. In any situation where a small bank or credit union 
has more deposits than it is able to profi tably reinvest within its locality, it will 
inevitably seek investments within the broader fi nancial system. Indeed, a 
reading of the accounts of smaller banks in the United States reveals that they 
partake in and contribute to the same global fi nancial markets as everyone 
else – investing in Treasury, mortgage or corporate bonds while often partici-
pating in socially destructive lending practices that equal those of the major 
banks.82 While clearly a reformist measure, ‘move your money’ might at least 
have been expected to lead to some transformations in the composition of the 
US banking system. However, as of September 2013, total assets held by the 
six largest US banks had increased by 37 per cent since the fi nancial crisis. 
Indeed, by every available measure the big US banks are larger today than at 
the beginning of the crisis, holding 67 per cent of all assets in the US banking 
system.83 And while legislative efforts across the world have made some 
attempts to impose restraints on the activities that led to the crisis (requiring 
increased capital asset ratios and regular ‘stress tests’ designed to avoid further 
bailouts), risky lending continues,84 and risky derivatives holdings remain at 
staggeringly high levels.85
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If localist efforts to constrain the size of the largest banks appear doomed 
to failure, what are we to make of alternative campaigns to replicate some of 
the local banks that make up much of the continental European banking 
system? For example, 70 per cent of the German banking sector consists of 
community or smaller-sized banks.86 German and Swiss community banks, 
their proponents argue, pool risks collectively and are mutually owned, with 
high degrees of autonomy to take advantage of local knowledge, and as a 
result generally remained profi table throughout the fi nancial crisis.87 It is also 
argued that local banks of this type are more likely to lend to small businesses 
than the larger institutions that are more common in the United States and 
the UK. There are advantages to some local banking models, but their stabil-
ity is often overstated. For example, despite being highly localised and under 
community control, Spain’s community banks (the cajas) took signifi cant 
risks in the property market and other speculative investments in the 2000s, 
necessitating thoroughgoing fi nancial restructuring after the 2008 crisis. 
Though under the alleged control of boards with community representation, 
investment decisions were effectively taken with little proper oversight. 
Localisation here meant the politicisation of allegedly disinterested govern-
ance boards, turning some cajas into platforms for local government invest-
ment in speculative property schemes, as a culture of cronyism took hold.88 
With the worst of Spain’s banking crisis centred on the local banks, restruc-
turing meant the merging of local banks to form larger institutions. Even in 
Germany, often touted as having the best localised banking system in the 
world, there were issues with some regional banks. The Landesbanken, for 
example, were heavily invested in structured credit products that performed 
particularly poorly during the fi nancial crisis.89 The lesson to draw from this 
is that there is nothing inherent in smaller institutions that will enable them 
to resist the worst excesses of contemporary fi nance – and that the idea of 
cleanly separating the local from the global is today impossible. Political 
capture, the need to seek profi table investments beyond those available in the 
local area, and simply the high returns of more risky investments, are all 
factors leading local banks to participate in the broader fi nancial system. 
Even mutual ownership is no guarantee of fi nancial probity, as demonstrated 
by the recent travails of the UK’s Co-operative Bank, which almost collapsed 
entirely following an ill-conceived takeover of a building society in 2009.90 
The systemic problems of the fi nancial system can only be properly dealt 
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with by taking apart fi nancial power, whether by means of broad regulation 
(as was briefl y achieved under postwar Keynesianism) or more revolutionary 
methods. Fetishising the small and the local seems to be a means of simply 
ignoring the more signifi cant ways in which the system could be transformed 
for the better.
RESISTANCE IS FUTILE
A folk-political sentiment has manifested itself in both radical horizontalist 
and more moderate localist movements, yet similar intuitions underpin a 
broad range of the contemporary left. Across these groups, a series of judg-
ments are widely accepted: small is beautiful, the local is ethical, simpler is 
better, permanence is oppressive, progress is over. These kinds of ideas are 
favoured over any counter-hegemonic project – a politics that might contend 
with capitalist power at the largest scales. At its heart, much of contemporary 
folk politics therefore expresses a ‘deep pessimism: it assumes we can’t make 
large-scale, collective social change’.91 This defeatist attitude runs amok on 
the left – and perhaps with good reason, considering the continued failures of 
the past thirty years.
For centre-left political parties, nostalgia for a lost past is the best that can 
be hoped for. The most radical content to be found here consists of dreams of 
social democracy and the so-called ‘golden age’ of capitalism.92 Yet the very 
conditions which once made social democracy possible no longer exist. The 
capitalist ‘golden age’ was predicated on the production paradigm of the 
orderly factory environment, where (white, male) workers received security 
and a basic standard of living in return for a lifetime of stultifying boredom 
and social repression. Such a system depended on an international hierarchy 
of empires, colonies and an underdeveloped periphery; a national hierarchy 
of racism and sexism; and a rigid family hierarchy of female subjugation. 
Moreover, social democracy relied on a particular balance of forces between 
classes (and a willingness for compromise between them), and even this was 
only possible in the wake of the unprecedented destruction caused by the 
Great Depression and World War II, and in the face of external threats from 
communism and fascism. For all the nostalgia many may feel, this regime is 
both undesirable and impossible to recover. But the more pertinent point is 
that even if we could go back to social democracy, we should not. We can do 
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better, and the social democratic adherence to jobs and growth means it will 
always err on the side of capitalism and at the expense of the people. Rather 
than modelling our future on a nostalgic past, we should aim to create a 
future for ourselves. The move beyond the constraints of the present will not 
be achieved through a return to a more humanised capitalism reconstructed 
from a misty-eyed recollection of the past.
While nostalgia for a lost past is clearly not an adequate response, neither 
is today’s widespread glorifi cation of resistance. Resistance always means 
resistance against another active force. In other words, it is a defensive and 
reactive gesture, rather than an active movement. We do not resist a new 
world into being; we resist in the name of an old world. The contemporary 
emphasis on resistance therefore belies a defensive stance towards the 
encroachments of expansionary capitalism. Trade unions, for instance, posi-
tion themselves as resisting neoliberalism with demands to ‘save our health 
system’ or ‘stop austerity’; but these demands simply reveal a conservative 
disposition at the heart of the movement. According to these demands, the 
best one can hope for is small impediments in the face of a predatory capital-
ism. We can only struggle to keep what we already have, as limited and crisis-
ridden as it may be. Even in left-leaning Latin America this trend is visible, 
with the most signifi cant successes largely around efforts to impede transna-
tional corporations, particularly in relation to mining.93 In many circles resist-
ance has come to be glorifi ed, obscuring the conservative nature of such a 
stance behind a veil of radical rhetoric. Resistance is seen to be all that is 
possible, while constructive projects are nothing but a dream.94 While it can 
be important in some circumstances, in the task of building a new world, 
resistance is futile.
Other movements argue for an approach of withdrawal, whereby individu-
als exit from existing social institutions. Horizontalism is closely linked to this 
approach, being predicated on the rejection of existing institutions and the 
creation of autonomous forms of community. Indeed, the recent history of 
activism has tended towards such approaches.95 Often these approaches are 
explicitly opposed to complex societies, meaning that the ultimate implied 
destination is some form of communitarianism or anarcho-primitivism.96 
Others suggest making oneself invisible in order to evade detection and 
repression by the state.97 At the extreme, some argue for what amounts to a 
left-wing survivalism: civilisation is in catastrophe,98 and we should therefore 
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become invisible,99 retreat to small communes,100 and learn how to grow 
food, hunt, heal and defend ourselves.101 If left at the level of survivalism, 
these kinds of positions, while perhaps unappealing, would at least have some 
consistency. They at least have the virtue of being open about their implica-
tions. However, arguments for withdrawal and exit too easily confuse the idea 
of a social logic separate from capitalism with a social logic that is antagonis-
tic to capitalism – or, in an even stronger claim, that poses a threat to capital-
ist logics.102 Yet capitalism has been and will continue to be compatible with 
a wide range of different practices and autonomous spaces. The Spanish town 
of Marinaleda offers a useful example of this. Over the course of three 
decades, this small community (pop. 2,700) has built up a ‘communist utopia’ 
that has expropriated land, built its own housing and co-operatives, kept 
living costs low, and provided work for everyone. Yet the limits of such an 
approach for transforming capitalism are quickly revealed: housing materials 
are provided by the regional government, agricultural subsidies come from 
the European Union, jobs are sustained by the rejection of labour-saving 
devices, income still comes from selling goods on wider capitalist markets, 
and businesses remain subjected to capitalist competition and the global 
fi nancial crisis.103 Marinaleda is but one example of how the project of with-
drawing, escaping or exiting from capitalism is still contained within a folk-
political horizon, within which defending small bunkers of autonomy against 
the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for. Yet we would 
argue not only that more can be hoped for (and achieved), but that, in the 
absence of broad and systematic contention, even those small pockets of 
resistance are likely to be swiftly eradicated.
ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL?
Horizontalism, localism, nostalgia, resistance and withdrawal all embody, to 
greater or lesser degrees, folk-political intuitions about how to do politics. 
And they all remain inadequate for the task of transforming capitalism. But 
this is not to say that they should be rejected in their entirety. As the rest of the 
book will make clear, there are a number of important elements to retain 
from these approaches. Rather than being intrinsically malign, folk politics is 
simply partial, temporary and insuffi cient. Various horizontalist approaches, 
for example, have raised important questions about power, domination and 
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hierarchy – but they have not developed adequate responses to them. Folk 
politics as a tendency retreats from the diffi culty of these problems by attempt-
ing to dispel them from the outset. Yet, in a world where dominance, power, 
hierarchy and exploitation are imposed upon us, such questions must be 
confronted directly, rather than retreated from.104 Likewise, in a banal sense, 
all politics is local. We act upon things in our immediate vicinity in order to 
change larger political structures. We cannot simply reject the local. But 
today’s folk-political tendencies invoke a stronger sense of local politics: a 
retreat into the local in order to avoid the problems of a complex and abstract 
society; an assumption about the authenticity and naturalness of the local; 
and a neglect of scalable and sustainable practices that might go beyond the 
local. While all politics begins within the local, folk politics remains local.
In the end, a signifi cant part of the problem with folk politics lies less in 
the particular tactics and practices it tends to adhere to than in the overarch-
ing strategic vision into which it is placed. Protests, marches, occupations, 
sit-ins and blockades all have their place: none of these tactics in themselves 
are fundamentally folk-political. But when they are marshalled by a strategic 
vision that sees temporary and small-scale changes as the horizon of success, 
or when they are extrapolated beyond the particular conditions that made 
them effective, they are inevitably going to be bound up within folk-political 
thinking. If the tactic of occupation, for example, is employed in order to 
create exemplars and temporary spaces of non-capitalist social relations, it 
will inevitably fail to achieve substantial change. If, on the other hand, it is 
understood as a mechanism to produce solidarity networks and mobilise 
them for further action, then it may still have use within broader counter-
hegemonic strategies. But this sort of strategic refl ection about the virtues and 
limits of any particular action is what is absent from too much of the left 
today. The numerous protests and marches and occupations typically operate 
without any sense of strategy, simply acting as dispersed and independent 
blips of resistance. There is far too little thought given to how to combine 
these various actions, and how they might function together to collectively 
build a better world. Instead we are left with actions that sometimes succeed 
but which rarely have an overarching eye to how this contributes to medium- 
and long-term goals.105 In the next chapter, we look at how the right undertook 
such strategic refl ection and orchestrated a situation in which neoliberalism 
became the dominant common sense of our time.
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Chapter 3
Why Are They Winning?
The Making of Neoliberal Hegemony
We are all Keynesians now.
Milton Friedman
If our era is dominated by one hegemonic ideology, it is that of neoliberalism. 
It is widely assumed that the most effective away to produce and distribute 
goods and services is by allowing instrumentally rational individuals to 
exchange via the market. State regulations and national industries are, by 
contrast, seen as distortions and ineffi ciencies holding back the productive 
dynamics inherent to free markets. Today, this vision of how economies 
should operate is what both its critics and proponents take as a baseline. 
Neoliberalism sets the agenda for what is realistic, necessary and possible. 
While the economic crisis of 2008 has upset the blind belief in neoliberalism, 
it nevertheless remains an entrenched part of our worldview – so much so 
that it is diffi cult even for its critics to picture coherent alternatives. Yet this 
ideology of neoliberalism did not emerge fully formed from the minds of 
Milton Friedman or Friedrich Hayek, or even the Chicago School, and its 
global hegemony did not arise inevitably from capitalism’s logic.
In its origins, neoliberalism was a fringe theory. Its adherents found it diffi cult 
to gain employment, were often untenured, and were mocked by the Keynesian 
mainstream.1 Neoliberalism was far from being the world-dominating ideology 
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it would eventually become. The question this chapter will focus on is: How did 
a small band of neoliberals manage to reshape the world so radically? 
Neoliberalism was never a given, never a necessary endpoint of capitalist 
accumulation. Rather, it was a political project from the beginning, and a 
massively successful one in the end. It succeeded by skilfully constructing an 
ideology and the infrastructure to support it, and by operating in a non–folk-
political manner. This chapter aims to show that neoliberalism functioned as an 
expansive universal ideology. From humble beginnings, the universalising logic 
of neoliberalism made it capable of spreading across the world, infi ltrating the 
media, the academy, the policy world, education, labour practices, and the 
affects, feelings and identities of everyday people. This chapter therefore focuses 
primarily on how neoliberal hegemony was constructed, rather than on the 
specifi c content of neoliberalism. What is of greatest interest is how it was able 
to transform the ideological and material fabric of global society.
What standard histories of neoliberalism often neglect is the ways in which 
the main components of this ideological architecture were systematically and 
painstakingly set in place in the decades prior to the 1970s.2 It is in this prehis-
tory of the neoliberal era that we can discern an alternative mode of political 
action – one that evades the limits of folk politics. This is not to say that this 
prehistory provides a model for any future leftist programme simply to copy; 
rather, it is an instructive case study in how the right was able to move beyond 
folk politics and create a new hegemony. The history of neoliberalism has 
been one of contingencies, struggle, concentrated action, patience and 
grand-scale strategic thinking. It has been a fl exible idea, actualised in various 
ways according to the specifi c circumstances it encountered: from Germany 
in the 1940s, Chile in the 1970s and the UK in the 1980s, to post-Hussein 
Iraq in the 2000s. This versatility has made neoliberalism a sometimes contra-
dictory project, but one that succeeds precisely by transforming these contra-
dictions into productive tensions.3
These tensions and variations have led some to believe that the term 
‘neoliberalism’ is meaningless and should be relegated to polemics. But the 
term has some validity, even if it is often used loosely. In popular perception, 
neoliberalism is usually identifi ed with a glorifi cation of free markets – a 
position that also entails a commitment to free trade, private property rights and 
the free movement of capital. Defi ning neoliberalism as the veneration of free 
markets is problematic, however, because many ostensibly neoliberal states do 
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not adhere to free-market policies. Others have argued that neoliberalism is 
predicated upon instilling competition wherever possible.4 This makes sense of 
the drive towards privatisation, but it fails to explain the debates within 
neoliberalism about whether competition is an ultimate good or not.5 Some 
take into account these tensions within neoliberalism and recognise it as the 
political, rather than economic, project of a particular class.6 There is certainly 
some truth to this claim, but, taken at face value, it cannot explain why 
neoliberal ideology was rejected for so long by the capitalist classes that 
purportedly benefi t from it.
Our view is that, contrary to its popular presentation, neoliberalism differs 
from classical liberalism in ascribing a signifi cant role to the state.7 A major 
task of neoliberalism has therefore been to take control of the state and repur-
pose it.8 Whereas classical liberalism advocated respect for a naturalised 
sphere supposedly beyond state control (the natural laws of man and the 
market), neoliberals understand that markets are not ‘natural’.9 Markets do not 
spontaneously emerge as the state backs away, but must instead be consciously 
constructed, sometimes from the ground up.10 For instance, there is no natu-
ral market for the commons (water, fresh air, land), or for healthcare, or for 
education.11 These and other markets must be built through an elaborate array 
of material, technical and legal constructs. Carbon markets required years to 
be built;12 volatility markets exist in large part as a function of abstract fi nancial 
models;13 and even the most basic markets require intricate design.14 Under 
neoliberalism, the state therefore takes on a signifi cant role in creating ‘natu-
ral’ markets. The state also has an important role in sustaining these markets 
– neoliberalism demands that the state defend property rights, enforce 
contracts, impose anti-trust laws, repress social dissent and maintain price 
stability at all costs. This latter demand, in particular, has greatly expanded in 
the wake of the 2008 crisis into the full-spectrum management of monetary 
issues through central banks. We therefore make a grave mistake if we think 
the neoliberal state is intended simply to step back from markets. The unprec-
edented interventions by central banks into fi nancial markets are symptomatic 
not of the neoliberal state’s collapse, but of its central function: to create and 
sustain markets at all costs.15 Yet it has been an arduous and winding path from 
neoliberalism’s origins to the present, in which its ideas hold sway over those 
injecting trillions of dollars into the market.
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THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE
The origins of neoliberalism are disparate, both geographically and intellec-
tually. Elements of what would become the neoliberal project can be found 
in 1920s Vienna, 1930s Chicago and London, and 1930s and 1940s Germany. 
Throughout these decades, national movements worked on the margins of 
academia to maintain liberal ideas. It was not until 1938 that these independ-
ent movements were to gain their fi rst transnational organisation, resulting 
from the Walter Lippmann Colloquium held in Paris just before the eruption 
of World War II. For the fi rst time, this event brought together the classical 
liberal theorists, the new German ordoliberals, the British LSE liberals, and 
Austrian economists such as Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. It 
focused on the historical ebbing of classical liberalism in the face of rising 
collectivism, and it was here that the fi rst steps were made in consolidating a 
group of new liberal thinkers. Out of this event a new organisation – Centre 
International d’Études pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme – arose with the 
explicit aim of developing and spreading a new liberalism. The outbreak of 
World War II quickly put an end to the ambitious aims of this organisation, 
but the network of people involved would continue to work towards develop-
ing a neoliberalism. The seeds of the global neoliberal infrastructure had 
been planted.
It was an idea of Hayek’s that ultimately mobilised this infrastructure into 
a ‘neoliberal thought collective’ and inaugurated the slow rise of the new 
hegemony.16 Since the Walter Lippmann Colloquium had been buried in 
the onslaught of World War II, the transnational infrastructure of an incipient 
neoliberalism had to be reconstructed. A chance meeting with a Swiss busi-
nessman in 1945 gave Hayek the fi nancial means to put his ideas into action.17 
Thus was born the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS): a closed intellectual network 
that provided the basic ideological infrastructure for neoliberalism to 
ferment.18 It is no exaggeration to say that almost all of the important fi gures 
in the postwar creation of neoliberalism were in attendance at its fi rst meeting 
in 1947, including the Austrian economists, the UK liberals, the Chicago 
School, the German ordoliberals and a French contingent.19
From its beginnings, the MPS was consciously focused on changing 
political common sense and sought to develop a liberal utopia.20 It explicitly 
understood that this intellectual framework would then be actively fi ltered 
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down through think tanks, universities and policy documents, in order to 
institutionalise and eventually monopolise the ideological terrain.21 In a 
letter to those he had invited, Hayek wrote that the purpose of the MPS was
to enlist the support of the best minds in formulating a programme which 
has a chance of gaining general support. Our effort therefore differs from 
any political task in that it must be essentially a long-run effort, concerned 
not so much with what would be immediately practicable, but with the 
beliefs which must gain ascendance if the dangers are to be averted which 
at the moment threaten individual freedom.22
The Society thus made a ‘commitment to a long-run war of position in the 
“battle of ideas” . . . Privatized, strategic, elite deliberation was therefore 
established as the modus operandi.’23 Opening the ten-day event, Hayek diag-
nosed the problem of the new liberals: a lack of alternatives to the existing 
(Keynesian) order. There was no ‘consistent philosophy of the opposition 
groups’ and no ‘real programme’ for change.24 As a result of this diagnosis, 
Hayek defi ned the central goal of the MPS as changing elite opinion in order 
to establish the parameters within which public opinion could then be 
formed. Contrary to a common assumption, capitalists did not initially see 
neoliberalism as being in their interests. A major task of the MPS was there-
fore to educate capitalists as to why they should become neoliberals.25 In 
order to achieve these goals, the vision of effective action was one of operat-
ing on the invisible framework of political common sense that was formed by 
the ideas circulating in elite networks. From its origins, the MPS eschewed 
folk politics by working with a global horizon, by working abstractly (outside 
the parameters of existing possibilities) and by formulating a clear strategic 
conception of the terrain to be occupied – namely, elite opinion – in order to 
change political common sense.
Behind this set of goals there lay a consistent but highly fl exible account of 
what was new about neoliberalism. Divisions arose, in particular, over the 
role of the state in maintaining a competitive order; some argued that inter-
vention was necessary to sustain competition, and others that intervention 
was the source of monopolies and centralisation.26 There were less divisive 
arguments over other particular policy positions, indicating that this was far 
from a homogeneous or unifi ed group. In many ways, the common element 
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was simply the social network itself, with its commitment to building a new 
liberalism.27 Yet this inbuilt plurality allowed neoliberalism to foster and 
mutate as it spread around the world, giving it hegemonic strength in its 
adaptations to the particularity of each space.28 Its fl exibility as an ideology 
allowed it to excel in carrying out its hegemonic function of incorporating 
different groups into an overarching consensus.29
These debates also extended to questions of strategy. Many members and 
fi nanciers of Mont Pelerin were impatient with Hayek’s long-term approach 
and wanted to start producing books and other publications immediately, in 
order to infl uence the public.30 In the midst of Keynesian dominance, stable 
growth and low unemployment, Hayek keenly recognised the unlikelihood 
of changing public opinion. The Society’s strategy was self-consciously long-
term, and Hayek’s view eventually won out within its meetings. Outside these 
meetings, the networks surrounding the MPS began actively to construct an 
extensive transnational infrastructure of ideological diffusion. Hayek had 
been planning since at least the mid 1940s to establish a system of think tanks 
propounding neoliberal ideas, while at the same time working to place 
Society members in government positions (a strategy that eventually produced 
three heads of state and a large number of cabinet ministers).31 It was the 
1950s, in particular, that saw the proliferation of think tanks allied to the 
Society, and the subsequent diffusion of neoliberal ideas into the academic 
and policy worlds.
In the UK, the aims of the MPS were pursued by a network of think tanks 
and other organisations, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs, the Adam 
Smith Institute, the Centre for Policy Studies, and an array of smaller groups. 
Members of the MPS were to enter into US politics, fi rst via think tanks like 
the American Enterprise Institute, and then through more formal positions 
such as Milton Friedman’s role as economic advisor to Barry Goldwater in 
his presidential run. Yet it was in Germany that neoliberalism would fi rst 
achieve both organisational and policy success.
NOT SO TENTATIVE STEPS
In the wake of World War II, the world was primed for signifi cant changes in 
economic ideas. Yet it was Germany that faced a unique set of economic 
diffi culties – both the well-known hyperinfl ation problems of the Weimar 
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Republic and the arduous post–World War II reconstruction effort. While 
most of the world adopted Keynesian policies, Germany took a different path-
way, guided by some of the same neoliberals who had convened at the Walter 
Lippmann Colloquium. Given the utter collapse of the German state, the 
problem facing postwar reconstruction planners was how to reconstitute the 
state – specifi cally, how to produce legitimacy without having a functional 
state infrastructure already in place. The answer was found in the ideas 
propounded by the early ordoliberals: establish a space of economic freedom. 
This in turn generated a web of connections between individuals which 
produced the legitimacy of a nascent postwar German state. Rather than
a legal legitimacy, the state was seen to derive its legitimacy from a well-
functioning economy.32 It was this idea that would provide the grounding for 
neoliberalism’s fi rst policy experiments.
Following World War II, the ordoliberals began to move into government 
positions and implement their ideas, establishing the material and institu-
tional foothold from which to shape economic ideology. The fi rst, and 
perhaps most historically signifi cant position, was the appointment of Ludwig 
Erhard to the directorate of economics in the postwar administrative zone of 
the British and US militaries. With the support of a fellow ordoliberal, 
Wilhelm Röpke, Erhard simultaneously eliminated all existing price and 
wage controls, and drastically cut income and capital taxes. This was a radical 
deregulatory move, and one that compelled the Soviet Union to establish a 
blockade on Berlin and inaugurate the Cold War.33 In the decades that 
followed, ordoliberals would come increasingly to populate signifi cant 
positions in the German Ministry of Economics, with Erhard himself 
becoming Chancellor in 1963. But despite their intentions, the ordoliberals 
lacked a principled distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
government interventions – an ambiguity which facilitated the German 
economy’s transformation into increasingly Keynesian forms. Interventions 
to maintain competition shaded into interventions to provide welfare, and by 
the 1970s Germany had become a standard social democratic state. The 
diffi culties encountered in the policy world did not stop neoliberalism from 
innovating on other terrains, though – in particular, the space of the so-called 
‘second-hand dealers’ in ideas.
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SECOND-HAND DEALERS
Neoliberals had long emphasised the importance of using a variety of venues 
to infl uence elites and construct a new common sense. In the postwar era, 
this approach spanned academia, the media and the policy world. But one of 
the primary innovations for neoliberal consolidation of the ideological sphere 
was the use of think tanks. While they had existed for over a hundred years, 
the extensive use made of them by the MPS was a novelty. It involved devel-
oping policy arguments, building policy solutions and homing in on 
economic culprits. An informal division of labour was established, with some 
think tanks focusing on the large philosophical ideas, targeting the very 
assumptions and rationale of the orthodox Keynesian position – this was the 
task adopted by the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (MIPR) in the 
1970s, for example – while others aimed to produce more immediate public 
policy proposals. These were explicit attempts to unhinge the dominant 
worldview in order to subsequently introduce specifi c policy solutions that 
were grounded upon the neoliberal view.
The fi gure of Antony Fisher was vital in the building of neoliberalism’s 
ideological hegemony.34 One of the founders of the UK’s fi rst neoliberal 
think tank – the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) – Fisher explicitly argued 
that the most diffi cult part of changing ideas lay not in their production, but 
in their diffusion. As a result of this belief, Fisher would be heavily involved 
in establishing conservative think tanks not only in the UK, but also in 
Canada (the Fraser Institute) and the United States (the MIPR). The IEA 
itself was focused on ‘those whom Hayek had called the “second-hand 
dealers” in ideas, the journalists, academics, writers, broadcasters, and 
teachers who dictate the long-term intellectual thinking of the nation’.35 The 
explicit intention was to change the ideological fabric of the British elite, 
infi ltrating and subtly altering the terms of discourse. This also extended 
shrewdly to the mission of the IEA itself, which maintained a deceptive 
position on its own aims, presenting itself as an apolitical organisation 
focusing on research into markets in general.36 In line with this vision of 
ideological takeover, the IEA produced short pamphlets intended to be as 
accessible as possible to a mainstream audience.37 Moreover, these texts were 
written in a somewhat utopian fashion, without regard for whether a policy 
was capable of being implemented at that moment.38 The goal, as always, was 
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the long-term redefi nition of the possible. Over the course of decades, these 
various interventions developed a wide-ranging neoliberal worldview. More 
than just single-issue responses to the fashionable problems of the day, what 
the IEA and its associates had constructed was a systematic and coherent 
economic perspective.39 Think tanks instilled this worldview by educating 
and socialising rising members of political parties. Numerous members of 
what would become Thatcher’s administration passed through the IEA 
during the 1960s and 1970s.40 The outcome of the IEA’s efforts was not only 
to subtly transform the economic discourse in Britain, but also to naturalise 
two particular policies: the necessity of attacking trade union power, and the 
imperative of monetary stability. The former would purportedly let markets 
freely adapt to changing economic circumstances, while the latter would 
provide the basic price stability needed for a healthy capitalist economy.
In the United States, too, think tanks and academic research groups were 
built to push for a broadly neoliberal agenda, the Heritage Foundation and 
the Hoover Institute being two of the most notable.41 The MIPR aimed to 
redefi ne political common sense by writing books on neoliberal economics 
that were intended for a popular audience, some of which eventually sold 
over 500,000 copies. Other books, such as Charles Murray’s Losing Ground, 
laid the foundations for the policy shift which today identifi es welfare depend-
ency rather than poverty itself as the central social problem. Numerous other 
widespread policy ideas, such as zero-tolerance policing and workfare, 
stemmed from the policy factory of the MIPR. Its books succeeded in their 
objective of changing the common sense of the political classes and the 
public. The think tank, as an organisational form, was so integral to neoliber-
alism’s ideological success that the very process of creating think tanks was 
itself institutionalised. The Atlas Economic Research Foundation, founded 
in 1981 by Fisher, declared as its explicit aim ‘to institutionalise this process 
of helping start up new think tanks’. Atlas today boasts of having helped create 
or connect over 400 neoliberal think tanks in more than eighty countries. 
The sheer scale of the neoliberal ideological infrastructure is made fully 
transparent here.
Beyond think tanks, a variety of other mechanisms were used to build up a 
hegemonic discourse. In working to install the Chicago brand of neoliberalism 
as the dominant alternative, Milton Friedman wrote extensive op-eds and 
newspaper columns, and made use of television interviews in a way that was 
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unprecedented for an academic. Businesses funded projects to turn his work 
into popular television shows, taking the media terrain by storm.42 These tech-
nological tools were the essential means he used to diffuse his economic vision 
to policymakers and the public. Newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal, 
Daily Telegraph and Financial Times paralleled this effort, shaping the public’s 
perspective by invoking neoliberal policies at every opportunity.43 Business 
schools and management consultancies also began to adopt and spread neolib-
eral ideas about corporate forms, and the Chicago School became a global 
beacon of neoliberal thought.44 Such institutions were crucial for the spread of 
neoliberal hegemony, since they were often the training grounds of the global 
elite.45 Individuals would come to these neoliberal US schools and then return 
to their own countries with the neoliberal ideology inculcated in them. By the 
1970s, therefore, a full-spectrum infrastructure had developed to promulgate 
neoliberal ideas. Think tanks and utopian proclamations organised long-term 
thinking; public-facing speeches, pamphlets and media efforts framed the 
general outlines of the neoliberal common sense; and politicians and policy 
proposals made tactical interventions into the political terrain.46 Yet, despite 
their increasingly hegemonic potential, a mere decade prior to the arrival in 
offi ce of Thatcher and Reagan, Keynesianism still refl ected the most widely 
accepted approach to organising states and markets. The ideas of this group of 
neoliberal intellectuals were still often seen as senseless throwbacks to the 
failed policies of the pre–Great Depression era. But this would all change by 
the 1980s – a decade that would leave Keynesianism in disarray and enshrine 
neoliberalism as the preeminent model for economic modernisation.
GRASPING THE WHEEL
Having made national inroads, neoliberalism fi rst gained serious interna-
tional prominence in the 1970s, as a response to the combined pressures of 
high unemployment and high infl ation – both of which had originated in oil 
shocks, general commodity price rises, wage increases and the expansion of 
credit. The dominant Keynesian approach to the economy had argued that 
governments should stimulate the economy by putting money into it when 
unemployment was rising, but, when infl ation was rising, take money out of 
the economy, to slow down price rises. In the 1970s, however, both problems 
arose simultaneously – rising infl ation and rising unemployment, or 
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‘stagfl ation’. The traditional Keynesian policy solutions were incapable of 
dealing with this conjunction, thus seemingly dictating a turn to alternative 
theories. It is important to be clear that, at this point, multiple interpretations 
of the economic problem were possible. The production of infl ation through 
wage rigidities and trade union power was not the only possible framing of the 
problem, and neoliberalism was not the only possible solution. Alternative 
interpretations were available, alternative answers possible; in the moment, 
no one knew what the way out would be.47 The neoliberal narrative of the 
crisis, for instance, plays down the role of banking deregulation by UK 
Chancellor Anthony Barber in the early 1970s and the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system. These deregulations sparked a surge in the monetary 
base and a subsequent surge in price infl ation, and then wage infl ation.48 In 
other words, an alternative narrative was possible in which the problem was 
not strong unions, but rather deregulated fi nance.
That the neoliberal story won out is in no small measure because of the 
ideological infrastructure that adherents to its ideas had constructed over 
decades. The neoliberals found themselves well placed, since they had 
routinely argued that infl ation was a necessary outcome of the welfare state’s 
unwillingness to break wage and price rigidities. They had both a diagnosis of 
the problem and a solution. Government offi cials who were uncertain about 
what to do in the face of crisis found a plausible story in neoliberalism.49 It 
was thus the long-term construction of intellectual hegemony by the neolib-
eral thought collective that left them well positioned to leverage their ideas 
into power.50 As Milton Friedman famously put it, ‘Only a crisis – actual or 
perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that 
are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our 
basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive 
and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically 
inevitable.’51 This programme spells out exactly what happened in the 1970s 
crisis. If alternative analyses of the crisis had been accepted, it would have 
entailed a policy response different from that of neoliberalism. Rather than 
attacking the power of labour, for example, politicians could have responded 
by re-regulating credit creation. In other words, neoliberalism was not a 
necessary outcome, but a political construction.52
While Keynesian approaches were eventually able to develop an explana-
tion of stagfl ation, by then it was too late, and the neoliberal approach had 
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taken over academic economics and the policy world. In short, neoliberalism 
had become hegemonic. The decade after 1979 saw Margaret Thatcher 
elected as the British prime minister, Paul Volcker appointed as chairman of 
the Federal Reserve, and Ronald Reagan elected president of the United 
States. The IMF and World Bank, facing identity crises after the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system, were rapidly infi ltrated and converted into 
crucibles of the true neoliberal faith by the 1980s. France undertook a neolib-
eral turn during the Mitterrand administration in the early 1980s, and the 
major economies of Europe became bound by the neoliberal policies embod-
ied in the constitution of the European Union. In the United States and UK, 
a wave of systematic attacks were launched against the power of labour. Piece 
by piece, trade unions were demolished and labour regulations dismantled. 
Capital controls were loosened, fi nance was deregulated, and the welfare 
state began to be scavenged for profi table parts.
Outside Europe and North America, neoliberalism had already been 
forced on Chile and Argentina in the aftermath of military coups in the 
1970s. The developing world debt crisis of the 1980s acted as a key moment 
to break traditional proto-socialist hegemonies and institute a turn to neolib-
eralism across the world.53 Moreover, with the breakdown of the USSR, 
Eastern Europe saw a wave of neoliberalising trends that were spurred on by 
Western economic advisors. It is estimated that these privatising policies in 
former Soviet nations led to a million deaths, proving that privatisation could 
be just as deadly as collectivisation, and that the expansion of neoliberalism 
was a far from bloodless affair.54 Misery, death and dictatorships lay in the 
wake of its advances across the globe. This was a normative regime that had 
forced itself into the everyday psychic and bodily reality of the world’s 
population. By the mid 1990s, with the collapse of the USSR, neoliberalism’s 
extension via IMF structural adjustment policies, its consolidation in the 
UK’s New Labour and Clinton’s US administration, and its ubiquity in the 
academic fi eld of economics, neoliberalism had reached its hegemonic peak. 
The novel conjunctural moment of the 1970s was quickly forgotten by the 
public, and neoliberalism took on the universal and natural qualities that 
Thatcher’s doctrine of ‘there is no alternative’ had espoused. Neoliberalism 
had become a new common sense, accepted by every party in power. It 
mattered little whether the left or right won; neoliberalism had stacked the 
deck.
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THE IMPOSSIBLE BECOMES INEVITABLE
As we have seen, neoliberalism propagated its ideology through a division of 
labour – academics shaping education, think tanks infl uencing policy, and 
popularisers manipulating the media. The inculcation of neoliberalism 
involved a full-spectrum project of constructing a hegemonic worldview. A 
new common sense was built that came to co-opt and eventually dominate 
the terminology of ‘modernity’ and ‘freedom’ – terminology that fi fty years 
ago would have had very different connotations. Today, it is nearly impossible 
to speak these words without immediately invoking the precepts of neoliberal 
capitalism.
We all know today that ‘modernisation’ translates into job cuts, the slashing 
of welfare and the privatisation of government services. To modernise, today, 
simply means to neoliberalise. The term ‘freedom’ has suffered a similar fate, 
reduced to individual freedom, freedom from the state, and the freedom to 
choose between consumer goods. Liberal ideas of individual freedom played 
an important role in the ideological struggle with the USSR, priming the 
population of the Western world to mobilise behind any ideology that 
purported to value individual freedoms. With its emphasis on individual free-
doms, neoliberalism was able to co-opt elements of movements organised 
around ‘libertarianism, identity politics, [and] multiculturalism’.55 Likewise, 
by emphasising freedom from the state, neoliberalism was able to appeal to 
anarcho-capitalists and the movements of desire that exploded in May 1968.56 
Lastly, with the idea of freedom being limited to a freedom of the market, the 
ideology could co-opt consumerist desires. At the level of production, 
neoliberal freedom could also recruit emerging desires among workers for 
fl exible labour – desires that were soon turned against them.57 In struggling 
for and successfully seizing the ideological terrain of modernity and freedom, 
neoliberalism has managed to wind its way inexorably into our very self-
conceptions. In arrogating the meaning of terms such as modernisation and 
freedom, neoliberalism has proved itself to be the single most successful 
hegemonic project of the last fi fty years.
Neoliberalism has thus become ‘the form of our existence – the way in 
which we are led to conduct ourselves, to relate to others and to ourselves’.58 
It is, in other words, not just politicians, business leaders, the media elite and 
academics who have been enrolled into this vision of the world, but also 
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workers, students, migrants – and everyone else. In other words, neoliberal-
ism creates subjects. Paradigmatically, we are constructed as competitive 
subjects – a role that encompasses and surpasses industrial capitalism’s 
productive subject. The imperatives of neoliberalism drive these subjects to 
constant self-improvement in every aspect of their lives. Perpetual education, 
the omnipresent requirement to be employable, and the constant need for 
self-reinvention are all of a piece with this neoliberal subjectivity.59 The 
competitive subject, moreover, straddles the divide between the public and 
the private. One’s personal life is as bound to competition as one’s work life. 
Under these conditions, it is no surprise that anxiety proliferates in contem-
porary societies. Indeed, an entire battery of psychopathologies has been 
exacerbated under neoliberalism: stress, anxiety, depression and attention 
defi cit disorders are increasingly common psychological responses to the 
world around us.60 Crucially, the construction of everyday neoliberalism has 
also been a primary source of political passivity. Even if you do not buy into 
the ideology, its effects nevertheless force you into increasingly precarious 
situations and increasingly entrepreneurial inclinations. We need money to 
survive, so we market ourselves, do multiple jobs, stress and worry about how 
to pay rent, pinch pennies at the grocery store, and turn socialising into 
networking. Given these effects, political mobilisation becomes a dream that 
is perpetually postponed, driven away by the anxieties and pressures of every-
day life.
At the same time, we should recognise that this production of subjectivity 
was not simply an external imposition. Hegemony, in all its forms, operates 
not as an illusion, but as something that builds on the very real desires of the 
population. Neoliberal hegemony has played upon ideas, yearnings and 
drives already existing within society, mobilising and promising to fulfi l those 
that could be aligned with its basic agenda. The worship of individual 
freedom, the value ascribed to hard work, freedom from the rigid work week, 
individual expression through work, the belief in meritocracy, the bitterness 
felt at corrupt politicians, unions and bureaucracies – these beliefs and desires 
pre-exist neoliberalism and fi nd expression in it.61 Bridging the left–right 
divide, many people today are simply angry at what they see as others taking 
advantage of the system. Hatred for the rich tax evader combines easily with 
disgust for the poor welfare cheat; anger at the oppressive employer becomes 
indistinguishable from anger at all politicians. This is linked with the spread 
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of middle-class identities and aspirations – desires for home ownership, self-
reliance and entrepreneurial spirit were fostered and extended into formerly 
working-class social spaces.62 Neoliberal ideology has a grounding in lived 
experience and does not exist simply as an academic puzzle.63 Neoliberalism 
has become parasitical on everyday experience, and any critical analysis that 
misses this is bound to misrecognise the deep roots of neoliberalism in today’s 
society. Over the course of decades, neoliberalism has therefore come to 
shape not only elite opinions and beliefs, but also the normative fabric of 
everyday life itself. The particular interests of neoliberals have become 
universalised, which is to say, hegemonic.64 Neoliberalism constitutes our 
collective common sense, making us its subjects whether we believe in it or 
not.65
A MONT PELERIN OF THE LEFT?
It has often been argued that neoliberalism succeeded (and continues to 
succeed in spite of its failures) because it is supported by a series of overlap-
ping and powerful interests – the transnational elite, the fi nanciers, the major 
stockholders of the largest corporations. While these interests have certainly 
assisted the potency of the neoliberal ideology, such an explanation neverthe-
less leaves certain questions unanswered. If elite support was suffi cient for 
ideological success, and if neoliberalism was clearly benefi cial to elites, there 
would not have been a forty-year delay between the initial formulation of the 
ideas and their implementation. Instead, the embedded liberalism of 
Keynesianism remained ideologically dominant even as it constrained power-
ful interests. In particular, fi nancial interests were sidelined for a long period 
after the 1929 crash and ensuing Great Depression. The power dynamics 
maintaining the Keynesian consensus needed to be taken apart piecemeal. 
Equally, an explanation of neoliberalism’s success that relies solely on its 
compatibility with particular elite interests also leaves unexplained why other 
possible responses to the problems of the 1970s were never implemented. An 
important element of neoliberalism’s eventual ideological success is that 
there was both a crisis and a readily available solution. The crisis (stagfl ation) 
was one that no government knew how to deal with at the time, while the 
solution was the preconceived neoliberal ideas that had been fermenting for 
decades in its ideological ecology. It was not that neoliberals presented a 
9781784780968 Inventing the Future (454i) final pass.indd   65 04/09/2015   14:24:55
66 INVENTING THE FUTURE
better argument for their position (the myth of rational political discourse); 
rather, an institutional infrastructure was constructed to project their ideas 
and establish them as the new common sense of the political elite.
In all of this there are important lessons to be learned, which have led some 
to call for a Mont Pelerin of the left.66 On the broadest level, this history of 
neoliberalism serves to demonstrate that the greatest recent success of the right 
– installing a neoliberal hegemony on a global scale – was accomplished 
through non–folk-political means. This means, in the fi rst place, that the neolib-
erals thought in long-term visions. This was a different temporality from both 
election cycles and the boom-and-bust of individual protests. Instead, what the 
left can learn from is how the MPS patiently set out explicit objectives and 
analysed the terrain of their historical conjunction, all in order to propose 
specifi c and effective means to alter that terrain. It set its sights on long-term 
change, waiting forty years for the crisis of Keynesianism and the emergence of 
Reagan and Thatcher. In taking this approach, the intellectuals of neoliberalism 
thought abstractly in terms of possibilities: what was impossible during their own 
time became possible later, partly through their actions and preparations. 
Secondly, they sought to build a counter-hegemonic project that would overturn 
the consensus around social democracy and Keynesian policies. They took a 
full-spectrum approach to changing hegemonic conditions and built up an 
entire ideological infrastructure that was capable of insinuating itself into every 
political issue and every fi bre of political common sense. It overthrew the 
hegemonic ideas of its time. As Philip Mirowski writes, their strategic genius was
to appreciate that it is not enough to dangle a utopian vision just beyond 
reach as eventual motivation for political action; the cadre that triumphs is 
the side that can simultaneously mount a full set of seemingly unrelated 
political proposals that deal with the short-, medium-, and long-term hori-
zons of action, combining regimes of knowledge and interim outcomes, so 
that the end result is the inexorable movement of the polis ever closer to 
the eventual goal. The shrewd strategy of simultaneously conducting both 
a short game and a long game, superfi cially appearing to the uninformed to 
be in mutual confl ict but united behind the scenes by overarching theoreti-
cal aims, is probably the single most signifi cant explanation of the triumph 
of neoliberal policies during a conjuncture where their opponents had 
come to expect utter refutation.67
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The third major lesson for the left to learn is that the loose collective of 
MPS also thought expansively in spatial terms – aiming to spread the network 
globally, through key nodes. In the think tank, they found an organisational 
form adapted to the task of global intellectual hegemony. They established 
networks between think tanks, politicians, journalists, the media and teachers 
– building a consistency between these disparate groups that did not require 
a unity of purpose or organisational form. This entailed an admirable fl exibil-
ity in their project. While neoliberalism is often denounced as being too 
empirically disparate to make sense as a coherent project, it is in fact the 
willingness to modify its ideas in light of conditions on the ground that has 
made it particularly powerful as an ideology.
The call for a Mont Pelerin of the left should therefore not be taken as an 
argument to simply copy its mode of operation. The argument is rather that 
the left can learn from the long-term vision, the methods of global expansion, 
the pragmatic fl exibility and the counter-hegemonic strategy that united an 
ecology of organisations with a diversity of interests. The demand for a Mont 
Pelerin of the left is ultimately a call to build anew the hegemony of the left.
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Chapter 4
Left Modernity
In the present climate, around the world, almost everything that can be 
proposed as an alternative will appear to be either utopian or trivial. Thus 
our programmatic thinking is paralysed.
Roberto Mangabeira Unger
This chapter marks a turning point. From the negative task of diagnosing the 
strategic limitations of the contemporary left, this chapter begins the positive 
project of elaborating an escape route from our current condition. In the 
following chapters, we argue that the contemporary left should reclaim 
modernity, build a populist and hegemonic force, and mobilise towards a 
post-work future. Folk-political attempts at prefi guration, direct action and 
relentless horizontalism are unlikely to achieve this, partly because they 
misrecognise the nature of their opponent. Capitalism is an aggressively 
expansive universal, from which efforts to segregate a space of autonomy are 
bound to fail.1 Withdrawal, resistance, localism and autonomous spaces 
represent a defensive game against an uncompromising and incessantly 
encroaching capitalism. Moreover, particularisms can easily coexist with 
capitalist universalism. The innumerable cultural and political variants of 
capitalism do little to stifl e the expansion of commodifi cation, the creation of 
proletariats, and the imperative of accumulation. The much-lamented capac-
ity of capitalism to incorporate resistance more often than not simply reveals 
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that particularisms are, in themselves, incapable of competing against a 
universalism.2 Indeed, given neoliberalism’s inherently expansionary nature, 
only an alternative expansionary and inclusive universal of some kind will be 
able to combat and supersede capitalism on a global scale.3 With the dynam-
ics of accumulation at the heart of capital, a non-expansionary capitalism is 
an oxymoron. An ambitious leftist politics therefore cannot be satisfi ed with 
measures to defend localities. It must seek instead to construct a new future-
oriented politics capable of challenging capitalism at the largest scales. It 
must unmask the pseudo-universality of capitalist social relations and recap-
ture the meaning of the future.
This chapter takes a step back from the empirical and historical focus of 
the earlier chapters, and seeks to elaborate a philosophical ground for the 
chapters that follow. We argue that a key element of any future-oriented left 
must be to contest the idea of ‘modernity’. Whereas folk-political approaches 
lack an enticing vision of the future, struggles over modernity have always 
been struggles over what the future should look like: from the communist 
modernism of the early Soviet Union to the scientifi c socialism of postwar 
social democracy, and on to the sleek neoliberal effi ciency of Thatcher and 
Reagan.4 What it means to be modern is not pre-established, but is instead a 
highly ‘contested fi eld’.5 Yet, in the face of capitalism’s success at universalis-
ing itself, this term has been almost fully ceded to the right. ‘Modernisation’ 
has come to signify simply some dread combination of privatisation, height-
ened exploitation, rising inequality and inept managerialism.6 Likewise, 
notions of the future tend to revolve around ideas of ecological apocalypse, 
the dismantling of the welfare state, or corporate-led dystopia, rather than 
anything bearing the mark of utopia or universal emancipation. For many, 
therefore, modernity is simply a cultural expression of capitalism.7 From this 
accepted wisdom, the necessary conclusion follows: only the cancellation of 
modernity can bring about the end of capitalism. The result has been an anti-
modern tendency within numerous social movements from the 1970s 
onward. Yet this mistaken confl ation of modernity with the institutions of 
capitalism overlooks the alternative forms it can take, and the ways in which 
many anti-capitalist struggles rely upon its ideals.8 Modernity presents both a 
narrative for popular mobilisation and a philosophical framework for under-
standing the arc of history. As the term that indexes the direction of society, it 
must be a key discursive battleground for any leftist politics invested in 
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creating a better world.9 This chapter sets out the broad philosophical stakes 
of such a project by examining three factors that would help to elaborate a left 
modernity: an image of historical progress, a universalist horizon and a 
commitment to emancipation.
In discussing ‘modernity’, we face the immediate problem of clarifying 
what it means. It can refer to a chronological period, typically fi ltered through 
European history with a variety of events having been posited as its origin: the 
Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial 
Revolution.10 For others, modernity is defi ned by a distinct set of practices 
and institutions: widespread bureaucratisation, a basic framework of liberal 
democracy, the differentiation of social functions, the colonisation of the 
non-European world, and the expansion of capitalist social relations. Yet 
modernity also refers to a repertoire of conceptual innovations revolving 
around universal ideals of progress, reason, freedom and democracy. This 
chapter emphasises these latter aspects: modernity names a set of concepts 
that have been independently developed in numerous cultures across the 
world, but which took on a particular resonance in Europe. These are the 
elements of modernity that cannot be renounced, and that form the well-
spring from which more popular discourses around modernisation are gener-
ated. The conceptual ideals – such as freedom, democracy and secularism – 
are the source of both capitalist modernity and the struggles against it. Ideas 
associated with modernity animated the work of abolitionists, formed the 
basis of numerous African trade union struggles,11 and continue today in 
‘those thousands of campaigns for wages, land rights, basic health, and secu-
rity, dignity, self-determination, autonomy, and so forth’.12 In broad terms, 
then, whether it is explicitly recognised or not, the political struggles of today 
are struggles within the space of modernity and its ideals. Modernity must be 
contested, not rejected.13
HYPERSTITIONAL PROGRESS
To invoke modernity is ultimately to raise the question of the future. What 
should the future look like? What courses should we set? What does it mean 
to be contemporary? And whose future is it? Since the emergence of the 
term, modernity has been concerned with unravelling a circular or 
retrospective notion of time and introducing a rupture between the present 
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and the past. With this break, the future is projected as being potentially 
different from and better than the past.14 Modernity is tantamount to ‘the 
discovery of the future’ and has therefore found itself intimately linked with 
notions such as ‘progress, advance, development, emancipation, liberation, 
growth, accumulation, Enlightenment, embetterment, [and the] avant-
garde’.15 Suggesting that history can progress through deliberate human 
action, it is the nature of this progress that competing defi nitions of modernity 
have struggled over.16 Historically, the left has found its natural home in 
being oriented towards the future. From early communist visions of 
technological progress, to Soviet space utopias, to the social democratic 
rhetoric of the ‘white heat of technology’, what set the left apart from the right 
was its unambiguous embrace of the future. The future was to be an 
improvement over the present in material, social and political terms. By 
contrast, the forces of the political right were, with a few notable exceptions, 
defi ned by their defence of tradition and their essentially reactionary nature.17
This situation was reversed during the rise of neoliberalism, with politi-
cians like Thatcher commanding the rhetoric of modernisation and the 
future to great effect. Co-opting these terms and mobilising them into a new 
hegemonic common sense, neoliberalism’s vision of modernity has held sway 
ever since. Consequently, discussions of the left in terms of the future now 
seem aberrant, even absurd. With the postmodern moment, the seemingly 
intrinsic links between the future, modernity and emancipation were prized 
apart. Philosophers like Simon Critchley can now confi dently assert that ‘we 
have to resist the idea and ideology of the future, which is always the ultimate 
trump card of capitalist ideas of progress’.18 Such folk-political sentiments 
blindly accept the neoliberal common sense, preferring to shy away from 
grand visions and replace them with a posturing resistance. From the radical 
left’s discomfort with technological modernity to the social democratic left’s 
inability to envision an alternative world, everywhere today the future has 
largely been ceded to the right. A skill that the left once excelled at – building 
enticing visions for a better world – has deteriorated after years of neglect.
If the left is to recover a sense of progress, however, it cannot simply adopt 
the classic images of history headed towards a singular destination. Progress, 
for these approaches, was not only possible, but in fact woven as a necessity 
into the very fabric of history. Human societies were thought to travel along a 
pre-defi ned pathway towards a single outcome modelled after Europe. The 
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nations of Europe were deemed to have developed capitalist modernity inde-
pendently, and their historical experiences of development were considered 
to be both necessary and superior to those of other cultures.19 Such ideas 
dominated traditional European philosophy and continued on in the infl u-
ential modernisation literature of the 1950s and 1960s, with their attempts to 
naturalise capitalism against a Soviet opponent.20 Partly endorsed by both 
early Marxism and later Keynesian and neoliberal capitalisms, a one-size-fi ts-
all model of historical progress positioned non-Western societies as lacking 
and in need of development – a position that served to justify colonial and 
imperial practices.21
From the standpoint of their philosophical critics, these notions of progress 
were disparaged precisely for their belief in preconceived destinations – 
whether in the liberal progression towards capitalist democracy or in the 
Marxist progression towards communism. The complex and often disastrous 
record of the twentieth century demonstrated conclusively that history could 
not be relied upon to follow any predetermined course.22 Regression was as 
likely as progress, genocide as possible as democratisation.23 In other words, 
there was nothing inherent in the nature of history, the development of 
economic systems, or sequences of political struggle that could guarantee any 
particular outcome. From a broadly left perspective, for example, even those 
limited but not insignifi cant political gains that have been achieved – such as 
welfare provision, women’s rights and worker protections – can be rolled 
back. Moreover, even in states where nominally communist governments 
took power, it proved far more diffi cult than expected to transition from a 
capitalist system of production to a fully communist one.24 This series of 
historical experiences fuelled an internal critique of European modernity by 
way of psychoanalysis, critical theory and poststructuralism. For the thinkers 
of postmodernism, modernity came to be associated with a credulous 
naivety.25 In Jean-François Lyotard’s epochal defi nition, postmodernity was 
identifi ed as the era that has grown to be suspicious of the grand metanarra-
tive.26 On this account, postmodernity is a cultural condition of disillusion-
ment with the kinds of grandiose narratives represented by capitalist, liberal 
and communist accounts of progress.
To be sure, these critiques capture something important about the chrono-
logical texture of our time. And yet, the announcement of the end of grand 
narratives has often been viewed by those outside Europe as being absolutely 
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of a piece with modernity.27 Further, with the benefi t of thirty years’ hind-
sight, the broader impact of the cultural condition diagnosed by Lyotard has 
not been the decline of belief in metanarratives per se, but rather a broad 
disenchantment with those offered by the left. The association between 
capitalism and modernisation remains, while properly progressive notions of 
the future have wilted under postmodern critique and been quashed beneath
the social wreckage of neoliberalism. Most signifi cantly, with the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the rise of globalisation, history does appear to have 
a grand narrative.28 Throughout the world, markets, wage labour, commodities 
and productivity-enhancing technologies have all expanded under the 
systemic imperative to accumulate. Capitalism has become the destiny of 
contemporary societies, happily coexisting with national differences and 
paying little heed to clashes between civilisations. But we can draw a 
distinction here between the endpoint (capitalism) and the pathway towards 
it. Indeed, the mutual entanglement of countries means that the European 
pathway (heavily reliant on exploiting colonies and slavery) is barred for 
many of the newly developing countries. While there are broad paradigms of 
development, each country has had to fi nd its own unique way to respond to 
the imperatives of global capitalism. The path of capitalist modernisation is 
therefore instantiated in different cultures, following different trajectories 
and with different rhythms of development.29 Uneven and combined 
development is the order of the day.30 Progress is therefore not bound to a 
single European path, but is instead fi ltered through a variety of political and 
cultural constellations, all directed towards instantiating capitalist relations. 
Today, modernisers simply fi ght over which variant of capitalism to install.
Recuperating the idea of progress under such circumstances means, fi rst 
and foremost, contesting the dogma of this inevitable endpoint. Capitalist 
modernity was never a necessary outcome, but instead a successful project 
driven by various classes and a systemic imperative towards accumulation 
and expansion. Various modernities are possible, and new visions of the 
future are essential for the left. Such images are a necessary supplement to 
any transformative political project. They give a direction to political struggles 
and generate a set of criteria to adjudicate which struggles to support, which 
movements to resist, what to invent, and so on. In the absence of images of 
progress, there can only be reactivity, defensive battles, local resistance and a 
bunker mentality – what we have characterised as folk politics. Visions of the 
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future are therefore indispensable for elaborating a movement against 
capitalism. Contra the earlier thinkers of modernity, there is no necessity to 
progress, nor a singular pathway from which to adjudicate the extent of 
development. Instead, progress must be understood as hyperstitional: as a 
kind of fi ction, but one that aims to transform itself into a truth. Hyperstitions 
operate by catalysing dispersed sentiment into a historical force that brings 
the future into existence. They have the temporal form of ‘will have been’. 
Such hyperstitions of progress form orienting narratives with which to 
navigate forward, rather than being an established or necessary property of 
the world. Progress is a matter of political struggle, following no pre-plotted 
trajectory or natural tendency, and with no guarantee of success. If the 
supplanting of capitalism is impossible from the standpoint of one or even 
many defensive stances, it is because any form of prospective politics must set 
out to construct the new. Pathways of progress must be cut and paved, not 
merely travelled along in some pre-ordained fashion; they are a matter of 
political achievement rather than divine or earthly providence.
SUBVERSIVE UNIVERSALS
Any elaboration of an alternative image of progress must inevitably face up to 
the problem of universalism – the idea that certain values, ideas and goals 
may hold across all cultures.31 Capitalism, as we have argued, is an expan-
sionary universal that weaves itself through multiple cultural fabrics, rework-
ing them as it goes along. Anything less than a competing universal will end 
up being smothered by an all-embracing series of capitalist relations.32 Various 
particularisms – localised, specifi c forms of politics and culture – cohabitate 
with ease in the world of capitalism. The list of possibilities continues to grow 
as capitalism differentiates into Chinese capitalism, American capitalism, 
Brazilian capitalism, Indian capitalism, Nigerian capitalism, and so on. If 
defending a particularism is insuffi cient, it is because history shows us that 
the global space of universalism is a space of confl ict, with each contender 
requiring the relative provincialisation of its competitors.33 If the left is to 
compete with global capitalism, it needs to rethink the project of 
universalism.
But to invoke such an idea is to call forth a number of fundamental 
critiques directed against universalism in recent decades. While a universal 
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politics must move beyond any local struggles, generalising itself at the global 
scale and across cultural variations, it is for these very reasons that it has been 
criticised.34 As a matter of historical record, European modernity was 
inseparable from its ‘dark side’ – a vast network of exploited colonial 
dominions, the genocide of indigenous peoples, the slave trade, and the 
plundering of colonised nations’ resources.35 In this conquest, Europe 
presented itself as embodying the universal way of life. All other peoples were 
simply residual particulars that would inevitably come to be subsumed under 
the European way – even if this required ruthless physical violence and 
cognitive assault to guarantee the outcome. Linked to this was a belief that 
the universal was equivalent to the homogeneous. Differences between 
cultures would therefore be erased in the process of particulars being 
subsumed under the universal, creating a culture modelled in the image of 
European civilisation. This was a universalism indistinguishable from pure 
chauvinism. Throughout this process, Europe dissimulated its own parochial 
position by deploying a series of mechanisms to efface the subjects who made 
these claims – white, heterosexual, property-owning males. Europe and its 
intellectuals abstracted away from their location and identity, presenting their 
claims as grounded in a ‘view from nowhere’.36 This perspective was taken to 
be untarnished by racial, sexual, national or any other particularities, 
providing the basis for both the alleged universality of Europe’s claims and 
the illegitimacy of other perspectives. While Europeans could speak and 
embody the universal, other cultures could only be represented as particular 
and parochial. Universalism has therefore been central to the worst aspects of 
modernity’s history.
Given this heritage, it might seem that the simplest response would be to 
rescind the universal from our conceptual arsenal. But, for all the diffi culties 
with the idea, it nevertheless remains necessary. The problem is partly that 
one cannot simply reject the concept of the universal without generating 
other signifi cant problems. Most notably, giving up on the category leaves us 
with nothing but a series of diverse particulars. There appears no way to build 
meaningful solidarity in the absence of some common factor. The universal 
also operates as a transcendent ideal – never satisfi ed with any particular 
embodiment, and always open to striving for better.37 It contains the 
conceptual impulse to undo its own limits. Rejecting this category also risks 
Orientalising other cultures, transforming them into an exotic Other. If there 
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are only particularisms, and provincial Europe is associated with reason, 
science, progress and freedom, then the unpleasant implication is that 
non-Western cultures must be devoid of these. The old Orientalist divides are 
inadvertently sustained in the name of a misguided anti-universalism. On the 
other hand, one risks licensing all sorts of oppressions as simply the inevitable 
consequence of plural cultural forms. All the problems of cultural relativism 
reappear if there are no criteria to discern which global knowledges, politics 
and practices support a politics of emancipation. Given all of this, it is unsur-
prising to see aspects of universalism pop up throughout history and across 
cultures,38 to see even its critics begrudgingly accept its necessity,39 and to see 
a variety of attempts to revise the category.40
To maintain this necessary conceptual tool, the universal must be identi-
fi ed not with an established set of principles and values, but rather with an 
empty placeholder that is impossible to fi ll defi nitively. Universals emerge 
when a particular comes to occupy this position through hegemonic strug-
gle:41 the particular (‘Europe’) comes to represent itself as the universal 
(‘global’). It is not simply a false universal, though, as there is a mutual 
contamination: the universal becomes embodied in the particular, while the 
particular loses some of its specifi cities in functioning as the universal. Yet 
there can never be a fully achieved universalism, and universals are therefore 
always open to contestation from other universals. This is what we will later 
outline in politico-strategic terms as counter-hegemony – a project aimed at 
subverting an existing universalism in favour of a new order. This leads us to 
our second point – as counter-hegemonic, universals can have a subversive 
and liberating strategic function. On the one hand, a universal makes an 
unconditional demand – everything must be placed under its rule.42 Yet, on 
the other hand, universalism is never an achieved project (even capitalism 
remains incomplete). This tension renders any established hegemonic 
structure open to contestation and enables universals to function as 
insurrectionary vectors against exclusions. For example, the concept of 
universal human rights, problematic as it may be, has been put to use by 
numerous movements, ranging from local housing struggles to international 
justice for war crimes. Its universal and unconditional demand has been 
mobilised in order to highlight those who are left out of its protections and 
rights. Similarly, feminists have criticised certain concepts as exclusionary of 
women and mobilised universal claims against their constraints, as in the use 
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of the universal idea that ‘all humans are equal’. In such cases, the particular 
(‘woman’) becomes a way to prosecute a critique against an existing universal 
(‘humanity’). Meanwhile, the previously established universal (‘humanity’) 
becomes revealed as a particular (‘man’).43 These examples show that univer-
sals can be revitalised by the struggles that both challenge and elucidate 
them. In this regard, ‘to appeal to universalism as a way of asserting the supe-
riority of Western culture is to betray universality, but to appeal to universal-
ism as a way of dismantling the superiority of the West is to realize it’.44 
Universalism, on this account, is the product of politics, not a transcendent 
judge standing above the fray.
We can turn now to one fi nal aspect of universalism, which is its heteroge-
neous nature.45 As capitalism makes clear, universalism does not entail 
homogeneity – it does not necessarily involve converting diverse things into 
the same kind of thing. In fact, the power of capitalism is precisely its versatil-
ity in the face of changing conditions on the ground and its capacity to 
accommodate difference. A similar prospect must also hold for any leftist 
universal – it must be one that integrates difference rather than erasing it. 
What then does all of this mean for the project of modernity? It means that 
any particular image of modernity must be open to co-creation, and further 
transformation and alteration. And in a globalised world where different 
peoples necessarily co-exist, it means building systems to live in common 
despite the plurality of ways of life. Contrary to Eurocentric accounts and 
classic images of universalism, it must recognise the agency of those outside 
Europe, and the necessity of their voices in building truly planetary and 
universal futures. The universal, then, is an empty placeholder that hegemonic 
particulars (specifi c demands, ideals and collectives) come to occupy. It can 
operate as a subversive and emancipatory vector of change with respect to 
established universalisms, and it is heterogeneous and includes differences, 
rather than eliminating them.
SYNTHETIC FREEDOM
While the left has traditionally been associated with ideals of equality (mani-
fested today in the focus on income and wealth inequalities), we believe that 
freedom is an equally essential principle of left modernity. This concept has 
been central to the political battles fought throughout the twentieth century, 
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with the United States routinely posing as ‘the free world’ against a totalitarian 
enemy (in the fi gure of the USSR, and then the increasingly incoherent 
images of ‘Islamofascism’). In these hegemonic battles, capitalism has 
repeatedly asserted its superiority by upholding an idea of negative freedom.46 
This is the freedom of individuals from arbitrary interference by other 
individuals, collectives and institutions (paradigmatically, the state). Negative 
freedom’s insistence on the absence of interference has made it an ideal tool 
to wield against purportedly totalitarian opponents, yet it is a woefully 
emaciated concept of freedom. In practice, it translates into a modicum of 
political freedom from the state (ever less so in an age of digital spying and 
the war on terror) and the economic freedoms to sell our labour power and to 
choose between shiny new consumer goods.47 Under negative freedom, the 
rich and the poor are considered equally free, despite the obvious differences 
in their capacities to act.48 Negative freedom is entirely compatible with mass 
poverty, starvation, homelessness, unemployment and inequality. It is also 
entirely compatible with our desires being manufactured and designed by 
pervasive advertising. Against this limited concept of freedom, we argue for a 
much more substantial version.
Whereas negative freedom is concerned with assuring the formal right to 
avoid interference, ‘synthetic freedom’ recognises that a formal right without 
a material capacity is worthless.49 Under a democracy, for example, we are all 
formally free to run for political leadership. But without the fi nancial and 
social resources to run a campaign, this is a meaningless freedom. Equally, 
we are all formally free to not take a job, but most of us are nevertheless prac-
tically forced into accepting whatever is on offer.50 In either case, various 
options may be theoretically available, but for all practical purposes are off 
the table. This reveals the signifi cance of having the means to realise a formal 
right, and it is this emphasis on the means and capacities to act that is crucial 
for a leftist approach to freedom. As Marx and Engels wrote, ‘it is possible to 
achieve real liberation only in the real world and by real means’.51 Understood 
in this way, freedom and power become intertwined. If power is the basic 
capacity to produce intended effects in someone or something else,52 then an 
increase in our ability to carry out our desires is simultaneously an increase 
in our freedom. The more capacity we have to act, the freer we are. One of 
the biggest indictments of capitalism is that it enables the freedom to act for 
only a vanishingly small few. A primary aim of a postcapitalist world would 
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therefore be to maximise synthetic freedom, or in other words, to enable the 
fl ourishing of all of humanity and the expansion of our collective horizons.53 
Achieving this involves at least three different elements: the provision of the 
basic necessities of life, the expansion of social resources, and the develop-
ment of technological capacities.54 Taken together, these form a synthetic 
freedom that is constructed rather than natural, a collective historical achieve-
ment rather than the result of simply leaving people be. Emancipation is thus 
not about detaching from the world and liberating a free soul, but instead a 
matter of constructing and cultivating the right attachments.
In the fi rst place, synthetic freedom entails the maximal provision of the 
basic resources needed for a meaningful life: things like income, time, health 
and education. Without these resources, most people are left formally but not 
really free. Understood in this way, rising global inequality is revealed as an 
equally massive disparity in freedom. One initial step in resolving this is the 
classic social democratic goal of providing the common goods of society, such 
as healthcare, housing, childcare, education, transport and internet access.55 
The liberal idea in which these basic necessities of life are supposedly 
enhanced by freedom of choice in the market ignores the actual (fi nancial 
and cognitive) burdens involved in making such choices.56 In a world of 
synthetic freedom, high-quality public goods would be provided for us, leav-
ing us to get on with our lives rather than worrying about which healthcare 
provider to go with. Beyond the social democratic imagination, however, lie 
two further essentials of existence: time and money. Free time is the basic 
condition for self-determination and the development of our capacities.57 
Equally, synthetic freedom demands the provision of a basic income to all in 
order for them to be fully free.58 Such a policy not only provides the monetary 
resources for living under capitalism, but also makes possible an increase in 
free time. It provides us with the capacity to choose our lives: we can experi-
ment and build unconventional lives, choosing to foster our cultural, intel-
lectual and physical sensibilities instead of blindly working to survive.59 Time 
and money therefore represent key components of freedom in any substan-
tive sense.
A full image of synthetic freedom must also seek to expand our capacities 
beyond what is currently possible. If it is to avoid the problem of manipulat-
ing people into contentment with the status quo, synthetic freedom must be 
open to whatever people might desire.60 That is to say, freedom cannot simply 
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be equated with making existing options viable, but instead must be open to 
the largest possible set of options. In this, collective resources are essential.61 
Processes of social reasoning, for instance, can enable common understand-
ings of the world, creating a ‘we’ in the process that has much greater powers 
to act than individuals alone.62 Equally, language is effectively cognitive scaf-
folding that enables us to leverage symbolic thought to expand our horizons.63 
The development, deepening and expansion of knowledge enable us to 
imagine and achieve capacities that are otherwise unattainable. As we acquire 
technical knowledge of our built environment and scientifi c knowledge of 
the natural world, and come to understand the fl uid tendencies of the social 
world, we gain greater powers to act. As Louis Althusser put it,
Just as knowledge of the laws of light has never prevented men from seeing 
. . . so knowledge of the laws that govern the development of societies does 
not prevent men from living, or take the place of labour, love and struggle. 
On the contrary: knowledge of the laws of light has produced the glasses 
which have transformed men’s sight, just as knowledge of the laws of social 
development has given rise to endeavours which have transformed and 
enlarged the horizon of human existence.64
The anti-intellectualism that permeates the political right, and increasingly 
infects the critical left, is therefore a retrogression of the worst kind. Healthy 
scepticism is transformed into an abdication of our commitments to expand 
freedom. This retrogression in relation to knowledge also occurs in the fanta-
sies of immediate and unbound freedoms in practice. The voluntaristic 
image that sees mediations, institutions and abstractions as opposed to free-
dom simply confuses the absence of artifi ce with the full expression of free-
dom. Needless to say, this is misguided. Collective action, with its expansion 
of synthetic freedom, is more often than not carried out through complex 
divisions of labour, mediated chains of engagement and abstract institutional 
structures. The social aspect of synthetic freedom is therefore not a return to 
some human desire for face-to-face sociality and simple cooperation, but 
instead a call for collective, complex and mediated self-determination.
Finally, if we are to expand our capacities to act, the development of tech-
nology must play a central role. As has always been the case, ‘technology is 
the source of our options [and] options are the basis of a future that keeps us 
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above the level of pawn’.65 Our level of freedom is highly dependent upon the 
historical conditions of scientifi c and technological development.66 The 
artifi ces that emerge from these fi elds both expand existing capacities for 
action and create entirely new ones in the process. The full development of 
synthetic freedom therefore requires a reconfi guration of the material world 
in accordance with the drive to expand our capacities for action. It demands 
experimentation with collective and technological augmentation, and a 
spirit that refuses to accept any barrier as natural and inevitable.67 Cyborg 
augmentations, artifi cial life, synthetic biology and technologically mediated 
reproduction are all examples of this elaboration.68 The overall aim must 
therefore be picked out as an unrelenting project to unbind the necessities of 
this world and transform them into materials for the further construction of 
freedom.69 Such an image of emancipation can never be satisfi ed with or 
condensed into a static society, but will instead continually strain beyond any 
limitations. Freedom is a synthetic enterprise, not a natural gift.
Underlying this idea of emancipation is a vision of humanity as a 
transformative and constructible hypothesis: one that is built through 
theoretical and practical experimentation and elaboration.70 There is no 
authentic human essence to be realised, no harmonious unity to be returned 
to, no unalienated humanity obscured by false mediations, no organic 
wholeness to be achieved. Alienation is a mode of enablement, and humanity 
is an incomplete vector of transformation. What we are and what we can 
become are open-ended projects to be constructed in the course of time. As 
Sadie Plant puts it,
It’s always been problematic to talk about the liberation of women because 
that presupposes that we know what women are. If both women and men 
have been organised into the forms we currently take, then we don’t want 
to liberate what we are now, if you see what I mean . . . It’s not a question 
of liberation so much as a question of evolution – or engineering. There’s a 
gradual re-engineering of what it can be to be a woman and we don’t yet 
know what it is. We have to fi nd out.71
What must therefore be articulated is a humanism that is not defi ned in 
advance. This is a project of self-realisation, but one without a pre-established 
endpoint.72 It is only through undergoing the process of revision and 
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construction that humanity can come to know itself. This means revising the 
human both theoretically and practically, engaging in new modes of being 
and new forms of sociality as practical ramifi cations of making ‘the human’ 
explicit.73 It is to undertake an interventionist approach to the human that is 
opposed to those humanisms that protect a parochial image of the human at 
all costs.74 These interventions range from individual bodily experimentation 
to collective political mobilisations against restricted images of the human, 
and everything in between.75 It means liberating ourselves from the decrepit 
economic image of humanity that capitalist modernity has installed, and 
inventing a new humanity. Emancipation, under this vision, would therefore 
mean increasing the capacity of humanity to act according to whatever its 
desires might become. And universal emancipation would be the insistent 
and maximal extension of this goal to the entirety of our species. It is in this 
sense that universal emancipation lies at the heart of a modern left.76
We have seen that, without a conception of the future, the left becomes 
bound to a defence of tradition, and to protecting bunkers of resistance. 
What, then, would a left modernity look like? It would be one that offered 
enticing and expansive visions of a better future. It would operate with a 
universal horizon, mobilise a substantial concept of freedom, and make use 
of the most advanced technologies in order to achieve its emancipatory goals. 
Rather than a Eurocentric view of the future, it would rely upon a global set 
of voices articulating and negotiating in practice what a common and plural 
future might be. Whether operating through slave revolts, workers’ struggles, 
anti-colonial uprisings or women’s movements, the critics of sedimented 
universalisms have always been essential agents in modernity’s construction 
of the future; they are the ones who have continually revised, revolted and 
created a ‘universalism from below’.77 Yet to truly enable the liberation of 
futures in the plural, the current global order premised on waged labour and 
capitalist accumulation will need to be transcended fi rst. A left modernity 
will, in other words, require building a postcapitalist and post-work platform 
upon which multiple ways of living could emerge and fl ourish. The next two 
chapters will set out both the necessity and desirability of this particular vision 
of the future.
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Chapter 5
The Future Isn’t Working
It is already contained in the concept of the free labourer, that he is a pauper: 
a virtual pauper.
Karl Marx
We have so far argued that the contemporary left tends towards a folk politics 
that is incapable of turning the tide against global capitalism. In its place, the 
left needs to reclaim the contested legacy of modernity and advance visions for 
a new future. It is imperative, however, that its vision of a new future be 
grounded upon actually existing tendencies. This chapter sets out a conjunc-
tural analysis of contemporary capitalism, viewed through the lens of work. 
On the basis of this analysis, the next chapter will argue for the desirability of 
a future without work. What does it mean to call for the end of work? By 
‘work’, we mean our jobs – or wage labour: the time and effort we sell to 
someone else in return for an income. This is time that is not under our 
control, but under our bosses’, managers’ and employers’ control. A full 
one-third of our adult lives is spent in submission to them. Work can be framed 
in contrast to ‘leisure’, typically associated with the weekend and holidays. But 
leisure should not be confused with idleness, as many of the things we enjoy 
most involve immense amounts of effort. Learning a musical instrument, 
reading literature, socialising with friends and playing sports all involve varying 
degrees of effort – but these are things that we freely choose to do. A post-work 
9781784780968 Inventing the Future (454i) final pass.indd   85 04/09/2015   14:24:55
86 INVENTING THE FUTURE
world is therefore not a world of idleness; rather, it is a world in which people 
are no longer bound to their jobs, but free to create their own lives. Such a 
project draws upon a long line of thinkers – Marxists, Keynesians, feminists, 
black nationalists and anarchists alike – who have rejected the centrality of 
work.1 These thinkers have, each in their own way, sought to liberate humanity 
from the drudgery of work, the dependence on wage labour, and the submission 
of our lives to a boss. They have struggled to open up the ‘realm of freedom’ 
from which humanity can continue its project of emancipation.2
While the broad aims of this project have a long series of precedents, 
recent developments in capitalism give renewed urgency to these issues. 
Rapid automation, expanding surplus populations and the continued imposi-
tion of austerity all heighten the need to rethink work and prepare for the new 
crises of capitalism. Just as the Mont Pelerin Society foreshadowed the crisis 
of Keynesianism and prepared a full-spectrum set of responses, so too should 
the left prepare for the coming crisis of work and surplus populations. While 
the effects of the 2008 crisis continue to reverberate throughout the world, it 
is too late to take advantage of that moment; all around us we can see that 
capital has recovered and consolidated itself in a renewed and sharpened 
form. The left must instead prepare for the next opportunity.3
This chapter explains why a post-work world is an increasingly pressing 
option. The fi rst section outlines the emerging crisis of work – the breakdown 
of stable jobs in developed countries, the rise of unemployment and surplus 
populations, and the collapse of ‘work’ as a disciplinary measure holding 
society together. We then turn to the various symptoms of this crisis as it is 
manifested not only in unemployment fi gures, but also in increased precarity, 
jobless recoveries, growing slums and expanding urban marginality. All 
around us we can see the effects of this shift bubbling up in new social 
confl icts and problems. Finally, we look at the various ways in which capital-
ism’s tendency to produce surplus populations has been managed by the 
state. Today, the crisis of work threatens to overrun these traditional tools of 
control, laying the social conditions for the shift to a post-work world.
VIRTUAL PAUPERS
While work is common to every society, under capitalism it takes on 
historically unique qualities. In pre-capitalist societies, work was necessary, 
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but people had shared access to land, subsistence farming and the necessary 
means of survival. Peasants were poor but self-suffi cient, and survival was not 
dependent on working for someone else. Capitalism changed all this. 
Through the process called primitive accumulation, pre-capitalist workers 
were uprooted from their land and dispossessed of their means of subsist-
ence.4 Peasants struggled against this and continued to survive on the margins 
of the emerging capitalist world,5 and it eventually took violent force and 
harsh new legal systems to impose wage labour on the population. Peasants, 
in other words, had to be made into a proletariat. This new fi gure of the 
proletariat was defi ned by its lack of access to the means of production or 
subsistence, and its requirement for wage labour in order to survive.6 This 
means that the ‘proletariat’ is not just the ‘working class’ nor is it defi ned by 
an income level, profession or culture. Rather, the proletariat is simply that 
group of people who must sell their labour power to live – whether they are 
employed or not.7 And the history of capitalism is the history of the world’s 
population being transformed into proletarian existence through the advanc-
ing dispossession of the peasantry. With the recent integration of post-
communist countries and the rise of China and India, the global proletariat 
has seen a ‘great doubling’, with 1.5 billion more people now reliant upon 
waged work for survival.8 But with the emergence of the proletariat, there also 
comes a new form of unemployment. In fact, unemployment as we under-
stand it today was an invention of capitalism.9 Having been torn away from 
their means of subsistence, for the fi rst time in history a new ‘surplus popula-
tion’ emerges that is unable to fi nd waged work.10 While capitalism may 
exploit the employed working class, as Joan Robinson once wrote, ‘The 
misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of 
not being exploited at all.’11
For the most part, the size of this surplus expands and contracts in tandem 
with economic cycles. All things being equal, as economies grow, workers are 
drawn from the surplus and into waged labour, the unemployment level 
decreases, and the labour market tightens. At a certain point, however, 
economic demand stalls, wages begin to cut into profi tability, or workers 
become too politically bold. For reasons of profi tability, or infl ation,12 or 
simply to regain political power over the working class, workers are laid off.13 
The surplus subsequently expands, held in reserve for the next cycle of 
growth. Yet these cyclical mechanisms only partly explain our current 
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situation, particularly given that wage pressures have been stagnant for 
decades, infl ation has remained stable, and the labour movement has been 
devastated. The cyclical account based on economic demand certainly 
accounts for the depth of the 2008 crisis, but it does not explain longer-term 
changes in the labour market such as the rise in precarity, the emergence of 
jobless recoveries, and the growth of non-capitalist labour markets. To under-
stand the current conjuncture fully, other tendencies therefore need to be 
taken into account. These are the mechanisms that produce a secular trend 
towards a larger and larger surplus population, independently of cyclical 
boom-and-bust patterns.14 It is these that pose the biggest threat to the repro-
duction of capitalist social relations.
Today, the production of surplus populations through technological 
change has increasingly hypnotised the media’s imagination. While this 
attention has been focused on fears of an imminent job apocalypse carried 
out by vast armies of robots,15 technological developments can also make 
older processes more productive without automation (for example, advances 
in agriculture). In either case, productivity enhancements mean that capital-
ism needs less labour to produce the same output. Automation appears as the 
most imminent threat, however, with estimates suggesting that anything from 
47 to 80 per cent of current jobs are likely to be automatable in the next two 
decades.16 But estimates based solely on advances in technology are insuffi -
cient to predict growing unemployment. After all, despite continually rising 
productivity, employment has remained relatively stable throughout the 
history of capitalism. With some painful delays, new jobs have been created 
to replace those that were lost. Yet sanguinity based on past experiences over-
looks the political and contingent basis of this historical record: government 
policies, workers’ movements, the gendered division of the labour force, and 
simultaneous reductions in the work week have all played a role in sustaining 
employment in the past. As a result, additional qualifi cations are necessary to 
understand under what conditions technological change will lead to 
increased unemployment. A fi rst qualifi cation argues that because increased 
productivity lowers production prices, unemployment only increases when 
demand fails to grow enough in response to these lower prices.17 If the 
cheaper prices spark more sales, the company may expand rather than cut 
workers. A similar argument suggests that technological developments often 
create new industries, and that this potentially creates replacement jobs.18 
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Since the introduction of the personal computer, for instance, over 1,500 
new job types have emerged.19 In either of these cases, consumers buy more 
goods (because they are cheaper or new) and others are kept employed. The 
same logic holds for services. The rollout of ATMs, for example, led to fewer 
bank tellers being employed in each branch – but banks responded to the 
cheaper costs by opening more branches and expanding their market share.20 
The result was that the number of bank tellers remained steady (though this 
may be changing today, as banks move their services online).21 In all of these 
cases, the logic is that even if technology eliminates some jobs, demand grows 
suffi ciently to create new jobs. In a second situation, technological change 
reaches such a speed that an increasingly large portion of the population 
becomes unable to keep up with the skills needed.22 In this case, even if new 
demand can be created, there simply are not enough capable workers to take 
up these jobs – the supply of labour falters.23 The speed of technological 
change and diffusion may render entire segments of the population as an 
obsolete surplus. In a third situation, labour-saving technologies can be of 
such general use that they diffuse across the entire economy, dampening the 
overall demand for labour.24 In this circumstance, even if new industries are 
created, they will require increasingly less labour because these technologies 
have a wide range of applicability.25 If any of the above conditions hold, then 
technological change can lead to increased unemployment. As we will see, 
there are good reasons to believe a number of these conditions do hold. But 
while technological unemployment is the most prominent reason today for 
swelling surplus populations, it is not the only one.
Another mechanism that actively changes the size of the surplus is one we 
have already noted: primitive accumulation.26 This is not just an origin story 
of capitalism, but also an ongoing process that involves the transformation of 
pre-capitalist subsistence economies into capitalist economies. Through vari-
ous means, a poor but self-suffi cient peasantry is forced off its land and made 
to rely on wage labour to survive. As have seen, with globalisation this process 
has accelerated and led to a doubling of the proletariat. The supply of rural 
labour that China can draw upon is dwindling, but the integration of Africa 
and South Asia means the worldwide supply of labour continues to increase 
at a rapid pace.27 The outcome of this is a vast new global labour force, 
dependent upon the creation of equally vast numbers of new jobs. Therefore, 
independently of any technological changes in capitalist production, surplus 
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population have increased because of this new labour supply. In addition to 
this, a third mechanism involves the active exclusion of a particular popula-
tion from capitalist wage labour. Both in the past and present, this has 
predominantly involved the exclusion of women and racial minorities from 
the job market.28 While the problems of slavery, racism and sexism are not 
reducible to capitalist imperatives – indeed, they have separate logics of 
domination – these phenomena have also indirectly served capitalist goals.29 
Unfree labour in the form of slavery is well documented as a key element of 
capitalism’s origins (and continues today),30 and the unpaid labour of many 
women and racialised prison populations continues to act as a source of 
hyper-exploitation.31 On a more modest level, unemployment continues to 
be distributed unevenly across distinctions of race, gender and geography 
(witness the devastation of post-industrial cities, for instance). Certain groups 
are more likely to be the last hired during a boom, and the fi rst fi red during a 
recession.32 The vulnerabilities that surplus populations face are therefore 
differentiated between sexes and races; an economic logic of exploitation and 
expulsion intersecting with other logics of oppression. But in all of these 
cases, surplus populations are concentrated within a particular group as a 
result of political, legal and social structures. It is not, in other words, techno-
logical change or primitive accumulation that is responsible for their diffi cul-
ties in fi nding waged labour. But these mechanisms often intersect with each 
other: some people are more likely to be affected by technological change,33 
and the incorporation of new surplus populations usually involves racial 
coding.34 In a myriad of ways, these mechanisms – technological change, 
primitive accumulation and active exclusion – generate an expanding 
number of proletariat outside the formal workforce.
What, then, is the composition of the surplus population today? Broadly, 
we can divide it into four different strata: the capitalist segment, the 
non-capitalist segment, the latent segment and the inactive segment.35 The 
fi rst segment we are all familiar with: the unemployed and underemployed, 
situated within the normal capitalist labour market. This group has access to 
at least some minimal state welfare, is actively seeking a(nother) job, and 
therefore exerts pressure on the wages of the employed. Yet, for most of the 
world, being ‘unemployed’ is a relative luxury.36 In the absence of any social 
safety net, most people must constantly work to survive, and are therefore 
forced into creating new subsistence economies alongside capitalism.37 This 
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is the non-capitalist segment of the surplus population, fi lled with people 
who have been dispossessed of their means of subsistence38 but have few 
social safety nets (either community- or state-based) to allow them to go 
without work for long. These subsistence economies produce goods for the 
market – small trinkets, for example – but they are organised as non-capitalist 
forms of production in that they do not seek to accumulate.39 These types of 
economies increasingly dominate the labour market of the developing world, 
ranging from 30 to 80 per cent of the working population in any given 
country.40 A third latent group exists primarily in pre-capitalist economic 
formations that can be readily mobilised into the capitalist labour market. 
This includes the reservoir of proto-proletarians (including peasants), but this 
group also includes unwaged domestic labourers, as well as salaried 
professionals who are under threat of being returned to the proletariat, often 
through deskilling (for example, medical professionals, lawyers and 
academics).41 The importance of this group is that it forms an additional 
reservoir of labour for capitalism when existing labour markets are tight.42 
Finally, in addition to the other strata, a vast number of people are considered 
economically inactive (including the discouraged, the disabled and 
students).43 Overall, determining the precise size and nature of the global 
surplus population is diffi cult with existing data, and subject to fl uctuations 
as individuals move in and out of categories, but a variety of measures 
converge to suggest it signifi cantly outnumbers the active working class.44
This is the crisis of work that capitalism faces in the coming years and 
decades: a lack of formal or decent jobs for the growing numbers of the prole-
tarian population. In an earlier generation, the identifi cation of surplus 
populations as a problem was an idea that was often derided. During the 
‘golden age’ of capitalism, low unemployment, stable jobs, rising wages and 
rising living standards meant the idea that capitalism produced a surplus 
humanity enjoyed little material support. Yet, while most leftist thinkers 
turned to the economic problems of growth for capitalism, an occluded intel-
lectual tradition has instead emphasised the social reproduction problem of 
surplus populations. It is no surprise that it was often those outside the func-
tioning capitalist order who saw the potential in this surplus class.45 Writing 
from Algiers in the 1970s, Eldridge Cleaver presciently argued that ‘When 
workers become permanently unemployed, displaced by the streamlining of 
production, they revert back to their basic [proletarian] condition’ and that 
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‘the real revolutionary element of our era is the [proletariat]’.46 From the 
capitalist core, Paul Mattick called it ‘the most important of all capitalistic 
contradictions’.47 And more recently, communisation theorists have made 
important contributions to analysing the crisis of wage labour, and Fredric 
Jameson has argued that Capital ‘is not a book about politics, and not even a 
book about labour: it is a book about unemployment’.48 Indeed, it is often 
forgotten that Marx argued that the expulsion of surplus populations was part 
of ‘the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation’.49 In the wake of the 
2008 crisis and continued sluggishness in the labour market, it is no surprise 
that the issue of surplus populations should emerge again. With technological 
change proceeding apace, the already large numbers of surplus humanity 
look set to swell. The very social basis of capitalism as an economic system – 
the relationship between the proletariat and employers, with waged work 
mediating between them – is crumbling.
THE MISERY OF NOT BEING EXPLOITED
As we have seen, very little of the global labour force is employed in formal 
wage labour, and this number has only decreased in the wake of the 2008 
crisis. The most obvious symptoms of this rising surplus population are 
embodied in the long-term changes in unemployment statistics. In the 
immediate postwar era, unemployment as low as 1 to 2 per cent was once 
considered a viable goal of developed economies: during the 1950s and 
1960s, the UK and the United States saw unemployment hover around 2 per 
cent, while Germany even saw unemployment dip below 1 per cent.50 Each 
decade since has seen a ratcheting up of the acceptable level of unemploy-
ment, combined with decreases in employment growth.51 Today, the Federal 
Reserve considers 5.5 per cent to be the optimal long-term unemployment 
rate – more than doubling the postwar levels.52 In the United States the 
percentage of men not working has tripled since the late 1960s, and the 
percentage of women has also increased, despite starting at a much higher 
level.53 The proportion of people employed has dropped precipitously, and 
the overall surplus population has been growing consistently in recent 
decades.54 At a global level, the unemployment rate has continued to rise 
after the 2008 crisis, both in absolute and relative terms.55 The global rate of 
job creation has remained signifi cantly lower, has largely generated part-time 
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jobs, and is forecast to continue its sluggish trend.56 Meanwhile, labour force 
participation rates have been declining globally for decades, and are set to 
continue falling for decades more.57 Yet these statistics are only the tip of the 
iceberg. The crisis of work and the effects of surplus populations are expressed 
not only in these direct measures, but also through a series of more subtle and 
indirect effects.
One of these – increased precarity – has come to exemplify the neoliberal 
labour market in developed economies.58 Relative to the stable and well-
paying careers of earlier generations, today’s jobs typically involve more 
casual working hours, low and stagnant wages, decreasing job protections 
and widespread insecurity.59 This trend towards precarity has a number of 
causes, but one of the primary functions of a surplus population is that it 
enables capitalists to place extra pressure on the lucky few who have found a 
job.60 As the surplus grows and the labour market slackens, more workers seek 
after fewer jobs, and power passes over to the employers. The threat of moving 
a factory, for instance, is only possible with a global labour glut. The result is 
that employers gain strength over workers and the quality of jobs decreases 
(supplementing the quantity measured by unemployment statistics). This is 
exactly what we have seen in the past few decades. Throughout Europe the 
intensity of work, in terms of both speed and demands, has increased.61 The 
shift to just-in-time supply chains has exacerbated the demands of work, 
while new surveillance technologies are being forced upon labourers (in 
some cases, even monitoring them outside of work hours).62 The decline in 
the quality of jobs can also be seen in the cutting of work hours, rather than 
the outright elimination of jobs. We can see this in the small but growing 
number of part-time, fl exible and freelance jobs over the past thirty years.63 
For instance, the relatively low unemployment levels of the UK after the 
2008 crisis are largely a result of more self-employed people living off poverty 
wages.64 In the United States, more than 6.5 million people are forced to 
work part-time despite desiring full-time work.65 This casualisation also 
involves innovations such as crowd-sourced tasks, temporary staffi ng agencies 
and zero-hours contracts, along with the harsh working conditions and lack 
of benefi ts that accompany them. In the UK, for example, it is estimated that 
nearly 5 per cent of the working population is presently on zero-hours 
contracts.66 Surplus populations have also put downward pressure on wages. 
Estimates suggest that every 1 per cent increase in labour market slack is 
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associated with a 1.6 per cent increase in income inequality.67 The stagnation 
of real wages and the declining share of income going to labour are both tied 
to an excess supply of labour,68 and most economists believe automation and 
the globalisation of the proletariat are central reasons why wages have been 
stagnant in recent decades.69 All of these trends have continued since the 
2008 crisis as well, with slow real wage growth across the G20, and outright 
decline in the UK.70 The slow growth of wages leads precarity to also be 
expressed in the anxiety over high levels of consumer debt and low levels of 
personal savings.71 In the United States, for example, a full 34 per cent of full-
time workers live paycheque-to-paycheque, while in the UK, 35 per cent of 
people could not live off their savings for more than a month.72 And at its 
most vicious, precarity is indicated by a rise in depression, anxiety and suicides 
– an ‘excess’ that goes uncounted in traditional economic measures.73 Indeed, 
unemployment is associated with a fi fth of all global suicides, and this has 
only worsened in the wake of the fi nancial crisis.74
In addition to precarity, surplus populations and technological automation 
help to make sense of a recent labour market phenomenon: the emergence 
of ‘jobless recoveries’, in which economic growth returns after a crisis but job 
growth remains anaemic.75 Such recoveries have become standard for the US 
economy,76 and since the 1990s the trend has been towards longer and longer 
jobless recoveries.77 The current crisis is no exception, with more than a 
million full-time jobs yet to return, and forecasts suggesting that US 
unemployment will remain above pre-crisis levels until 2024.78 This is a 
global phenomenon as well, with the world economy creating jobs so slowly 
that the number of jobs will remain signifi cantly below pre-crisis levels for at 
least a decade.79 While their cause is ultimately still a mystery, jobless recov-
eries appear to be closely related to automation.80 In fact, the only occupa-
tions that have experienced jobless recoveries are those that have been under 
threat from automation in recent decades – semi-skilled, routine jobs.81 
Moreover, these job losses have occurred almost entirely during and in the 
wake of recessions.82 In other words, crisis periods are when automatable jobs 
disappear, never to be heard from again. If automation accelerates over the 
coming decades, these problems are likely to intensify – with capital using 
periods of crisis to permanently eliminate such jobs.83 The slow return of jobs 
also expresses itself as a rise in long-term unemployment, whereby entire 
groups of people become increasingly segregated from the normal labour 
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market. Since the most recent crisis, the average length of unemployment 
has doubled and remained stubbornly high.84 These extended periods of 
unemployment suggest that a structural problem is responsible – that is to 
say, a problem that takes longer for unemployed workers to adapt to, such as 
retraining for an entirely new skill set. Workers laid off from an area like retail 
will fi nd it diffi cult to immediately step into a job in growth sectors like 
programming. Meanwhile, when the long-term unemployed do fi nd a job, 
they are more likely to enter at the margins of the labour market, with lower 
pay and more temporary work.85 Jobless recoveries, in other words, exacer-
bate the problems of precarity, and increasingly segregate out a portion of the 
population as permanently underemployed. Ultimately, unemployment and 
the threat of it are becoming the norms for the labour force.
In some urban areas, joblessness and segregation from the normal labour 
market have long been features of everyday existence. In the banlieues of 
Paris, the ghettos of the United States and the rising spaces of suburban 
poverty, entire communities have been economically separated from broader 
economic trends, stagnating even during periods of growth.86 More often 
than not, these segregated spaces are also divided along racial lines, with 
deliberate neglect and outright exclusion transforming these communities 
into increasingly harsh areas of poor social cohesion, inadequate housing and 
high unemployment.87 The historical origin of these spaces is well known: 
racism, slavery and the active exclusion carried out by policy choices, physical 
violence and white migration.88 In early-twentieth-century America, for 
example, the mechanisation of agriculture led the rural black population to 
migrate and concentrate in urban areas. Yet jobs were hard to come by, as 
continued racism excluded them from working in textiles or manufacturing. 
(The racialisation of the surplus population also enabled owners to manipu-
late the white working class, keeping wages low and preventing unionisa-
tion.)89 As capitalism grew in the postwar era, manufacturing jobs eventually 
opened up to the black population, and by the mid 1950s rates of black and 
white youth unemployment were broadly similar.90 But then the globalisa-
tion of the labour supply wreaked havoc on low-skilled black workers. With 
manufacturing jobs shipped overseas or subject to automation, these workers 
were disproportionately affected by deindustrialisation.91 Industrial jobs left 
the urban centres and were replaced by service work often located in distant 
suburban areas.92 The urban ghettos were left to rot, becoming concentrated 
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hubs of long-term joblessness.93 They became poverty traps, devoid of jobs, 
with little community support and a proliferation of underground economies.94 
Entire communities were cast aside from the machinery of capitalism and 
left to fend for themselves with whatever means could be scraped together. 
People seeking an income were forced into off-the-books work, new businesses 
turned to loan sharks after being denied by white-owned banks, and increasing 
desperation led to outright illicit activities.95
Mirroring the concentration of joblessness in the urban margins, develop-
ing economies have had to deal with the expansion and concentration of 
surplus populations in slums, favelas and shantytowns. Globally, these have 
swelled to unprecedented levels as the urban workforce is tossed aside into 
the informal and marginal economies.96 As one UN report puts it, ‘the cities 
have become a dumping ground for a surplus population working in 
unskilled, unprotected and low-wage informal service industries and trade’.97 
The primary cause behind this expansion of slums has been primitive 
accumulation. Spurred on, fi rst by colonialism and then by structural 
adjustment policies, the peasantry in many developing countries has been 
forced off their lands via global competition, rapid industrialisation and 
rampaging climate change. Like the earlier European experience of 
industrialisation, dispossessed rural workers have migrated to urban areas to 
fi nd jobs. And in Europe, too, this process sometimes led to slum-dwelling 
and destitution for the new urban proletariat.98 But this is where the similarities 
end, as in Europe the transition involved creating suffi cient numbers of jobs, 
the emergence of a strong industrial working class, and the eventual provision 
of housing for migrants.99 Under conditions of postcolonial development, this 
narrative has been broken. Rather than a scarcity of labour, recent 
industrialisation has occurred in the context of a large and global labour 
force.100 The result has been little development of anything resembling a 
traditional working class, continually weak job prospects and a lack of 
adequate housing.101 New urban migrants have been left in a permanent state 
of transition between peasantry and proletarianisation, and sometimes in 
seasonal circulation between rural existence and urban poverty.102 Slums and 
other improvised housing therefore represent a dual expulsion from the land 
and from the formal economy.103 This surplus humanity, having been 
deprived of its traditional means of subsistence yet left without employment, 
has been forced to create its own non-capitalist subsistence economies. Much 
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of the labour performed here is informal: low-paid, insecure, irregular and 
without state support. In these economies, production is typically organised 
in non-capitalist forms but remains directed towards commodity production 
– to selling goods on the market, rather than for individual use. Mediation by 
the market distinguishes these postcolonial subsistence economies from 
pre-capitalist subsistence economies,104 even though they both function as a 
desperate means of survival.105
But while primitive accumulation is responsible for the origins of these 
slums, it is ‘premature deindustrialisation’ that looks set to consolidate their 
existence. If previous periods of industrialisation at least had the benefi t of 
providing enough factory jobs for the new proletariat, premature 
deindustrialisation threatens to eliminate this traditional pathway entirely. 
Technological and economic developments now enable countries to virtually 
leapfrog the industrialisation phase, which means that developing economies 
are now deindustrialising at much lower rates of per capita income and with 
much lower shares of manufacturing employment.106 China is a good example 
of this, with manufacturing employment in decline,107 labour struggles 
becoming more confi dent,108 real wages surging109 and demographic limits 
leading to a focus on ‘technological upgrading [and] productivity 
enhancements’ in order to maintain growth.110 The automation of factories is 
at the leading edge of this deindustrialisation trend, with China already the 
biggest purchaser of industrial robots, and expected to soon have more 
industrial robots in operation than either Europe or North America.111 The 
factory of the world is going robotic. Deindustrialisation can also be seen in 
‘reshoring’, where manufacturing returns to developed economies in jobless, 
automated forms.112 These deindustrialisation trends are taking hold across 
the developing economies of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and most of 
Asia.113 Even in countries where manufacturing employment has increased 
in absolute terms, there have been signifi cant decreases in the labour-intensity 
of the process.114 The result of all of this is not only an incomplete transition 
to a signifi cant working class, but also the stymying of the expected 
employment path for the workforce. Premature deindustrialisation is leaving 
most of the world’s urban proletariat dispossessed of its agricultural livelihood 
and without the opportunity to be hired for manufacturing jobs. Some hold 
out the hope that an emerging service sector will absorb the surplus 
populations, yet this appears increasingly unlikely. Even in India, the centre 
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of service and high-tech outsourcing, only a small portion of the labour force 
works in the information and communication technology sector.115 More 
importantly, the potential of service jobs is constrained by the newest wave of 
automation, which is likely to eliminate the low-skilled, low-wage service jobs 
that have traditionally been outsourced – clerical work, call-centre work or 
data entry, for example.116 As this non-routine cognitive labour is increasingly 
automated, what may occur is a premature shift away from a service-based 
economy – on top of premature deindustrialisation. What this means is that 
the maintenance of large portions of humanity within slums and informal, 
non-capitalist economies is likely to be consolidated by emerging 
technological trends. In the end, while unemployment measures give us 
some sense of the size of the surplus population problem, it is precarity, 
jobless recoveries and mass urban marginality that truly express the squeeze 
on the global labour market.
REVENGE OF THE SURPLUS
Larger surpluses of labour are, on the one hand, benefi cial to capitalist inter-
ests. They serve as a disciplinary tool against the working class (particularly 
when fi ltered through racism, nationalism and sexism) and as a reserve to call 
upon in times of growth. They reduce wages, sow competition among workers 
and shackle the ambitions of the proletariat. These are among the reasons 
behind a gradual drive to incorporate the world’s population into a global 
labour force, fostered by imperialism and globalisation.117 On the other hand, 
capital requires a particular type of surplus population: cheap, docile and 
pliable.118 Without these characteristics, this excess of humanity becomes a 
problem for capital. Not content to lie down and accept its disposability, it 
makes itself heard through riots, mass migration, criminality, and all sorts of 
actions that disrupt the existing order. Capitalism therefore has simultane-
ously to produce a disciplined surplus and deploy violence and coercion 
against those who resist.
One of the principal ways to manage the unruly surplus has been to cham-
pion the social democratic ideal of full employment, whereby every physically 
capable (male) worker has a job. In support of this ideal, economic policies 
aim to reincorporate the surplus into capitalism as disciplined and waged 
workers, secured by a hegemonic consensus between the representatives of 
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labour and capital. The apogee of this approach was the postwar period, when 
working-class struggle and conservative concern with social order positioned 
full employment as a necessary economic goal.119 In this brief ‘golden age’ of 
capitalism, unemployment was kept to a minimum, and capital had to seek 
out pre-capitalist populations around the world in order to expand and accu-
mulate.120 For the most part, job growth was achieved through healthy 
economic growth that increased the demand for labour.121 Historically, growth 
of the national economy has often been important in warding off the effects of 
technological unemployment – either by increasing the output of existing 
industries or by inventing new industries to employ the displaced workers. For 
instance, during the latter half of the 1800s, the rise in capital goods output 
created jobs that offset the surplus population newly released from the agricul-
tural sector.122 In the prewar and postwar eras, growth in manufacturing jobs 
was sustained by the rise of mass consumerism and surges in government mili-
tary spending.123 Today, we can see similar attempts at creating new markets 
through accumulation by dispossession – turning public or common goods 
into privatised (and monetised) commodities. If increases in labour demand 
are to be successful, however, they require the right supply of labour – which 
means an increasingly high-skilled workforce. Education has been the primary 
way to achieve this, with, for example, secondary education having its origins 
in efforts to produce more skilled workers. The demand to educate workers for 
jobs held wide support during the high unemployment period of the Great 
Depression,124 and early neoliberals went so far as to argue that education was 
necessary only to adapt human beings to the constant changes in the econ-
omy.125 Today, the growth areas of the labour market tend to be in high-skilled, 
non-routine and cognitive jobs.126 This means any attempt at full employment 
increasingly requires new skills from workers – a demand that helps explain 
the aggressive efforts to reduce higher education to glorifi ed job training.127 
The overall societal aim becomes the production of competitive subjects 
undergoing constant self-improvement in an endless effort to be deemed 
‘employable’.128 The demands that workers be constantly retraining and that 
policies support healthy economic growth are necessary components to the 
drive for full employment.129
But while calls for more jobs remain ideologically pervasive, the practical 
viability of full employment has largely disappeared. With tight labour 
markets in the postwar era, the ensuing strength of the working class 
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increasingly became a problem for capitalism. The crisis of stagfl ation in the 
1970s, in particular, presented an opportunity to reverse the priority given to 
employment. Class pressure and its effects – work stoppages, wage infl ation, 
declining profi ts – were a major factor in central banks’ decisions to raise 
interest rates, in the hope of reducing aggregate demand and increasing 
unemployment.130 Indeed, Thatcher’s chief economic advisor eventually 
admitted that the war against infl ation was in fact a proxy war against the 
working class.131 The tight monetary policy of the early 1980s was therefore 
precisely an effort to undermine the power of the working class, increase 
unemployment to a level acceptable for capital, and end the dream of full 
employment. Yet even if full employment had not been attacked, it requires 
strong economic growth – a condition that looks increasingly unlikely for the 
global economy. In recent years, global growth has remained signifi cantly 
lower than during the pre-crisis period.132 Across the political spectrum, econ-
omists are warning that fundamental changes to the economy mean growth 
may have settled into a permanently lower state.133 Moreover, fi rms that are 
leading growth sectors – such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram – simply do 
not create jobs on the scale of classic fi rms like Ford and GM.134 In fact, new 
industries currently only employ 0.5 per cent of the American workforce – 
hardly an inspiring record of job creation.135 And after a steady decline, the 
average new business creates 40 per cent fewer jobs than it did twenty years 
ago.136 The old social democratic plan to encourage employment in new 
industries falters in the face of low labour-intensity fi rms and sputtering 
economic growth. Still, it might be imagined that, with the right political 
pressure and policies, a return to full employment could be an option.137 But, 
given that the height of the social democratic era required the exclusion of 
women from the waged workforce, we should in fact wonder whether full 
employment has ever been possible.
If full employment remains operative only as an ideological mystifi cation, 
its normalisation of work still extends to the unemployed. The transformation 
of welfare and the rise of workfare – forcing people to work in order to receive 
benefi ts – represent an increasingly insidious example of this. Mirroring the 
changing fortunes of full employment, unemployment has long been 
governed according to different ideas.138 Initial approaches saw unemploy-
ment as an individual accident – something to be mitigated by insurance-like 
solutions. But the mass unemployment of the Great Depression overwhelmed 
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this approach, and unemployment subsequently came to be seen as a struc-
tural (and male) problem. The labour movement became an employment 
movement, and governments adopted welfare and full employment policies 
partly in response. Today, many of the transformations that the welfare state 
is undergoing can be understood as an attempt to revive the disciplinary 
function of the unemployed. Their free labour, in the form of workfare, acts 
to repress wages and threaten the jobs of the employed; the fi gure of the 
‘jobseeker’ imposes a norm of work on everyone; and attacks on disability 
benefi ts turn even those outside the labour force into a reserve army of poten-
tial workers.139 The unemployed have to fulfi l an increasingly long list of 
conditions in order to gain even minimal benefi ts: attending training, 
constantly applying for jobs, listening to advice, and even working for free. 
The increase in surveillance and control is designed to produce not only an 
obedient, skilled and fl exible surplus population, but also one that exerts 
pressure on the employed. It therefore makes little difference whether these 
schemes actually reduce unemployment or not, since their purpose lies else-
where.140 Increasingly, the welfare state is becoming little more than an insti-
tution designed to deploy the surplus against the working class.
The management of surplus populations does not just revolve around the 
production of disciplined workers and pliable jobseekers. Increasingly, domi-
nation and punitive measures are becoming the norm in dealing with the 
excess to capital. For instance, the size and composition of this group is heav-
ily regulated through immigration policies. For the surplus, migrating to 
countries with better job prospects is a common response to high 
unemployment and has been the historical norm. In the nineteenth century, 
as the mechanisation of agriculture transformed the countryside, the 
dominant outlet was mass emigration to the New World.141 Yet today the 
option to migrate is increasingly closed off for the developing world. While 
there are a variety of reasons voiced to justify tighter immigration controls, 
reducing the potentially unruly excess labour supply has often been a 
dominant one.142 Today, we see the militarisation of America’s border with 
Mexico and the rise of Fortress Europe in response to mistaken fears about 
jobs being taken by foreigners. Yet the desperation of immigrants to fi nd a 
decent job is such that, even when faced with the threat of death, they still 
make the perilous trip to a new country. The result is that the past fi fteen 
years have seen over 22,000 migrants die trying to get into Europe, more than 
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6,000 die trying to cross the Mexico–US border, and over 1,500 die trying to 
get to Australia.143 These lethal barriers to migration are one of the primary 
mechanisms used today to segregate and manage global surplus populations. 
And inextricable from this treatment of migrants is racialised coding: these 
immigrants are not simply other individuals, but other races. Whether ‘foreign 
hordes’ threatening the sanctity of the European border, or immigrant textile 
workers in Thailand being subject to hyper-exploitation and abuse, racial 
hierarchies are an essential component of the control of surplus populations.144
When the co-optation of the surplus into a disciplined excess workforce 
has failed, the state can always resort to simply locking up, excluding and 
brutalising large sections of the surplus population. Across the world, mass 
incarceration has been increasing as the size of prison populations rise in 
both absolute and relative terms.145 Moreover, there is a signifi cant racial 
component to this – most notably in the mass incarceration of the US black 
population, but also of Muslims in much of Europe, Aboriginals in Canada, 
and the detention and deportation of foreign migrants around the world.146 
These systems of mass incarceration must be understood to extend beyond 
prisons, as they encompass an entire network of laws, courts, policies, habits 
and rules that work to subjugate a group of people.147 Mass incarceration is a 
system of social control aimed primarily at surplus populations rather than at 
crime. For example, increases in manufacturing unemployment are associ-
ated globally with increases in police employment.148 As the reserve army 
grows, so too does the state’s punitive apparatus. Likewise, the expansion of 
immigrant detention centres responds to the demise of subsistence econo-
mies and the formation of a mobile proletariat.149 Those who are unwilling to 
be forced into slums seek better opportunities elsewhere, only to be locked up 
or left for dead on the Mediterranean. The American system is perhaps the 
clearest example of how surplus populations and police enforcement inter-
twine. The well-documented surge in mass incarceration over the past few 
decades was not a response to rising crime rates,150 but rather to the prolifera-
tion of jobless ghettos and the advances made by the civil rights movement. 
The racialised nature of this system is well known, but the patterns of incar-
ceration cannot be fully understood without reference to class and surplus 
populations. For instance, middle-class and upper-class black populations are 
largely left alone,151 and the vast majority of the prison population consists of 
the ‘working or workless poor’.152 Likewise, the disparities in incarceration 
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between races are outpaced by the disparities in terms of class,153 and the rise 
of mass black incarceration coincides with the decline in employment for 
that same population.154 In fact, the racial nature of mass incarceration in 
America stems ‘exclusively’ from the wildly disproportionate locking up of 
lower-class black populations.155 Mass incarceration has therefore become a 
means to manage and control this surplus that has been excluded from the 
labour market and left in poverty. Spatially concentrated in inner-city ghet-
tos, these groups became an easy target of state control. This intersects with 
race, of course, as the origins of jobless ghettos lie in the active exclusion of 
the black population of the United States. And in many ways, the carceral 
system perpetuates the legacy of slavery, Jim Crow, and the ghettos – replac-
ing many of their functions with a new system of exclusion.156 But class 
enables us to see a distinction: whereas those previous systems of social 
control exploited free labour and attempted to transform black populations 
into a disciplined workforce, the modern prison system is designed largely to 
exclude and control the surplus population.157 Given the effects of having a 
criminal record, the carceral system brings about a triple exclusion: from 
cultural and educational capital, from political participation and from public 
aid.158 The end result is that incarceration initiates a vicious circle with the 
urban poor left unemployed and unable to fi nd a job, thereby endlessly 
reproducing these groups as outside of capital.159 Rather than trying to reform, 
educate and reintegrate prisoners into capitalist society, convoluted systems 
are set up to keep them out and to prevent their re-entry into normal wage 
labour after prison. At its extreme, these populations become simply 
disposable, situated outside of normal society and subject to gratuitous 
violence. The end result is a system that produces and reproduces permanent 
exclusion from the formal economy. These populations are deemed 
dispensable, and subjected to all the police brutality and state violence that 
can be mustered against them. We have, therefore, an entire range of 
mechanisms that the state and capital use to manage surplus populations, 
ranging from disciplined integration to violent exclusion.
THE CRISIS OF WORK
As we have seen, there is a growing population of people that are situated 
outside formal, waged work, making do with minimal welfare benefi ts, 
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informal subsistence work, or by illegal means. In all cases, the lives of these 
people are characterised by poverty, precarity and insecurity. Increasingly, 
there are simply not enough jobs to employ everyone. As the hegemonic 
order predicated upon decent and stable jobs breaks down, social control is 
likely to revert to increasingly coercive measures: harsher workfare, height-
ened antagonisms over immigration, stricter controls on the movement of 
peoples, and mass incarceration for those who resist being cast aside. This is 
the crisis of work facing neoliberalism and the surplus populations who make 
up most of the world’s labour force.
With the potential for extensive automation of work – a topic that will be 
discussed further in the next chapter – it is likely that we will see the following 
trends in the years to come:
1.  The precarity of the developed economies’ working class will intensify 
due to the surplus global labour supply (resulting from both globalisa-
tion and automation).
2.  Jobless recoveries will continue to deepen and lengthen, predominantly 
affecting those whose jobs can be automated at the time.
3.  Slum populations will continue to grow due to the automation of low-
skilled service work, and will be exacerbated by premature de industrial-
 isation.
4.  Urban marginality in the developed economies will grow in size as low-
skilled, low-wage jobs are automated.
5.  The transformation of higher education into job training will be 
hastened in a desperate attempt to increase the supply of high-skilled 
workers.
6.  Growth will remain slow and make the expansion of replacement jobs 
unlikely.
7.  The changes to workfare, immigration controls and mass incarceration 
will deepen as those without jobs are increasingly subjected to coercive 
controls and survival economies.
Of course, none of these outcomes is inevitable. But this analysis is based on 
the current tendencies of capitalism, and on the problems that are likely to 
arise as surplus populations continue to grow. These trends portend a crisis of 
work, and a crisis of any society based upon the institution of wage labour. 
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Under capitalism, jobs have been pivotal to our social lives and sense of who 
we are, as well as being the sole source of income for most people. What the 
next two decades portend is a future in which the global economy is increas-
ingly unable to produce enough jobs (let alone good jobs), yet where we 
remain dependent upon jobs for our living. Political parties and trade unions 
appear ignorant of this crisis, struggling to manage its symptoms even as 
automation promises to toss more and more workers aside. In the face of 
these tensions, the political project for the twenty-fi rst-century left must be to 
build an economy in which people are no longer dependent upon wage 
labour for survival.
As we will argue in the next few chapters, this struggle can and should 
span an array of different approaches: it means creating hegemonic ideas 
about the obsolescence of drudgery, shifting the goals of trade unions from 
resisting automation to job-sharing and reduced working weeks,160 govern-
ment subsidies for automation investment, and raising the cost of labour for 
capital,161 along with many other options.162 It means opposing the expulsion 
of surplus populations and attacking the mechanisms of control over them. 
Mass incarceration and the racialised system of domination associated with it 
must be abolished,163 and the spatial mechanisms of control – ranging from 
ghettos to border controls – must be taken apart to ensure the free movement 
of peoples. And the welfare state must be defended, not as an end in itself, but 
as a necessary component of a broader post-work society. The future remains 
open, and which direction the crisis of work takes is precisely the political 
struggle before us.
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Chapter 6
Post-Work Imaginaries
The goal of the future is full unemployment.
Arthur C. Clarke
Whereas the previous chapter analysed the changing social conditions that 
are making a post-work world increasingly necessary, this chapter will 
outline what a post-work world might mean in practice.1 To that end, we 
advance some broad demands to start building a platform for a post-work 
society. In asserting the centrality of demands, we are breaking with a 
widespread tendency of today’s radical left that believes making no 
demands is the height of radicalism.2 These critics often claim that making 
a demand means giving into the existing order of things by asking, and 
therefore legitimating, an authority. But these accounts miss the antago-
nism at the heart of making demands, and the ways in which they are 
essential for constituting an active agent of change.3 In this light, the rejec-
tion of demands is a symptom of theoretical confusion, not practical 
progress. A politics without demands is simply a collection of aimless 
bodies. Any meaningful vision of the future will set out proposals and 
goals, and this chapter is a contribution to that potential discussion. None 
of the proposals presented will be radically new, but this is part of their 
strength: it is not a free-fl oating project, since frameworks and movements 
already exist and have traction in the world.
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Today, revolutionary demands appear naive, while reformist demands 
appear futile. Too often that is where the debate ends, with each side 
denouncing the other and the strategic imperative to change our conditions 
forgotten. The demands we propose are therefore intended as non-reformist 
reforms. By this we mean three things. First, they have a utopian edge that 
strains at the limits of what capitalism can concede. This transforms them 
from polite requests into insistent demands charged with belligerence and 
antagonism. Such demands combine the futural orientation of utopias with 
the immediate intervention of the demand, invoking a ‘utopianism without 
apology’.4 Second, these non-reformist proposals are grounded in real 
tendencies of the world today, giving them a viability that revolutionary 
dreams lack. Third, and most importantly, such demands shift the current 
political equilibrium and construct a platform for further development. 
They project an open-ended escape from the present, rather than a mechan-
ical transition to the next, predetermined stage of history.5 The proposals in 
this chapter will not break us out of capitalism, but they do promise to 
break us out of neoliberalism, and to establish a new equilibrium of politi-
cal, economic and social forces. From the social democratic consensus to 
the neoliberal consensus, our argument is that the left should mobilise 
around a post-work consensus. With a post-work society, we would have 
even more potential to launch forward to greater goals. But this is a project 
that must be carried out over the long term: decades rather than years, 
cultural shifts rather than electoral cycles. Given the reality of the weakened 
left today, there is only one way forward: to patiently rebuild its power – a 
topic that will be covered in the chapters to follow. There simply is no other 
way to bring about a post-work world. We must therefore attend to these 
longer-term strategic goals, and rebuild the collective agencies that might 
eventually bring them about. By directing the left towards a post-work 
future, not only will signifi cant gains be aimed for – such as the reduction 
of drudgery and poverty – but political power will be built in the process. In 
the end, we believe a post-work society is not only achievable, given the 
material conditions, but also viable and desirable.6 This chapter charts a 
way forward: building a post-work society on the basis of fully automating 
the economy, reducing the working week, implementing a universal basic 
income, and achieving a cultural shift in the understanding of work.
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FULL AUTOMATION
Our fi rst demand is for a fully automated economy. Using the latest techno-
logical developments, such an economy would aim to liberate humanity 
from the drudgery of work while simultaneously producing increasing 
amounts of wealth. Without full automation, postcapitalist futures must 
necessarily choose between abundance at the expense of freedom (echoing 
the work-centricity of Soviet Russia) or freedom at the expense of abundance, 
represented by primitivist dystopias.7 With automation, by contrast, machines 
can increasingly produce all necessary goods and services, while also releas-
ing humanity from the effort of producing them.8 For this reason, we argue 
that the tendencies towards automation and the replacement of human 
labour should be enthusiastically accelerated and targeted as a political 
project of the left.9 This is a project that takes an existing capitalist tendency 
and seeks to push it beyond the acceptable parameters of capitalist social 
relations.
Capitalism has long been synonymous with rapid changes in technology: 
driven by the imperative to accumulate, the means of production are contin-
ually transformed.10 In the nineteenth century, agriculture began to be mech-
anised, and small plots of land became increasingly centralised under larger 
and larger industrial farms. Craftwork was transformed too, with machinery 
appearing as an alien intervention into the production process. Work that had 
traditionally been undertaken by a skilled labourer was now broken down 
into its deskilled constituent tasks, and often carried out using machinery.11 
Workers became assigned to partial tasks, and tools that had once been 
governed by workers became machines that rhythmically conducted the 
labourers.12 Work became increasingly repetitive, deskilled and ruled by 
machinery – with greater demand for cheap unskilled labourers (particularly 
women and children).13 In the early twentieth century, this tendency began 
to shift with the introduction of technologies that eliminated the most routine 
and mundane of manual tasks (such as hauling and conveying goods). Skilled 
workers became increasingly necessary in overseeing the new machines, 
carrying out expanding service work, and managing the increasingly large 
fi rms that were emerging.14 The need for skilled labour was further amplifi ed 
in the early twentieth century by the rise of offi ce technologies – typewriters, 
photocopiers, and so on – that required relatively well-educated operators. In 
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other words, technology is not uniformly deskilling, and the increased 
demand for skilled labour over the past century testifi es to that.15 Over this 
period, manufacturing employment continued to decline, due to its suscepti-
bility to productivity-enhancing technology.16 The automation of mass-
production manufacturing in the early twentieth century was eventually 
extended, with the automation of small-batch manufacturing.17 While the 
industrial sector employed 1,000 robots in 1970, today it uses over 1.6 million 
robots.18 In terms of employment, manufacturing has reached a global satura-
tion point. Even in developing countries, the trend is towards deindustrialisa-
tion, with employment growth now confi ned predominantly to the service 
sector.19 Concurrent with the decline of manufacturing, the latter half of the 
twentieth century oversaw another shift. While earlier offi ce technologies 
had supplemented workers and increased demand for them, the development 
of the microprocessor and computing technologies began to replace semi-
skilled service workers in many areas – for example, telephone operators and 
secretaries.20 The roboticisation of services is now gathering steam, with over 
150,000 professional service robots sold in the past fi fteen years.21 Under 
particular threat have been ‘routine’ jobs – jobs that can be codifi ed into a 
series of steps. These are tasks that computers are perfectly suited to accom-
plish once a programmer has created the appropriate software, leading to a 
drastic reduction in the numbers of routine manual and cognitive jobs over 
the past four decades.22 The result has been a polarisation of the labour 
market, since many middle-wage, mid-skilled jobs are routine, and therefore 
subject to automation.23 Across both North America and Western Europe, 
the labour market is now characterised by a predominance of workers in 
low-skilled, low-wage manual and service jobs (for example, fast-food, retail, 
transport, hospitality and warehouse workers), along with a smaller number 
of workers in high-skilled, high-wage, non-routine cognitive jobs.24
The most recent wave of automation is poised to change this distribution 
of the labour market drastically, as it comes to encompass every aspect of the 
economy: data collection (radio-frequency identifi cation, big data); new 
kinds of production (the fl exible production of robots,25 additive 
manufacturing,26 automated fast food); services (AI customer assistance, care 
for the elderly); decision-making (computational models, software agents); 
fi nancial allocation (algorithmic trading); and especially distribution (the 
logistics revolution, self-driving cars,27 drone container ships and automated 
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warehouses).28 In every single function of the economy – from production to 
distribution to management to retail – we see large-scale tendencies towards 
automation.29 This latest wave of automation is predicated upon algorithmic 
enhancements (particularly in machine learning and deep learning), rapid 
developments in robotics and exponential growth in computing power (the 
source of big data) that are coalescing into a ‘second machine age’ that is 
transforming the range of tasks that machines can fulfi l.30 It is creating an era 
that is historically unique in a number of ways. New pattern-recognition tech-
nologies are rendering both routine and non-routine tasks subject to automa-
tion: complex communication technologies are making computers better 
than humans at certain skilled-knowledge tasks, and advances in robotics are 
rapidly making technology better at a wide variety of manual-labour tasks.31 
For instance, self-driving cars involve the automation of non-routine manual 
tasks, and non-routine cognitive tasks such as writing news stories or research-
ing legal precedents are now being accomplished by robots.32 The scope of 
these developments means that everyone from stock analysts to construction 
workers to chefs to journalists is vulnerable to being replaced by machines.33 
Workers who move symbols on a screen are as at risk as those moving goods 
around a warehouse. One report forecasts a ‘depopulation of trading fl oors’ as 
robots continue infi ltrating the fi nancial world;34 retail jobs – long a bastion 
of post-industrial employment – are set to be taken over by machines;35 and 
over 140 million cognitive jobs worldwide are forecast to be eliminated.36 
While the last wave of automation led to a polarisation of the labour market, 
this newest wave looks set to decimate the low-skilled, low-wage end of the 
labour market.37 And as robots substitute for human labour, workers are likely 
to face lower wages and increasing immiseration.38 At the very least then, the 
emerging wave of automation will drastically change the composition of the 
labour market, and potentially lead to a signifi cant reduction in demand for 
workers.
A number of economists have pointed out, however, that productivity has 
not increased to the degree that would be expected by a revolution in auto-
mation.39 If a machine is replacing half of the workers in a factory, productiv-
ity should double if the factory produces the same number of goods. In fact, 
however, there has been a broad global slowdown in productivity growth over 
the past decade, particularly following the crisis.40 Leaving aside the fact that 
productivity is a notoriously diffi cult thing to measure, we believe a few 
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phenomena can help explain this anomaly. First, it is highly likely that low 
wages are repressing investment in productivity-enhancing technologies. 
Access to a large reserve of cheap labour means that companies have less 
incentive to focus on capital investment. Why purchase new machines when 
cheaper workers will do the same for less? This means that in the effort to 
bring about full automation, fi ghting for higher global wages is a crucial 
complementary task. Second, there is likely a delay factor at work. In the 
1990s, the IT revolution took some time to become expressed in productivity 
fi gures, as companies had to invest and then adapt to the new capacities of 
these technologies. Organisations have to be changed, new skills have to be 
learned, and processes have to be reworked in order to make effective use of 
these new technologies. In general, it appears that investments in digital tech-
nologies face productivity lags of fi ve to fi fteen years.41 Today, many of the 
technologies under discussion are incredibly new and were unimaginable 
even a decade ago. This novelty means that we should expect a delay in the 
response of productivity fi gures, as the technologies are adopted and then 
adapted into the way businesses run.42 Finally, and most importantly, our 
argument here relies largely on a normative claim rather than a descriptive 
one. Full automation is something that can and should be achieved, regard-
less of whether it is yet being carried out. For instance, out of the US compa-
nies that could benefi t from incorporating industrial robots, less than 10 per 
cent have done so.43 This is but one area for full automation to take hold in, 
and this reiterates the importance of making full automation a political 
demand, rather than assuming it will come about from economic necessity. A 
variety of policies can help in this project: more state investment, higher 
minimum wages and research devoted to technologies that replace rather 
than augment workers. In the most detailed estimates of the labour market, it 
is suggested that between 47 and 80 per cent of today’s jobs are capable of 
being automated.44 Let us take this estimate not as a deterministic prediction, 
but instead as the outer limit of a political project against work. We should 
take these numbers as a standard against which to measure our success.
While full automation of the economy is presented here as an ideal and a 
demand, in practice it is unlikely to be fully achieved.45 In certain spheres, 
human labour is likely to continue for technical, economic and ethical 
reasons. On a technical level, machines today remain worse than humans at 
jobs involving creative work, highly fl exible work, affective work and most 
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tasks relying on tacit rather than explicit knowledge.46 The engineering prob-
lems involved in automating these tasks appear insurmountable for the next 
two decades (though similar claims were made about self-driving cars ten 
years ago), and a programme of full automation would aim to invest research 
money into overcoming these limits. A second barrier to full automation 
occurs for economic reasons: certain tasks can already be completed by 
machines, but the cost of the machines exceeds the cost of the equivalent 
labour.47 Despite the effi ciency, accuracy and productivity of machine labour, 
capitalism prefers to make profi ts, and therefore uses human labour when-
ever it is cheaper than capital investment. A programme of full automation 
would aim to overcome this as well, through measures as simple as raising the 
minimum wage, supporting labour movements and using state subsidies to 
incentivise the replacement of human labour.
A fi nal limit of full automation is the moral status we give to certain jobs, 
such as care work.48 These tasks, including the raising of children, are ones 
that many would argue must be carried out by human beings. We can outline 
two broad approaches to these sorts of labours. A fi rst approach would agree 
that such labour has moral value and should be carried out by humans rather 
than machines. In a post-work society, however, care labour could be given 
greater value, turning society away from the privileged status bestowed upon 
profi table labour. The free time that accrues from full automation could also 
facilitate experimentation with alternative domestic arrangements. There is a 
long history of utopian experiments that can be drawn upon to rethink how 
our societies organise domestic, reproductive and care labour.49 All of this, it 
must be stressed, would still require a political movement to achieve; a post-
work world may facilitate change, but it cannot guarantee it. A more radical 
approach, however, argues that automating much of this labour should be a 
goal for the future.50 Indeed, the stereotype that women are naturally nurtur-
ing and desiring of this affective labour is often a pernicious cover for their 
continued exploitation. But what if much of this labour could be eliminated? 
Traditionally, the household has been a space that featured little technologi-
cal change: its unpaid nature and lack of productivity norms have given capi-
talism few incentives to invest in the reduction of household labour.51 Yet 
increasingly, domestic tasks like cleaning the house and folding clothes, for 
example, can be delegated to machines.52 Assistive technologies and affective 
computing are also making inroads in automating some of the highly personal 
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and embarrassing care work that might be better suited to impersonal robots.53 
More speculatively, some have argued that the pain and suffering involved in 
pregnancy is something that should be relegated to the past, rather than 
mystifi ed as natural and beautiful.54 In this vision, synthetic forms of biologi-
cal reproduction would enable a newfound equality between the sexes. We 
will not adjudicate on these paths here, but simply set them out as options 
opened up by a post-work world. Whatever approach is taken, though, the 
point is that labour will not be immediately or entirely eliminated, but instead 
progressively reduced. Full automation is a utopian demand that aims to 
reduce necessary labour as much as possible.
IT’S NOT MONDAYS YOU HATE, IT’S YOUR JOB
A second major demand for building a post-work platform involves a return 
to classic ideas about reducing the length of the working week with no cut in 
pay. From the beginning of capitalism, workers have struggled against the 
imposition of fi xed working hours, and the demand for shorter hours was a 
key component of the early labour movement.55 Initial battles saw high levels 
of resistance in the form of individual absenteeism, numerous holidays and 
irregular work habits.56 This resistance to normal working hours continues 
today in widespread slacking off, with workers often surfi ng the internet 
rather than doing their job.57 At every step of the way, then, workers have 
struggled to escape normal working hours, and many of the labour move-
ment’s earliest successes had to do with reducing work time. The two-day 
weekend, for example, emerged spontaneously from workers’ predilection for 
drinking and spending an extra day recovering rather than working.58 The 
weekend’s eventual consolidation as a recognised and bounded period of 
time off was the product of sustained political struggles (a process that was 
not completed in the Western world until the 1970s).59 Likewise, workers 
achieved signifi cant success in reducing the working week from sixty hours in 
1900 to just below thirty-fi ve hours during the Great Depression.60 Such was 
the speed of success that, over a period of fi ve years in the 1930s, the working 
week declined by eighteen hours.61 During the earlier years of the Depression, 
the idea of a shorter working week enjoyed bipartisan support in the United 
States, and legislation for a thirty-hour working week was thought to be immi-
nent.62 Simultaneously, intellectuals prophesied even further reductions in 
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work time – imagining worlds where work was reduced to a bare minimum. 
In a classic statement, Paul Lafargue argued for limiting work to just three 
hours a day.63 Keynes famously argued for the same outcome, calculating that 
by 2030 we would all be working fi fteen-hour working weeks – though it is 
less well known that he was simply verbalising what were the broadly held 
beliefs of the time.64 And Marx made the shortening of the working week 
central to his entire postcapitalist vision, arguing that it represented a ‘basic 
prerequisite’ to reaching ‘the realm of freedom’.65
But such visions of a three-hour work day have disappeared. The near 
century-long push for shorter working hours ended abruptly during the Great 
Depression, when business opinion and government policy decided to use 
make-work programmes in response to unemployment.66 Soon after World 
War II, the working week stabilised at forty hours across much of the Western 
world, and there has since been little serious consideration of changing this.67 
Instead there has been a general expansion of work in the ensuing decades. 
First, there has been an increase in time spent at jobs throughout society.68 As 
women entered the workforce, the working week remained the same, and the 
overall amount of time devoted to jobs therefore increased.69 Secondly, there 
has been a progressive elimination of the work–life distinction, with work 
coming to permeate every aspect of our waking lives. Many of us are now tied 
to work all the time, with emails, phone calls, texts and job anxieties imping-
ing upon us constantly.70 Salaried workers are often compelled to work unrec-
ognised overtime, while many workers feel the social pressure to be seen 
working long hours. These demands mean that the average full-time US 
worker in fact logs closer to forty-seven hours a week.71 On top of this, a vast 
amount of work is unpaid and therefore uncounted in offi cial data (there is 
also an ongoing gender divide within this unpaid labour force).72 While 
waged work remains diffi cult for many to fi nd, unpaid work is proliferating 
– an entire sphere of ‘shadow work’ is emerging with automation at the point 
of sale, with work being delegated to users (think self-checkouts and ATMs).73 
Moreover, there is the hidden labour required to retain a job: fi nancial 
management, job searching if unemployed, constant skills training, 
commuting time, and the all-important (gendered) sphere of the labour 
involved in caring for children, family members and other dependents.74
If work has extended itself into so many areas of our lives, a return to a 
shorter working week would bring with it a number of benefi ts. Beyond the 
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most obvious – that it increases free time – it would bring with it a series of 
more subtle benefi ts.75 In the fi rst place, reducing the working week consti-
tutes a key response to rising automation. In fact, the role of this policy in 
previous periods of automation is often forgotten. Many commentators have 
rightly pointed to the history of technological change to show that it need not 
lead to mass unemployment. However, the primary periods of automation 
coincided with signifi cant reductions in the working week; employment was 
often sustained by redistributing the work. A second benefi t of this policy is 
its various environmental advantages. For instance, reductions in the work-
ing week would lead to signifi cant reductions in energy consumption and our 
overall carbon footprint.76 Increased free time would also mean a reduction 
in all the convenience goods bought to fi t into our hectic work schedules. 
More broadly, using productivity improvements for less work, rather than 
more output, would mean that energy effi ciency improvements would go 
towards reducing environmental impacts.77 A reduction in working hours is 
therefore an essential plank in any response to climate change. Other research 
suggests that a shorter working week would bring a general reduction in the 
stress, anxiety and mental health problems fostered by neoliberalism.78 But 
one of the most important reasons for reducing work time is that it is a 
demand that both consolidates and generates class power. In the fi rst place, 
reducing work time can be deployed as a temporary tactic in political strug-
gle – working to contract, strikes and other ways of removing labour time are 
means to exert pressure on capitalists. But secondly – and most importantly 
– the reduction of the working week also makes the labour movement 
stronger. By withdrawing labour hours from the market, the total supply of 
labour goes down and worker power increases. As two commentators recently 
noted, ‘No other bargaining demand simultaneously enhances bargaining 
position. Furthermore, no other strategic logic initiates a continuous virtuous 
cycle in which each victory establishes the conditions for strength in the next 
struggle.’79 For these reasons, the goal of reducing the working week should 
be an immediate and prominent demand of the twenty-fi rst-century left.
Our preference is for the establishment of a three-day weekend, rather than 
a reduction in the working day, in order to cut down on commuting and to 
build upon the long holiday weekends already in existence. This demand can 
be achieved in a number of ways – through trade union struggles, pressure from 
social movements, and legislative change by political parties. Trade unions 
9781784780968 Inventing the Future (454i) final pass.indd   116 04/09/2015   14:24:56
POST-WORK IMAGINARIES 117
building a strategy for the future, rather than accepting the capitalist demand 
for jobs at all costs, could use collective bargaining to accept automation in 
return for a shorter working week. Indeed, the historical record suggests that 
trade unions are often reactive in the face of technological change, and that 
wage concessions only delay automation, rather than preventing it.80 An alter-
native approach that focused on the reduction and diffusion of work could 
reduce work without leaving workers out on the streets.81 Efforts can also be 
made to gain recognition for unoffi cial, unpaid labour as part of the working 
week, reducing it simply by bringing attention to it.82 A focus on a shorter work-
ing week also requires that unions build links with part-time and precarious 
workers. But while unions are necessary in this struggle, they are not suffi cient, 
for the simple reason that each sector has different potentials for automation 
and productivity increases.83 A broader struggle is necessary if there is to be a 
break with the current logic of neoliberalism. Social movements and ideologi-
cal institutions must contribute to this struggle by shaping the space of possibil-
ity. A number of think tanks, including the New Economics Foundation and 
the Jimmy Reid Foundation, have started to call openly for a reduction of the 
working week.84 Groups in the UK such as the Precarious Workers Brigade and 
Plan C are highlighting unpaid work and mobilising around issues concerning 
the status of work in society today.85 But, most signifi cantly, there is already a 
high level of public desire for the reduction of the working week, with public 
opinion polls showing a majority of the population support the idea.86 There 
are also a variety of policy approaches to shorten the working week. Interventions 
can alter labour costs from a per-person basis to a per-hour basis, making it less 
cost-effective for businesses to enforce long hours.87 Countries like Belgium 
and the Netherlands have given workers the right to demand reduced hours 
without being discriminated against by employers. The Netherlands has also 
begun to shorten the working week at each end of the age spectrum. The young 
and the old are now transitioned into and out of the workforce, respectively, 
through gradual changes in their work hours.88 All of these options can and 
should be mobilised in pursuit of a project to reduce the working week.
THE WAGE DON’T FIT
These fi rst two proposals equate to the reduction of labour demand through 
full automation, and the reduction of labour supply through the shortening 
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of the working week.89 The combined outcome of these measures would be 
the liberation of a signifi cant amount of free time without a reduction in 
economic output or a signifi cant increase in unemployment. Yet this free 
time will be of little value if people continue struggling to make ends meet. 
As Paul Mattick puts it, ‘the leisure of the starving, or the needy, is no leisure 
at all but a relentless activity aimed at staying alive or improving their 
situation’.90 The underemployed, for instance, have plenty of free time but 
lack the means to enjoy it. Underemployed, it turns out, is really just a 
euphemism for under-waged. This is why an essential demand in a post-work 
society is for a universal basic income (UBI), giving every citizen a liveable 
amount of money without any means-testing.91 It is an idea that has periodi-
cally popped up throughout history.92 In the early 1940s, a version of it was 
advanced as an alternative to the Beveridge Report that eventually shaped the 
UK welfare state.93 In a now largely forgotten period during the 1960s and 
1970s, the basic income was central to proposals for US welfare reform. 
Economists, NGOs and policymakers explored the idea in detail,94 and a 
number of small-scale experiments were set up in Canada and the United 
States.95 Such was the infl uence of UBI that over 1,300 economists signed a 
petition pushing the US Congress to enact a ‘national system of income guar-
antees’.96 Three separate administrations gave serious consideration to the 
proposal, and two presidents – Nixon and Carter – attempted to pass legisla-
tion to achieve it.97 In other words, UBI very nearly became a reality in the 
1970s.98 While Alaska eventually implemented a basic income funded by its 
oil wealth, the idea largely disappeared from debate in the wake of neoliberal 
hegemony.99 But recent years have seen the idea undergo a resurgence in 
popularity. In both mainstream and critical media, it has gained traction, 
being taken up by Paul Krugman, Martin Wolf, the New York Times, the 
Financial Times and the Economist.100 The Swiss are holding a referendum 
on UBI in 2016, the proposal has been recommended by parliamentary 
committees in other countries, various political parties have adopted it in 
their manifestos, and there have been new experiments with it in Namibia 
and India.101 The idea has global scope, having been promoted forcefully by 
groups in Brazil, South Africa, Italy and Germany, and by an international 
network involving over twenty countries.102 The movement for a UBI is thus 
once again resurgent in the wake of the 2008 crisis and the austerity regimes 
put in place after it.
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The demand for a UBI, however, is subject to competing hegemonic 
forces. It is just as open to being mobilised for a libertarian dystopia as for a 
post-work society – an ambiguity that has led many to mistakenly confl ate the 
two poles. In demanding a UBI, therefore, three key factors must be articu-
lated in order to make it meaningful: it must provide a suffi cient amount of 
income to live on; it must be universal, provided to everyone unconditionally; 
and it must be a supplement to the welfare state rather than a replacement of 
it. The fi rst point is obvious enough: a UBI must provide a materially adequate 
income. The exact amount will vary between countries and regions, but it 
can be relatively easily arrived at with existing data. The risk is that, if set too 
low, UBI becomes just a government subsidy to businesses. In addition, UBI 
must be universal and given to everyone unconditionally. As there would be 
no means-testing or other measures required to receive the UBI, it would 
break free of the disciplinary nature of welfare capitalism.103 Moreover, a 
universal grant avoids the stigmatisation of welfare, since everyone receives it. 
As we argued in Chapter 4, the invocation of ‘universalism’ also obliges the 
continual subversion of any restricted application of a basic income (in terms 
of individuals’ status as citizens, immigrants or prisoners). The demand for 
universality provides the basis for a continued struggle to expand the scope 
and scale of the basic income. Lastly, the UBI must be a supplement to the 
welfare state. The conservative argument for a basic income – which must be 
avoided at all costs – is that it should simply replace the welfare state by 
providing a lump sum of money to every individual. In this scenario, the UBI 
would just become a vector of increased marketisation, transforming social 
services into private markets. Rather than being some aberration of neoliber-
alism, it would simply extend its essential gesture by creating new markets. By 
contrast, the demand made here is for UBI as a supplement to a revived 
welfare state.104
Drawing upon moral arguments and empirical research, there are a vast 
number of reasons to support a UBI: reduced poverty, better public health 
and reduced health costs, fewer high school dropouts, reductions in petty 
crime, more time with family and friends, and less state bureaucracy.105 
Depending on how UBI is presented, it is capable of generating support from 
across the political spectrum – from libertarians, conservatives, anarchists, 
Marxists and feminists, among others. The potency of the demand lies partly 
in this ambiguity, making it capable of mobilising broad popular support.106 
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However, for our purposes the signifi cance of UBI as a demand lies in four 
key interrelated factors.
The fi rst point to emphasise is that the demand for UBI is a demand for a 
political transformation, not just an economic one. It is often thought that 
UBI is simply a form of redistribution from the rich to the poor, or that it is 
just a measure to maintain economic growth by stimulating consumer 
demand. From this perspective, UBI would have impeccable reformist 
credentials and be little more than a glorifi ed progressive tax system. Yet the 
real signifi cance of UBI lies in the way it overturns the asymmetry of power 
that currently exists between labour and capital. As we saw in the discussion 
of surplus populations, the proletariat is defi ned by its separation from the 
means of production and subsistence. The proletariat is thereby forced to sell 
itself in the job market in order to gain the income necessary to survive. The 
most fortunate among us have the leisure to choose which job to take, but few 
of us have the capacity to choose no job. A basic income changes this condi-
tion, by giving the proletariat a means of subsistence without dependency on 
a job.107 Workers, in other words, have the option to choose whether to take a 
job or not (in many ways, taking neoclassical economics at its word, and 
making work truly voluntary). A UBI therefore unbinds the coercive aspects 
of wage labour, partially decommodifi es labour, and thus transforms the 
political relationship between labour and capital.
This transformation – making work voluntary rather than coerced – has a 
number of signifi cant consequences. In the fi rst place, it increases class power 
by reducing slack in the labour market. Surplus populations show what 
happens when there are large amounts of slack in the labour market: wages 
fall, and employers are free to debase workers.108 By contrast, when the labour 
market is tight, labour gains the political edge. The economist Michał Kalecki 
recognised this long ago when he argued that it explained why full employ-
ment would be resisted at every step.109 If every worker were employed, the 
threat of being fi red would lose its disciplinary character – there would be 
more than enough jobs waiting just outside. Workers would gain the upper 
hand, and capital would lose its political power. The same dynamic holds for 
a basic income: by eliminating the reliance on wage labour, workers gain 
control over how much labour to supply, giving them signifi cant power in the 
labour market. Class power is also increased in a variety of other ways. Strikes 
are easier to mobilise, since workers no longer have to worry about pay being 
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docked or dwindling strike funds. The amount of time spent working for a 
wage can be modifi ed to one’s own desire, with free time spent building 
communities and engaging with politics. One can slow down and refl ect, 
safely protected from the constant pressures of neoliberalism. The anxieties 
that surround work and unemployment are reduced with the safety net of a 
UBI.110 Moreover, the demand for UBI combines the needs of the employed, 
the unemployed, the underemployed, migrant labour, temporary workers, 
students and the disabled.111 It articulates a common interest between these 
groups and provides a populist orientation for them to mobilise towards.
The second related feature of UBI is that it transforms precarity and unem-
ployment from a state of insecurity to a state of voluntary fl exibility. It is often 
forgotten that the initial push for fl exible labour came from workers, as a way 
of demolishing the constraining permanency of traditional Fordist labour.112 
The repetitiveness of a nine-to-fi ve job, combined with the tediousness of 
most work, is hardly an appealing prospect for a life-long career. The demands 
of care labour often require a fl exible approach as well, further undermining 
the appeal of traditional jobs. Marx himself invokes the liberating aspects of 
fl exible labour in his famous claim that communism ‘makes it possible for 
me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fi sh 
in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have 
a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fi sherman, herdsman or critic’.113 In 
the face of these desires for fl exibility, capital adapted and co-opted them into 
a new form of exploitation. Today, fl exible labour simply presents itself as 
precarity and insecurity, rather than freedom. The UBI responds to this 
generalisation of precarity and transforms it from a state to be feared back 
into a state of liberation.
Third, a basic income would necessitate a rethinking of the values 
attributed to different types of work. Given that workers would no longer be 
forced to take a job, they could instead simply reject jobs that paid too little, 
required too much work, offered too few benefi ts, or were demeaning and 
undignifi ed. Low-waged work is often crass and disempowering, and under a 
programme of UBI it is unlikely that many would want to undertake it. The 
result would be that hazardous, boring and unattractive work would have to 
be better paid, while more rewarding, invigorating and attractive work would 
be less well paid. In other words, the nature of work would become a measure 
of its value, not merely its profi tability.114 The outcome of this revaluation 
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would also mean that, as wages for the worst jobs rose, there would be new 
incentives to automate them. UBI therefore forms a positive-feedback loop 
with the demand for full automation. On the other hand, a basic income 
would not only transform the value of the worst jobs, but also go some way 
towards recognising the unpaid labour of most care work. In the same way 
that the demand for wages for housework recognised and politicised the 
domestic labour of women, so too does UBI recognise and politicise the 
generalised way in which we are all responsible for reproducing society: from 
informal to formal work, from domestic to public work, from individual to 
collective work. What is central is not productive labour, defi ned in either 
traditional Marxist or neoclassical terms, but rather the more general category 
of reproductive labour.115 Given that we all contribute to the production and 
reproduction of capitalism, our activity deserves to be remunerated as well.116 
In recognising this, the UBI indicates a shift from remuneration based upon 
ability to remuneration based upon basic need.117 All the genetic, historical 
and social variations that make effort a poor measure of a person’s worth are 
rejected here, and instead people are valued simply for being people.
Finally, a basic income is a fundamentally feminist proposal. Its disregard 
for the gendered division of labour overcomes some of the biases of the 
traditional welfare state predicated upon a male breadwinner.118 Equally, it 
recognises the contributions of unwaged domestic labourers to the 
reproduction of society and provides them with an income accordingly. The 
fi nancial independence that comes with a basic income is also crucial to 
developing the synthetic freedom of women. It enables experimentation with 
different forms of family and community structure that are no longer bound 
to the model of the privatised nuclear family.119 And fi nancial independence 
can reconfi gure intimate relationships as well: one of the more unexpected 
fi ndings of experiments with UBI has been that the divorce rate tended to 
rise.120 Conservative commentators jumped on this as proof of the demand’s 
immorality, but higher divorce rates are easily explained as women gaining 
the fi nancial means to leave dysfunctional relationships.121 A basic income 
can therefore enable easier experimentation with the family structure, more 
possibilities for the provision of childcare and an easier transformation of the 
gendered division of labour. Moreover, unlike the demand for ‘wages for 
housework’ in the 1970s, the demand for UBI promises to break out of the 
wage relation rather than reinforce it.
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While a universal basic income may appear economically reformist, its 
political implications are therefore signifi cant. It transforms precarity, it 
recognises social labour, it makes class power easier to mobilise, and it 
extends the space in which to experiment with how we organise communities 
and families. It is a redistribution mechanism that transforms production 
relations. It is an economic mechanism that changes the politics of work. 
And in terms of class struggle, there is little to distinguish full employment 
from full unemployment: both tighten the labour market, give power to 
labour, and make it more diffi cult to exploit workers. Full unemployment 
has the added advantages of not being reliant upon the gendered division of 
labour between the household and the formal economy, of not keeping 
workers chained to the wage relation, and of allowing workers autonomy 
over their lives. For all of these reasons, the classic social democratic 
demand for full employment should be replaced with the future-orientated 
demand for full unemployment.
THE RIGHT TO BE LAZY
What are the impediments to implementing a basic income? While the prob-
lem of funding UBI appears immense, most research in fact suggests that it 
would be relatively easy to fi nance through some combination of reducing 
duplicate programmes, raising taxes on the rich, inheritance taxes, 
consumption taxes, carbon taxes, cutting spending on the military, cutting 
industry and agriculture subsidies, and cracking down on tax evasion.122 The 
most diffi cult hurdles for UBI – and for a post-work society – are not economic, 
but political and cultural: political, because the forces that will mobilise 
against it are immense; and cultural, because work is so deeply ingrained into 
our very identity. We will examine the political obstacles in the next two 
chapters, but turn to the cultural ones here.
One of the most diffi cult problems in implementing a UBI and building a 
post-work society will be overcoming the pervasive pressure to submit to the 
work ethic.123 Indeed, the failure of the United States’ earlier attempt to 
implement a basic income was primarily because it challenged accepted 
notions about the work ethic of the poor and unemployed.124 Rather than 
seeing unemployment as the result of a defi cient individual work ethic, the 
UBI proposal recognised it as a structural problem. Yet the language that 
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framed the proposal maintained strict divisions between those who were 
working and those who were on welfare, despite the plan effacing such a 
distinction. The working poor ended up rejecting the plan out of a fear of 
being stigmatised as a welfare recipient. Racial biases reinforced this resist-
ance, since welfare was seen as a black issue, and whites were loath to be 
associated with it. And the lack of a class identifi cation between the working 
poor and unemployed – the surplus population – meant there was no social 
basis for a meaningful movement in favour of a basic income.125 Overcoming 
the work ethic will be equally central to any future attempts at building a 
post-work world. As we saw in Chapter 3, neoliberalism has established a set 
of incentives that compel us to act and identify ourselves as competitive 
subjects. Orbiting around this subject is a constellation of images related to 
self-reliance and independence that necessarily confl ict with the programme 
of a post-work society. Our lives have become increasingly structured around 
competitive self-realisation, and work has become the primary avenue for 
achieving this.126 Work, no matter how degrading or low-paid or inconvenient, 
is deemed an ultimate good. This is the mantra of both mainstream political 
parties and most trade unions, associated with rhetoric about getting people 
back into work, the importance of working families, and cutting welfare so 
that ‘it always pays to work’. This is matched by a parallel cultural effort 
demonising those without jobs. Newspapers blare headlines about the 
worthlessness of welfare recipients, TV shows sensationalise and mock the 
poor, and the ever looming fi gure of the welfare cheat is continually evoked. 
Work has become central to our very self-conception – so much so that when 
presented with the idea of doing less work, many people ask, ‘But what would 
I do?’ The fact that so many people fi nd it impossible to imagine a meaningful 
life outside of work demonstrates the extent to which the work ethic has 
infected our minds.
While typically associated with the protestant work ethic, the submission 
to work is in fact implicit in many religions.127 These ethics demand dedica-
tion to one’s work regardless of the nature of the job, instilling a moral imper-
ative that drudgery should be valued.128 While originating in religious ideas 
about ensuring a better afterlife, the goal of the work ethic was eventually 
replaced with a secular devotion to improvement in this life. More contem-
porary forms of this imperative have taken on a liberal-humanist character, 
portraying work as the central means of self-expression.129 Work has come to 
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be driven into our identity, portrayed as the only means for true self-
fulfi lment.130 In a job interview, for instance, everyone knows the worst 
answer to ‘Why do you want this job?’ is to say ‘Money’, even as it remains the 
repressed truth. Contemporary service work heightens this phenomenon. In 
the absence of clear metrics for productivity, workers instead put on 
performances of productivity – pretending to enjoy their job or smiling while 
being yelled at by a customer. Working long hours has become a sign of 
devotion to the job, even as it perpetuates the gender pay gap.131 With work 
tied so tightly into our identities, overcoming the work ethic will require us 
overcoming ourselves.
The central ideological support for the work ethic is that remuneration be 
tied to suffering. Everywhere one looks, there is a drive to make people suffer 
before they can receive a reward. The epithets thrown at homeless beggars, 
the demonization of those on the dole, the labyrinthine system of bureau-
cracy set up to receive benefi ts, the unpaid ‘job experience’ imposed upon 
the unemployed, the sadistic penalisation of those who are seen as getting 
something for free – all reveal the truth that for our societies, remuneration 
requires work and suffering. Whether for a religious or secular goal, suffering 
is thought to constitute a necessary rite of passage. People must endure 
through work before they can receive wages, they must prove their worthiness 
before the eyes of capital. This thinking has an obvious theological basis – 
where suffering is thought to be not only meaningful, but in fact the very 
condition of meaning. A life without suffering is seen as frivolous and mean-
ingless. This position must be rejected as a holdover from a now-transcended 
stage of human history. The drive to make suffering meaningful may have 
had some functional logic in times when poverty, illness and starvation were 
necessary features of existence. But we should reject this logic today and 
recognise that we have moved beyond the need to ground meaning in suffer-
ing. Work, and the suffering that accompanies it, should not be glorifi ed.
What is needed, therefore, is a counter-hegemonic approach to work: a 
project that would overturn existing ideas about the necessity and desirability 
of work, and the imposition of suffering as a basis for remuneration. The 
media is already changing the conditions of possibility – positioning UBI as 
not only a possible solution, but increasingly as a necessary solution to prob-
lems of technological unemployment. These hegemonic trends should be 
amplifi ed. The dominance of the work ethic also runs up against the changing 
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material basis of the economy. Capitalism demands that people work in order 
to make a living, yet it is increasingly unable to generate enough jobs. The 
tensions between the value accorded to the work ethic and these material 
changes will only heighten the potential for transformation of the system. 
Actions to make precarity and joblessness an increasingly visible political 
problem would go some way to generating the support for a post-work society. 
(In the same way that Occupy raised awareness of inequality, and UK Uncut 
highlighted tax evasion.)132 Perhaps most importantly, there is already a 
widespread hatred for jobs that can be tapped into. Much as neoliberal 
hegemony co-opted real desires and garnered active consent, so too must any 
post-work hegemony fi nd its active force in the real desires of people. The 
widespread demand that others adopt the work ethic is matched only by the 
disdain we feel for our own jobs. Today, across the world, only 13 per cent of 
people say they fi nd their jobs engaging.133 Physically degraded, mentally 
drained and socially exhausted, most workers fi nd themselves under immense 
amounts of stress in their jobs. For the vast majority of people, work offers no 
meaning, fulfi lment or redemption – it is simply something to pay the bills. 
Those already excluded from jobs should not be fi ghting for inclusion in a 
society of work and labour, but rather be building the conditions to reproduce 
their lives outside of work. Changing the cultural consensus about the work 
ethic will mean taking actions at an everyday level, translating these medium-
term goals into slogans, memes and chants. It will require undertaking the 
diffi cult and essential work of workplace organizing and campaigning – of 
mobilising people’s passions in order to topple the dominance of the work 
ethic. The success of these efforts will be clear when media discussions about 
automation shift from fear-mongering over lost jobs to celebrations of the 
freedom from drudgery.134
THE REALM OF FREEDOM
A twenty-fi rst-century left must seek to combat the centrality of work to 
contemporary life. In the end, our choice is between glorifying work and the 
working class or abolishing them both.135 The former position fi nds its expres-
sion in the folk-political tendency to place value upon work, concrete labour 
and craftwork. Yet the latter is the only true postcapitalist position. Work must 
be refused and reduced, building our synthetic freedom in the process.136 As 
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we have set out in this chapter, achieving this will require the realisation of 
four minimal demands:
1. Full automation
2. The reduction of the working week
3. The provision of a basic income
4. The diminishment of the work ethic
While each of these proposals can be taken as an individual goal in itself, 
their real power is expressed when they are advanced as an integrated 
programme. This is not a simple, marginal reform, but an entirely new 
hegemonic formation to compete against the neoliberal and social demo-
cratic options. The demand for full automation amplifi es the possibility of 
reducing the working week and heightens the need for a universal basic 
income. A reduction in the working week helps produce a sustainable econ-
omy and leverage class power. And a universal basic income amplifi es the 
potential to reduce the working week and expand class power. It would also 
accelerate the project of full automation: as worker power rose and as the 
labour market tightened, the marginal cost of labour would increase as 
companies turned towards machinery in order to expand.137 These goals 
resonate with each other, magnifying their combined power. And a new post-
work hegemony would be resistant to reversion, having created a mass 
constituency benefi ting from its continuation.138 The ambition here is to take 
back the future from capitalism and build ourselves the twenty-fi rst-century 
world we want. It is to provide the time and money that are central to any 
meaningful conception of freedom. The traditional battle cry of the left, 
demanding full employment, should therefore be replaced with a battle cry 
demanding full unemployment. But let us be clear: there is no technocratic 
solution, and there is no necessary progression into a post-work world. The 
struggles for full automation, a shorter working week, the end of the work 
ethic and a universal basic income are primarily political struggles. The post-
work imaginary generates a hyperstitional image of progress – one that aims 
to make the future an active historical force in the present. The struggles that 
such a project will face require that the left move past its folk-political horizon, 
rebuild its power and adopt an expansive strategy for change. It is to these 
issues that we now turn.
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Chapter 7
A New Common Sense
The key is to succeed in making ‘common sense’ go in a direction of change.
Pablo Iglesias
A post-work society holds a potentially broad appeal and would materially 
improve the lives of most – but this is no guarantee of it coming about. Media 
discussions of basic income and automation today often seem to assume the 
benevolence of elites, the political neutrality of technology and the 
inevitability of a post-work society. Yet an array of powerful forces is invested 
in the continuation of the status quo, and the left has been devastated over 
the past few decades. Misery remains more likely than luxury. Under current 
conditions, automation is likely to cause more unemployment, with the 
benefi ts of new technologies going to their wealthy owners. Any free time we 
get will be eliminated with the production of dreary new jobs or the extension 
of precarious existence. And if a basic income were achieved tomorrow, it 
would almost certainly be set below poverty levels and simply act as a handout 
to companies. To achieve a meaningful post-work society therefore requires 
changing the present political conditions. In turn, this requires the left to face 
squarely up to the dismal situation before it: trade unions lying in ruin, 
political parties rendered into neoliberal puppets, and a waning intellectual 
and cultural hegemony. State and corporate repression of the left has 
signifi cantly intensifi ed in recent decades, legal changes have made it more 
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diffi cult to organise, generalised precarity has made us more insecure, and 
the militarisation of policing has rapidly gathered speed.1 And beyond this 
lies the fact that our inner lives, our social world and our built environment 
are organised around work and its continuation. The shift to a post-work 
society, much like the shift to a decarbonised economy, is not just a matter of 
overcoming a few elite interests. More fundamentally, it is a matter of 
transforming society from the ground up. An engagement with the totality of 
power and capital is inevitable, and we should be under no illusions about 
the diffi culties facing such a project. If full transformational change is not 
immediately possible, our efforts must be directed towards cracking open 
those spaces of possibility that do exist and fostering better political conditions 
over time. We must fi rst reach a space within which more radical demands 
can be meaningfully articulated, and must therefore prepare for the long 
term if we wish to alter the terrain of politics substantially.
This ought not to be entirely unexpected. Capitalism did not emerge all at 
once, but instead percolated to a position of dominance over the course of 
centuries.2 A large number of components had to be put in place: landless 
labourers, widespread commodity production, private property, technical 
sophistication, centralisation of wealth, a bourgeois class, a work ethic, and so 
on. These historical conditions are the components that enabled the systemic 
logic of capitalism eventually to gain traction in the world. The lesson here is 
that, just as capitalism relied upon the accumulation of a particular set of 
components, so too will postcapitalism. It will neither emerge all at once nor 
in the wake of some revolutionary moment. The task of the left must be to 
work out the conditions for postcapitalism and to struggle to build them on a 
continually expanding scale.
This chapter therefore begins from the premise that the contemporary left 
is in a dire situation and that any transformative project will take time. We 
limit our analysis here largely to Western capitalist democracies, with their 
peculiar apparatuses of political and economic power. We will mostly leave 
aside the immense (and immensely important) regions of the rest of the 
world.3 However, it is worth reiterating that the problems of automation and 
surplus populations are global in nature, and the grounds for post-work are 
fl ourishing around the world – as demonstrated by recent experiments with 
basic incomes in India and Namibia, the surge in industrial automation 
across the most populous regions of the world, and the spontaneous 
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emergence of movements against work in numerous countries. Though these 
dynamics are global, any political project to transform this situation will 
necessarily need to respond to particular conditions on the ground. While 
certain core principles will be translatable between contexts, they will need 
to be realised differently under different circumstances. With these 
qualifi cations in mind, how can a better future be built? The classic Leninist 
strategy of building dual power with a revolutionary party and overthrowing 
the state is obsolete.4 Proponents of the Bolshevik Revolution model appear 
more useful as historical re-enactors than as guides for contemporary politics. 
Likewise, the recent history of revolutions – from the Iranian Revolution to 
the Arab Spring – has simply led to some combination of theocratic 
authoritarianism, military dictatorship and civil war. The electoral reformist 
approach is equally a failure. The idea of voting in a new world mutated into 
a convivial elite consensus during the postwar era and became ensconced 
within neoliberal ideology in recent decades. At its best, such reformism is 
doomed simply to ameliorate capitalism and act as a type of politically 
mediated homeostatic system. And as the latest cycle of struggles has shown, 
the folk-political approach of prioritising various forms of immediacy has 
failed to transform society. Piecemeal efforts, defensive struggles, withdrawals 
and prefi gurative pockets of activity have been largely incapable of stemming 
the tide, let alone gaining ground on global capitalism. Equally, it remains 
insuffi cient simply to posit that progress will be worked out in practice or that 
the masses will spontaneously create a better world.5 While there are 
undoubtedly elements of luck and unpredictability in any struggle, the 
diffi culty of building a new world demands that strategic thought be carried 
out in advance. Our efforts must be organised strategically along broad lines, 
rather than dissipating into a series of partial and disconnected achievements. 
As modernity asserts, progress towards a better future comes on the back of 
deliberate refl ection and conscious action.
Given the limits of these other approaches, we argue that the best way 
forward is a counter-hegemonic strategy. This is a strategy that is adaptable 
from positions of weakness, is scalable from the local to the global, and recog-
nises the hold that capitalism has over every aspect of our lives, from our most 
intimate desires to the most abstract fi nancial fl ows. A counter-hegemonic 
strategy entails a project to overturn the dominant neoliberal common sense 
and rejuvenate the collective imagination. Fundamentally, it is an attempt to 
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install a new common sense – one organised around the crisis of work and its 
effects on the proletariat. In this, it involves preparatory work for moments 
when full-scale struggle erupts, transforming our social imagination and 
reconfi guring our sense of what is possible. It builds up support and a 
common language for a new world, seeking to alter the balance of power in 
preparation for when a crisis upsets the legitimacy of society. Unlike forms of 
folk politics, such a strategy is expansive, long-term, comfortable with abstrac-
tion and complexity, and aimed at overthrowing capitalist universalism.6 In 
this chapter, we examine three possible sites of struggle – over the intellec-
tual, cultural and technological mediums of neoliberal hegemony. The next 
section will examine hegemony at a theoretical level, while the rest of the 
chapter will explore illustrations of how a counter-hegemonic project might 
be put into practice – through utopian narratives, pluralist economics and 
the repurposing of technologies.
ENGINEERING CONSENT
The idea of ‘hegemony’ initially emerged as a way of explaining why ordinary 
people were not revolting against capitalism.7 According to the traditional 
Marxist narrative, workers would become increasingly aware of the exploita-
tive nature of capitalism and eventually organise to transcend it. Capitalism, 
it was believed, ought to be producing an ever more polarised world of capi-
talists versus the working class, in a process that underpinned a political strat-
egy in which the organised working class would win control over the state 
through revolutionary means. But by the 1920s it was clear that this was not 
about to happen in western European democratic societies. How was it, then, 
that capitalism and the interests of the ruling classes were secured in demo-
cratic societies largely devoid of overt force? The Italian Marxist Antonio 
Gramsci answered that capitalist power was dependent on what he termed 
hegemony – the engineering of consent according to the dictates of one 
particular group. A hegemonic project builds a ‘common sense’ that installs 
the particular worldview of one group as the universal horizon of an entire 
society. By this means, hegemony enables a group to lead and rule over a 
society primarily through consent (both active and passive) rather than coer-
cion.8 This consent can be achieved in a variety of ways: the formation of 
explicit political alliances with other social groups, the dissemination of 
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cultural values supporting a particular way of organising society (for example, 
the work ethic instilled by the media and through education), the alignment 
of interests between classes (for example, workers are better off when a capi-
talist economy is growing, even if this means mass inequality and environ-
mental devastation) and through building technologies and infrastructures in 
such a way that they silently constrain social confl ict (for example, by widen-
ing streets to prevent the erection of barricades during insurrections). In a 
broad and diffuse sense, hegemony enables relatively small groups of capital-
ists to ‘lead’ society as a whole, even when their material interests are at odds 
with those of the majority. Finally, as well as securing active and passive 
consent, hegemonic projects also deploy coercive means, such as imprison-
ment, police violence and intimidation, to neutralise those groups that 
cannot otherwise be led.9 Taken together, these measures enable small groups 
to infl uence the general direction of a society, sometimes through the 
achievement and deployment of state power, but also outside the confi nes of 
the state.
The latter point is particularly important, because hegemony is not just 
a strategy of governance for those in power, but also a strategy for the 
marginal to transform society. A counter-hegemonic project enables 
marginal and oppressed groups to transform the balance of power in a 
society and bring about a new common sense. To abjure hegemony 
therefore implies an abandonment of the basic idea of winning and 
exercising power, and is to effectively give up on the primary terrain of 
political struggle.10 While there are some on the left who explicitly endorse 
such a position,11 to the degree that horizontalist movements have been 
successful they have tended to operate as a counter-hegemonic force. 
Occupy’s major success – transforming the public discourse around 
inequality – is a prime example of this. A counter-hegemonic project will 
therefore seek to overturn an existing set of alliances, common sense, and 
rule by consent in order to install a new hegemony.12 Such a project will 
seek to build the social conditions from which a new post-work world can 
emerge and will require an expansive approach that goes beyond the 
temporary and local measures of folk politics. It requires mobilisation across 
different social groups,13 which means linking together a diversity of 
individual interests into a common desire for a post-work society. The 
neoliberal hegemony in the United States, for instance, came about by 
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linking together the interests of economic liberals with those of social 
conservatives. This is a fractious (sometimes even contradictory) alliance, 
but it is one that fi nds common interests in the broad neoliberal framework 
by emphasising individual freedoms.14 In addition, counter-hegemonic 
projects operate across diverse fi elds – from the state, to civil society,
to the material infrastructure. This means an entire battery of actions are 
needed, such as seeking to spread media infl uence, attempting to win state 
power, controlling key sectors of the economy and designing important 
infrastructures. This project requires empirical and experimental work to 
identify the parts of these various fi elds that are operating to reinforce the 
present general direction of society. The Mont Pelerin Society is a good 
example of this. Painstakingly aware of the ways in which Keynesianism was 
the hegemonic common sense of its time, the MPS undertook the long-
term task of taking apart the elements that sustained it. This was a project 
that took decades to come to full fruition, and during that time the MPS 
had to undertake counter-hegemonic actions in order to install it. Such 
long-term thinking is an important corrective to the tendency today to focus 
on immediate resistance and new daily outrages. However, hegemony is 
not just an immaterial contestation of ideas and values. Neoliberalism’s 
ideological hegemony, for example, depends upon a series of material 
instantiations – paradigmatically in the nexus of government power, media 
framing and the network of neoliberal think tanks. As we observed in our 
examination of the rise of neoliberalism, the MPS was particularly adept at 
creating an intellectual infrastructure, consisting of the institutions and 
material paths necessary to inculcate, embody and spread their worldview.
The combination of social alliances, strategic thinking, ideological work 
and institutions builds a capacity to alter public discourse. Crucial here is the 
idea of the ‘Overton window’ – this is the bandwidth of ideas and options that 
can be ‘realistically’ discussed by politicians, public intellectuals and news 
media, and thus accepted by the public.15 The general window of realistic 
options emerges out of a complex nexus of causes – who controls key nodes 
in the press and broadcast media, the relative impact of popular culture, the 
relative balance of power between organised labour and capitalists, who 
holds executive political power, and so on. Though emerging from the inter-
section of different elements, the Overton window has a power of its own to 
shape which future paths are taken by societies and governments. If something 
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is not deemed ‘realistic’, then it will not even be tabled for discussion and its 
proponents will be silenced as ‘unserious’. We can evaluate the success of 
neoliberal ideas in terms of this by the degree to which they have framed 
what is possible over a period of more than thirty years.16 While it has never 
been possible to convince the majority of the population of the positive merits 
of key neoliberal policies, active assent is unnecessary. A sequence of 
neoliberal administrations throughout the world, in conjunction with a 
network of think tanks and a largely right-leaning media, have been able to 
transform the range of possible options to exclude even the most moderate of 
socialist measures.17 Through this, the hegemony of neoliberal ideas has 
enabled the exercise of power without always requiring executive state power. 
Providing that the window of possible options can be stretched further to the 
right, it matters little whether right-wing governments hold power – a reality 
that the US Republican Party has consistently exploited over the last two 
decades, often to the surprise of those on the liberal left. Ideological hegem-
ony as we present it here is therefore not about maintaining a strict party line 
on what can be discussed. Simply bringing leftist issues and categories into 
positions of prominence would already be a major step forward.
While often understood as something that pertains to ideas, values and 
other immaterial aspects of society, there is in fact also a material sense to 
hegemony. The physical infrastructures of our world exert a signifi cant 
hegemonic force upon societies – imposing a way of life without overt coer-
cion. For instance, with regard to urban infrastructure, David Harvey writes 
that ‘projects concerning what we want our cities to be are . . . projects 
concerning human possibilities, who we want, or perhaps even more perti-
nently, who we do not want to become’.18 Infrastructure such as suburbs in 
the United States was built with the explicit intention of isolating and indi-
vidualising existing solidarity networks, and installing a gendered division 
between the private and the public in the form of single-family households.19 
Economic infrastructures also serve to modify and sculpt human behaviours. 
Indeed, technical infrastructures are often developed for political as well as 
economic purposes. If we think of global just-in-time supply chains, for exam-
ple, these are economically effi cient under capitalism, but also exceptionally 
effective in breaking the power of unions. In other words, hegemony, or rule 
by the engineering of consent, is as much a material force as it is a social one. 
It is something embedded in human minds, social and political organisations, 
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individual technologies and the built environment that constitutes our 
world.20 And, whereas the social forces of hegemony must be continually 
maintained, the materialised aspects of hegemony exert a force of momentum 
that lasts long past their initial creation.21 Once in place, infrastructures are 
diffi cult to dislodge or alter, despite changing political conditions. We are 
facing up to this problem now, for example, with the infrastructure built up 
around fossil fuels. Our economies are organised around the production, 
distribution and consumption of coal, oil and gas, making it immensely 
diffi cult to decarbonise the economy. The fl ipside of that problem, though, is 
that once a postcapitalist infrastructure is in place, it would be just as diffi cult 
to shift away from it, regardless of any reactionary forces. Technology and 
technological infrastructures therefore pose both signifi cant hurdles for 
overcoming the capitalist mode of production, as well as signifi cant potentials 
for securing the longevity of an alternative. This is why, for example, it is 
insuffi cient even to have a massive populist movement against the current 
forms of capitalism. Without a new approach to things like production and 
distribution technologies, every social movement will fi nd itself forced back 
into capitalistic practices.
The left must therefore develop a sociotechnical hegemony: both in the 
sphere of ideas and ideology, and in the sphere of material infrastructures. The 
objective of such a strategy, in a very broad sense, is to navigate the present 
technical, economic, social, political and productive hegemony towards a new 
point of equilibrium beyond the imposition of wage labour. This will require 
long-term and experimental praxis on multiple fronts. A hegemonic project 
therefore implies and responds to society as a complex emergent order, the 
result of diverse interacting practices.22 Some combinations of social practices 
will lead to instability, but others will tend towards more stable (if not literally 
static) outcomes. In this context, hegemonic politics is the work that goes into 
retaining or navigating towards a new point of relative stability across a variety 
of societal subsystems, from the national-level politics of the state, to the 
economic domain, from the battle of ideas and ideologies to different regimes 
of technology. The order which emerges as a result of the interactions of these 
different domains is hegemony, which works to constrain certain kinds of 
action and enable others. In the rest of this chapter, we examine three possible 
channels through which to undertake this struggle: pluralising economics, 
creating utopian narratives and repurposing technology. These certainly do 
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not exhaust the points of possible attack, but they do identify potentially 
productive areas to focus resources on.
REMEMBERING THE FUTURE
Today, one of the most pervasive and subtle aspects of hegemony is the limi-
tations it imposes upon our collective imagination. The mantra ‘there is no 
alternative’ continues to ring true, even as more and more people strive 
against it. This marks a signifi cant change from the long twentieth century, 
when utopian imaginaries and grandiose plans for the future fl ourished. 
Images of space fl ight, for instance, were constant ciphers for humanity’s 
desire to control its destiny.23 In pre-Soviet Russia, there was remarkably 
widespread fascination with space exploration. Though aviation was still a 
novelty, the dreams of space fl ight promised ‘total liberation from the signifi ers 
of the past: social injustice, imperfection, gravity, and ultimately, the Earth’.24 
The utopian inclinations of the time made sense of the rapidly changing 
world, gave credence to the belief that humanity could channel history in a 
rational direction and cultivated anticipations for a future society. In the 
more mystical formulations, cosmists argued with admirable ambition that 
geoengineering and space exploration were only partial steps towards the real 
goal: resurrecting the entirety of the dead.25 Meanwhile, more secular 
approaches outlined detailed plans for fully automated economies, mass 
economic democracy, the end of class society and the fl ourishing of 
humanity.26 Such was the level of enthusiasm and belief in imminent space 
travel that in 1924 a riot nearly erupted when rumours circulated about a 
possible rocket fl ight to the moon.27 Popular culture was saturated with these 
images and with stories in which technological and social revolution 
intertwined. But these were not simply matters of extraterrestrial fantasy, as 
they had concrete effects on people’s ways of living. In the post-revolutionary 
period, this culture of ambition fostered a series of social experiments with 
new ways of communal living, domestic arrangements and political 
formations.28 These experiments gave credence to the idea that anything was 
achievable in a time of rapid modernisation, lending support to the Bolsheviks 
and the people. While utopian ambitions were largely forced underground 
during the Stalinist era, they re-emerged in the 1950s with the growth of 
newfound economic confi dence and the resources to make good on some of 
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the earlier dreams.29 The greatest moments of the Soviet experiment – the 
launch of Sputnik and the economic dominance that it appeared on the 
verge of attaining in the 1950s – were ultimately inseparable from a popular 
culture imbued with utopian desires.30 A similar period of utopian ambition 
also held sway in the early years of the United States. Fuelled by a widespread 
belief that the new industrial capitalism was temporary and that a better 
world would soon emerge, workers militantly struggled for this new world. In 
a climate far more hostile than our own, labour was able to create an array of 
strong organisations and exert signifi cant pressure.31 The successes of this 
time were inseparable from a broader utopian culture.
By contrast, today’s world remains fi rmly confi ned within the parameters 
of capitalist realism.32 The future has been cancelled. We are more prone to 
believing that ecological collapse is imminent, increased militarisation inevi-
table, and rising inequality unstoppable. Contemporary science fi ction is 
dominated by a dystopian mindset, more intent on charting the decline of the 
world than the possibilities for a better one.33 Utopias, when they are proposed, 
have to be rigorously justifi ed in instrumental terms, rather than allowed to 
exist in excess of any calculation. Meanwhile, in the halls of academia the 
utopian impulse has been castigated as naive and futile. Browbeaten by 
decades of failure, the left has consistently retreated from its traditionally 
grand ambitions. To give but one example: whereas the 1970s saw radical 
feminism and queer manifestos calling for a fundamentally new society, by 
the 1990s these had been reduced to a more moderate identity politics; and 
by the 2000s discussions were dominated by even milder demands to have 
same-sex marriage recognised and for women to have equal opportunities to 
become CEOs.34 Today, the space of radical hope has come to be occupied 
by a supposedly sceptical maturity and a widespread cynical reason.35 And the 
goals of an ambitious left, which once aimed at the total transformation of 
society, have been reduced down to minor tinkering at the edges of society.
We believe that an ambitious left is essential to a post-work programme, 
and that to achieve this, the future must be remembered and rebuilt.36 
Utopias are the embodiment of the hyperstitions of progress. They demand 
that the future be realised, they form an impossible but necessary object of 
desire, and they give us a language of hope and aspiration for a better world. 
The denunciations of utopia’s fantasies overlook the fact that it is precisely 
the element of imagination that makes utopias essential to any process of 
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political change. If we want to escape from the present, we must fi rst dismiss 
the settled parameters of the future and wrench open a new horizon of possi-
bility. Without the belief in a different future, radical political thinking will 
be excluded from the beginning.37 Indeed, utopian ideas have been central to 
every major moment of liberation – from early liberalism, to socialisms of all 
stripes, to feminism and anti-colonial nationalism. Cosmism, afro-futurism, 
dreams of immortality, and space exploration – all of these signal a universal 
impulse towards utopian thinking. Even the neoliberal revolution cultivated 
the desire for an alternative liberal utopia in the face of a dominant Keynesian 
consensus. But any competing left utopias have gone sorely under-resourced 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We therefore argue that the left must 
release the utopian impulse from its neoliberal shackles in order to expand 
the space of the possible, mobilise a critical perspective on the present 
moment and cultivate new desires.
First, utopian thought rigorously analyses the current conjuncture and 
projects its tendencies out into the future.38 Whereas scientifi c approaches 
attempt to reduce discussions of the future to fi t within a probabilistic frame-
work, utopian thought recognises that the future is radically open. What may 
appear impossible today might become eminently possible. At their best, 
utopias include tensions and dynamism within themselves, rather than 
presenting a static image of a perfected society. While irreducible to instru-
mental concerns, utopias also foster the imagination of ideas that might be 
implemented when conditions change. For example, the nineteenth-century 
Russian cosmists were among the fi rst to think seriously about the social 
implications and potentials of space fl ight. Initially considered ineffectual 
dreamers, they ended up heavily infl uencing the future science of rocketry.39 
Likewise, early science fi ction dealing with space exploration and cosmist 
utopias went on to infl uence state policy towards science and technology in 
the wake of the Russian Revolution.40 The creation of alternatives also makes 
it possible to recognise that another world is possible in the fi rst place.41 As 
the fl awed but signifi cant global alternative posed by the USSR disappears 
from living memory, such images of a different world become increasingly 
important, widening the Overton window and experimenting with ideas 
about what might be achieved under different conditions.
In elaborating an image of the future, utopian thought also generates a 
viewpoint from which the present becomes open to critique.42 It suspends the 
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appearance of the present as inevitable and brings to light aspects of the world 
that would otherwise go unnoticed, raising questions that must be 
constitutively excluded.43 Recent US science fi ction, for instance, has often 
been written in response to contemporary issues of race, gender and class, 
while early Russian utopias imagined worlds that overcame the problems 
posed by rapid urbanisation and confl icting ethnicities.44 These worlds not 
only model solutions, but illuminate problems. As Slavoj Žižek notes in his 
discussion of Thomas Piketty, the seemingly modest demand to implement a 
global tax actually implies a radical reorganisation of the entire global politi-
cal structure.45 Implicit within this small claim is a utopian impulse, since the 
conditions for making it possible require such a fundamental reconfi guration 
of existing circumstances. Likewise, the demand for a universal basic income 
provides a perspective from which the social nature of work, its invisible 
domestic aspect and its extension to every area of our lives become more 
readily apparent. The ways we organise our work lives, families and commu-
nities are given a fresh appearance when viewed from the perspective of a 
post-work world. Why do we devote one-third of our lives in submission to 
someone else? Why do we insist that domestic work (performed primarily by 
women) go unpaid? Why are our cities organised around lengthy, dreary 
commutes from the suburbs? The utopian demand from the future therefore 
implores us to question the givens of our world. In these ways, utopias can be 
both a negation of the present and an affi rmation of a possible future.46
Finally, in affi rming the future, utopia functions as an affective modulator: 
it manipulates and modifi es our desires and feelings, at both conscious and 
pre-conscious levels. In all its variations, utopia ultimately concerns the 
‘education of desire’.47 It provides a frame for us, telling us both how and what 
to desire, while unleashing these libidinal elements from the bounds of the 
reasonable. Utopias give us something to aim for – something beyond the 
stale repetition of the same offered by the eternal present of capitalism. In 
cracking open the present and providing an image of a better future, the 
space between the present and the future becomes the space for hope and the 
desire for more.48 By generating and channelling these affects, utopian think-
ing can become a spur to action, a catalyst for change; it disrupts habits and 
breaks down consent to the existing order.49 Futural thinking, extended by 
communications mechanisms,50 generates collective affects of hope that 
mobilise people to act on behalf of a better future – affects that are necessary 
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to any political project.51 While utopian thinking rejects the melancholy and 
transcendental miserabilism found in some parts of the contemporary left, it 
also invokes its own negative affect.52 The obverse of hope is disappointment 
(an affect that is today embodied in fi gures like the young ‘graduate with no 
future’).53 Whereas anger has traditionally been the dominant affect of the 
militant left, disappointment invokes a more productive relation – not merely 
a willed transformation of the status quo, but also a desire for what-might-be. 
Disappointment indexes a yearning for a lost future.
If the left is to counter the common sense of neoliberalism (‘there’s not 
enough money’, ‘everyone must work’, ‘government is ineffi cient’), utopian 
thinking will be essential. We need to think big. The natural habitat of the 
left has always been the future, and this terrain must be reclaimed. In our 
neoliberal era, the drive for a better world has largely been whittled away 
under the pressures and demands of everyday existence. In this repression, 
what has been lost is that ambition to produce ‘a world that exceeds – existen-
tially, aesthetically, as well as politically – the miserable confi nes of bourgeois 
culture’.54 But as an apparently universal and irrepressible characteristic of 
human cultures, utopian thinking can surge forth under even the most 
repressive conditions.55 Utopian inclinations play out across the human spec-
trum of feelings and affects – embodied in popular culture, high culture, 
fashion, city planning, and even quotidian daydreaming.56 The popular desire 
for space exploration, for instance, points to a curiosity and ambition that lies 
beyond the profi t motive.57 The like-minded trend of afro-futurism offers not 
only a highly stylised image of a better future, but also ties it to a radical 
critique of existing structures of oppression and a remembrance of past strug-
gles. The post-work imaginary also contains numerous historical precedents 
in utopian writing, pointing to a constant striving to move beyond the 
constraints of wage labour. Cultural movements and aesthetic production 
have essential roles to play in reigniting the desire for utopia and inspiring 
visions of a different world.
NAVIGATING NEOLIBERALISM
While utopias seek to transform the cultural hegemony of neoliberalism, 
education forms a key institution for transforming intellectual hegemony. It 
is the educational apparatus that indoctrinates new generations in the 
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dominant values of a particular society, reproducing its ideology through the 
decades. In the education system, children learn the basic ideas of a society, 
respect for (in fact, submission to) the existing order, and the skills necessary 
to distribute them along different segments of the labour market.58 
Transforming the educational system of intellectuals is therefore a key task in 
building a new hegemony.59 It is not for nothing that the Nobel Prize–winning 
economist Paul Samuelson wrote that: ‘I don’t care who writes a nation’s laws, 
or crafts its advanced treatises, if I can write its economics textbooks.’ Projects 
focused on changing this institutional element of society could focus on 
three broad goals: pluralising the teaching of economics, reinvigorating the 
study of leftist economics and expanding popular economic literacy.
It is often forgotten, so deeply are we embedded in neoliberalism, that 
economics was once a relatively pluralist discipline. The interwar period was 
a time of healthy competition between a variety of formalist and non-
formalist approaches.60 In academic journals, it was not unusual to see 
discussions of economic planning, the tendency for the rate of profi t to fall, 
and other standard categories of Marxist economics. In the 1960s, the 
Cambridge capital controversy brought together heterodox and mainstream 
thinkers in a seminal debate about the foundations of the discipline – one 
that everyone admits the heterodox thinkers won.61 As late as the 1970s, one 
of the founders of modern economics was discussing exploitation, the labour 
theory of value and the transformation problem in a leading economics 
journal.62 Such an event is diffi cult to imagine today. While neoclassical 
economics is a large tent that contains a variety of approaches, it is nevertheless 
a fundamentally limited perspective on what counts as real economic 
knowledge. This problem is compounded by the particular methodological 
demands of the most preeminent journals, with formal modelling taking 
precedence over more sociological analyses and qualitative understandings.
If the broad cultural and academic ideas of how to run economies are to 
change, at a minimum it will require more pluralism in the education of 
students. Here, there are glimmers of hope for a pluralist revival. Work is 
being done across the world to bring alternative economics to mainstream 
universities, and groups of students and professionals alike are beginning to 
mobilise around this issue. Since 2000, numerous universities have seen 
students vocally demand pluralism in their economics education.63 More 
recent years have seen students openly protesting the defenders of mainstream 
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economics, and the emergence of groups like the Post-Crash Economic 
Society and Rethinking Economics that are making concerted efforts to 
change the curriculum.64 Essential to a project of pluralising economics, 
however, is the development of a research programme and textbooks. Part of 
the reason for the rise of formalist approaches is precisely their fi t with 
institutional requirements of higher education: they provided theories for 
researchers to spend time testing, textbooks and PhDs to continue a lineage 
of thought, and clear and transmissible principles.65 Today, the fi eld has come 
to be dominated by neoclassical textbooks, and the result is that, even if 
professors want to pluralise the discipline, they do not have many accessible 
resources to hand.66 Indications that this might be changing include the 
creation of a heterodox textbook by two proponents of modern monetary 
theory.67 But more work needs to be done on this front in order to broaden 
the parochial horizons of mainstream economics.
To support this process, there should be a movement to rejuvenate leftist 
economics. The dearth of economic analysis on the left could be seen in the 
wake of the 2008 crisis, when the most prominent critical response was a 
makeshift Keynesianism. The left was largely without a meaningful and desir-
able economic programme, having focused primarily on the critique of capi-
talism rather than the elaboration of alternatives. This is a crisis of utopian 
imagination, but also of cognitive limits. A series of emerging contemporary 
phenomena must be thought through carefully: for instance, the causes and 
effects of secular stagnation; the transformations invoked by the shift to an 
informational, post-scarcity economy; the changes wrought by the introduc-
tion of full automation and a universal basic income; the possible approaches 
to collectivising automated manufacturing and services; the progressive 
potentials of alternative approaches to quantitative easing; the most effective 
ways to decarbonise the means of production; the implications of dark pools 
for fi nancial instability – and so on. Equally, research should be revived on 
what postcapitalism might look like in practice. Beyond a few outdated clas-
sics, very little research has been done to think through an alternative 
economic system – even less so in the wake of emerging technologies like 
additive manufacturing, self-driving vehicles and soft AI.68 What role, for 
instance, could non-state cryptocurrencies have? How does one measure 
value if not by abstract or concrete labour? How can ecological concerns be 
fully accounted for in a postcapitalist economic framework? What mechanism 
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can replace the market and overcome the socialist calculation problem?69 
And what are the likely effects of the possible tendency for the rate of profi t to 
fall?70 Building a postcapitalist world is as much a technical task as a political 
one, and in order to begin thinking about it, the left needs to overcome its 
general aversion to formal modelling and mathematics. There is no small 
amount of irony in the fact that the same people who criticise the abstraction 
of mathematical modelling often adhere to the most abstract dialectical 
readings of capitalism. This recognition of the uses of quantitative methods 
does not mean simply adopting neoclassical models or slavishly following the 
dictates of numbers, but the rigour and computational elaboration that can 
come with formal modelling are essential for grappling with the complexity 
of the economy.71 However, from modern monetary theory to complexity 
economics, from ecological to participatory economics, trajectories of 
innovative thought are being launched – even if they remain marginal for 
now. Equally, organisations like the New Economics Foundation are leading 
the way in creating models of the economy that can inform leftist political 
goals, as well as fostering public literacy in economic matters.
The latter point is particularly important, as increasing economic literacy 
means not only transforming the practice of academic economists, but also 
making the economy intelligible to non-specialists. Sophisticated analyses of 
economic trends need to be connected to the intuitive insights of everyday 
lives. While, for the near future, the revival of leftist economics is likely to be 
centred in academia, the aim should be to spread such economics education 
far beyond the confi nes of universities. Unions could use their resources to 
educate their members about the changing nature of the contemporary econ-
omy. Through internal education programmes, rank-and-fi le workers can 
begin to situate the problems of their workplaces and communities within a 
larger economic context. Similar approaches can be – and in many cases 
already are – achieved through the training of activists. Open schools provide 
another medium for education, giving the public a chance to learn about 
ideas that are too often made impenetrable by academic jargon, and from 
which they are excluded by exorbitant tuition and publisher fees. There is a 
long tradition in the UK of working-class education, which can be drawn 
upon to learn from. For example, the Workers’ Educational Association 
already provides low-cost adult education to local communities.72 Such insti-
tutions provide ways in which abstract economic understandings can be 
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linked up with the on-the-ground knowledge of workers, activists and 
community members, each mutually shaping the other. Working 
systematically to develop pluralism, economic research and public education 
will play a signifi cant role in strengthening the utopian narratives outlined in 
the previous section, and providing the necessary navigational tools to chart a 
course out of capitalism.
REPURPOSING TECHNOLOGY
As we argued above, hegemony is embedded not only in the ideas of a society, 
but also in the built environment and technologies that surround us. These 
objects carry a politics within them: they facilitate particular uses and actions, 
while simultaneously constraining others. For instance, our current infra-
structure tends to shape our societies into individualistic, carbon-based, 
competitive forms, regardless of what individuals or collectives may want. 
The signifi cance of these politicised infrastructures is only increasing as 
technology expands into the smallest nano-scales and out to the largest post-
planetary formations. No aspect of our lives remains untouched by technology, 
and indeed, many would argue that humanity is intrinsically technological.73 
In response to this materialised hegemony – one thoroughly constructed by 
and implicated in capitalism – a few different options present themselves. A 
fi rst position argues we must destroy this built environment in order to ever 
liberate ourselves.74 While this argument reaches its zenith in primitivism 
and its demand to be done with civilisation, similar inclinations permeate the 
left today. Given the devastation such a project would bring about, and the 
theoretical ineptitude behind these claims, we consider this position little 
more than an academic curiosity. A second position instead argues that tech-
nology is the basis for a postcapitalist order, but that any meaningful focus on 
changing our technology should wait until after the political project of post-
capitalism is achieved.75 This would undoubtedly make our task simpler, but, 
given the pervasive entanglement of technology with politics, and given the 
latent potentials in current technology, we believe the far more prudent 
option is to look at how developments can be redirected today, and existing 
technology repurposed immediately. A third approach therefore focuses on 
invention and emphasises that the choice of which technologies to develop 
and how they are designed is primarily a political matter.76 The direction of 
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technological development is determined not only by technical and economic 
considerations, but also by political intentions. More than just seizing the 
means of production, this approach declares the need to invent new means 
of production. A fi nal approach focuses on how existing technology contains 
occluded potentials that strain at our current horizon and how they might be 
repurposed.77 Under capitalism, technology’s potential is drastically 
constrained – reduced to a mere vehicle for generating profi t and controlling 
workers. Yet potentials continue to exist in excess of these current uses.78 The 
task before us is to uncover the hidden potentials and link them up to scala-
ble processes of change. This is ultimately a utopian intervention, insofar as 
repurposing aims to ignite collective imagination about what can be done 
with the resources to hand.79
We have, therefore, two effective strategies in approaching the question of 
technological hegemony. In the fi rst approach, the focus is on the invention 
and adoption of new technologies, emphasising that we can create tools of 
change. In this vein, some have called for greater democratic control over the 
design and implementation of infrastructures and technologies.80 In the 
workplace, this means struggling over which technologies are brought in and 
how they are used. Given that technologies are rarely, if ever, introduced all 
at once, there is a lengthy period of time in which to leverage power to gain 
control over how technologies are being developed and implemented. The 
rejection of surveillance measures is one of the most obvious goals, but 
workplace struggle also means resisting technologies which simply intensify, 
speed up and worsen working conditions.81 At the level of the state, there is 
an equally strong case to be made for democratic control over technology 
development, given that most signifi cant innovations come from public-
sector fi nancing rather than the private sector. It is the state that leads 
signifi cant technological revolutions – from the internet to green technology, 
nanotechnology, the algorithm at the heart of Google’s search engine, and all 
of the major components of Apple’s iPhone and iPad.82 The microprocessor, 
the touchscreen, the GPS, the batteries, the hard drive and SIRI are just a few 
of the components that emerged from government investment.83 The fact of 
the matter is that capitalist markets tend towards short-term views and low-risk 
investments. It is governments that provide the long-term resources that 
enable major innovative changes to develop and fl ourish, whereas contempo-
rary venture capital increasingly tends towards the generation of short-term 
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profi t.84 It is governments that make investments in high-risk developments 
that are likely to fail – but for that reason are also likely to lead to major 
changes. Given government’s role in technological development and 
consumer product innovation, public funding should be under democratic 
control. This would mean that governments have a role to play not only in 
the rate of technological development, but more importantly in its direc-
tion.85 Particularly signifi cant here are what have been called ‘mission-
oriented’ projects.86 These do not aim at product differentiation and marginal 
improvements to existing goods, but are instead concerned with large-scale 
inventive projects such as space travel and the internet. This is revolutionary 
development, aimed at creating entirely new paths of technology and open to 
the possibility of unexpected innovations emerging in the process. Under 
democratic control, it could respond to the biggest social problems of the day 
and foster large-scale thinking by, for instance, using state investment banks 
to shape the social value of projects through funding decisions.87 A forward-
thinking government could support mission-oriented projects such as decar-
bonising the economy, fully automating work, expanding cheap renewable 
energy,88 exploring synthetic biology, developing cheap medicine, supporting 
space exploration and building artifi cial intelligence. The challenge is to 
develop institutional mechanisms that will enable popular control over the 
direction of technological creation.
Public control over how government funds are spent for development was 
also at the heart of a series of worker-based struggles in the 1970s. In now 
largely forgotten experiments, workers in the UK and Japan (and later across 
Brazil, India and Argentina) sought to channel technological development 
towards the production of ‘socially useful goods’.89 These were goods that 
responded to social needs and were produced in such a way as to minimise 
waste, be ecologically sustainable, and respect workers and their skills.90 The 
most infl uential of these projects occurred at Lucas Aerospace in the UK – a 
company that focused on producing high-tech components, predominantly 
for the military, and received signifi cant government funding.91 Faced with 
rising structural unemployment and impending redundancies, workers at 
Lucas Aerospace came together to develop an alternative proposal for how to 
run the company and maintain jobs. Their basic argument was that, given 
the public funds being channelled into the corporation, society should have 
a say in, and benefi t from, how these resources were being used. This was an 
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argument that entailed channelling resources away from military armaments 
and into useful products. In order to develop the proposal for socially useful 
goods, the workers compiled a list of the skills and equipment available to 
them, took on the perspective of planners, sought product suggestions from 
workers and their communities, and collectively decided how these technolo-
gies and skills could be repurposed to different ends.92 Rather than high-tech 
military equipment, the existing capacities were to be repurposed to design 
and produce medical technologies, renewable energy, safety improvements, 
and heating technology for social housing.93 The fi nal plan ran to over 1,200 
pages and included detailed proposals for 150 products.94 In order for it to 
achieve its political goals against an intransigent management, the strategy 
undertaken was in many ways a counter-hegemonic project, with workers 
explicitly aiming to ‘infl ame the imaginations of others’ and revise what 
people thought production was for.95
Notably, the Lucas Plan refused to remain a temporary space of prefi gura-
tive politics, and instead aimed to mobilise the resources of unions and 
governments in an effort to create a new hegemonic order. In this endeavour, 
the plan resonated with peace activists, environmentalists, feminists and 
other labour movements, leading to the building of international connec-
tions and a wave of worker-led action.96 Ultimately, however, the stagnation 
of the Labour Party and national trade unions, combined with the rising turn 
to neoliberalism, meant that the Lucas Plan fell short of its goals. But the 
successes it had – slowing job losses – were largely the result of moving 
beyond defensive approaches and towards creating an alternative.97 Despite 
these failures, the Lucas Plan demonstrates a clear example of how repurpos-
ing the productive forces of society might be used to transform the techno-
logical direction of society. This was not an attempt simply to build a worker-
controlled factory in the middle of a profi t-orientated economy; more 
radically, it was an attempt to reorganise technological development away 
from marginal weapon improvements and towards socially useful goods.98 It 
is an ideal model of how technical knowledge, political awareness and collec-
tive power can be combined to achieve a radical repurposing of the material 
world.
An even more ambitious project of repurposing occurred in Chile in the 
early 1970s. The newly elected government of Salvador Allende sought to 
transform Chile into a socialist nation through gradualist change, 
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implemented through the existing economic and political institutions. A 
crucial part of this process was the development of Cybersyn, an innovative 
attempt at decentralised economic planning that sought to connect fi rms 
throughout the country to government and bureaucratic functions. The 
project involved transforming cybernetics from what has often been excori-
ated as a system of control99 into an infrastructure of democratic socialism. 
The Cybersyn system was designed not for an omnipotent and external 
central government, but as a partial and internal modulator of ongoing 
economic fl ows.100 It was intended to give workers a say in the planning 
process and enable factories to self-manage, all while giving a rational 
orientation to the national economy. To achieve these goals, Cybersyn was to 
include a proto-internet connecting factories, an economic simulator to test 
out policies, a statistical forecaster to predict problems, and an operations 
room taken straight from science fi ction. But US hostility to the country 
made it virtually impossible to purchase new computers, and attempted deals 
with France only came to fruition after Allende had been overthrown.101 The 
result was that Chile’s effort to build a cybernetic socialism largely had to 
repurpose existing technologies in order to stand any chance at being success-
ful. It was a sort of bricolage approach, using what was available and cobbling 
together something new. At the time, Chile possessed only four mainframe 
computers (only one of which was available to Cybersyn)102 and fi fty comput-
ers around the nation – so the proto-internet was pared down, and based 
instead on more widely available telex machines. The ambition for a system 
of democratic, worker-managed enterprises was ultimately cut short by the 
US-backed coup that ended Allende’s regime in 1973. But while the project 
was never fully realised, parts of Cybersyn nevertheless demonstrated their 
potential in one notable experience. Faced with rising opposition from the 
economic elite, in 1972 the government had to deal with a strike by over 
40,000 truck owners.103 The petite bourgeoisie sought to undermine the 
government by preventing shipping of essential materials for factory produc-
tion. But workers took over factories and continued to drive trucks wherever 
possible, while the national government deployed the telex network of 
Cybersyn in order to coordinate around the blockades and the strike. 
Effectively, as the preeminent historian of Cybersyn writes, ‘the network 
offered a communications infrastructure to link the revolution from above, 
led by Allende, to the revolution from below, led by Chilean workers and 
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members of grassroots organisations’.104 In other words, the strike showed the 
potential of Cybersyn for repurposing the infrastructure of society towards 
democratic and socialist ends. It enabled a historically unique and promising 
vision of what an alternative future might have looked like. In the end, there-
fore, the experiment provides an imaginative and utopian example of the 
repurposing of cybernetic principles, existing Chilean technology and 
cutting-edge software.105
While the previous examples suggest how repurposing could be the focus 
of immediate political projects, more speculative propositions can also be 
imagined for a postcapitalist future. As a central source of productivity and 
the expansion of our capacities to act, technological innovations form an 
essential part of any mode of production beyond capitalism. A new world will 
have to be built, not on the ruins of the old, but on the most advanced 
elements of the present. Today we see the occluded potentials of this approach 
everywhere, in the fact that the technologies for achieving classic leftist goals 
(reduced work, increased abundance, greater democratic control) are more 
available than ever before. The problem is that they remain encased within 
social relations that obscure these potentials and render them impotent. In 
this context, the demand to refl ect upon and repurpose technologies operates 
to reignite a utopian imagination in the heart of a stale capitalism. An entire 
array of possibilities already exists. The last chapter examined automation 
technologies as a key hinge between capitalism and postcapitalism, but 
repurposing extends much further than just the automation of the productive 
forces. Similar arguments have been mobilised around logistics networks, 
around repurposing cities for ecological reasons and around deploying the 
latest computing technology for postcapitalist ends.106 Pinpointing these sorts 
of technologies can help to focus energy on political struggles over their 
development and use. Logistics provides a particularly signifi cant example, 
insofar as it simultaneously exploits wage differentials, enables global 
production and is at the leading edge of automation. Without denying the 
signifi cance of logistics to the project of exploiting cheap labour across the 
world, it is possible to see that logistics would be useful to postcapitalism in a 
variety of ways.107 Its uses, in other words, go far beyond just capitalist ones. 
First, any postcapitalist economy will require fl exibility in both production 
(for example, additive manufacturing) and distribution (for example, just-in-
time logistics). This enables an economy to be responsive to changes in 
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individual consumption, unlike the grand and infl exible planning efforts of 
the Soviet era. Without these technologies, postcapitalism would risk 
repeating all the economic problems already seen in the fi rst communist 
experiment.108 Second, global logistics makes possible the use of a wide array 
of comparative advantages – not simply wage differentials. To cite one 
example: research has found that it is more environmentally friendly for 
certain agricultural goods to be produced in New Zealand and shipped to the 
UK, as opposed to being produced and consumed in the UK.109 Even after 
being shipped across the world, they still have a smaller carbon footprint. The 
simple reason for this is that reproducing the appropriate climate in the UK 
would involve intense energy consumption. Such environmental compara-
tive advantages only exist where there is an effi cient and global logistics 
network. Finally, logistics is at the forefront of the automation of work, and 
therefore represents a prime example of what a postcapitalist world might 
look like: machines humming along and handling the diffi cult labour that 
humans would otherwise be forced to do. It is worth recalling that before the 
logistics revolution, transporting goods was a physically demolishing task for 
the bodies of workers. The automation of this labour is something to be 
applauded, not held back for parochial reasons. For all these reasons, logistics 
therefore presents an important transition technology between capitalism 
and postcapitalism.
But there are important limits to repurposing. The Soviets, for example, 
believed that capitalist technologies and techniques could simply be taken 
over and turned towards communist ends,110 but these technologies were 
biased towards maximal effi ciency and rigorous control by management.111 
Given their wholesale adoption of capitalist machinery and management 
techniques, it was no surprise that the system tended towards capitalist modes 
of operation. Workers became – once again – mere cogs in the machine, 
deprived of autonomy and coerced into working harder. The ambitious plan 
to conquer the capitalist means of production ran aground on the reality that 
power relationships are embedded within technologies, which cannot there-
fore be infi nitely bent towards purposes that oppose their very functioning.112 
Numerical control technologies, for example, have been used to set the pace 
of production, forcing workers to keep up with a machine – rendering the 
power of management more indirect and invisible.113 In this way, machines 
can conceal power relations by making them appear as simple mechanical 
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processes. Yet repurposing remains possible in spite of these limits because 
there is often a signifi cant untapped reservoir of potentials lying dormant 
within a technology. The diffi cult point to understand is that, in the words of 
one historian, ‘Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral.’114 Any 
given technology is political but fl exible, as it always exists in excess of the 
purposes for which it may have been designed.115 Rather, the design, meaning 
and impact of a technology are constantly shifting, altering as users transform 
it and as its environment changes.116 Paraphrasing Spinoza, we can say that 
we know not what a sociotechnical body can do. Who among us fully 
recognises what untapped potentials await discovery in the technologies that 
have already been developed? What sorts of postcapitalist communities could 
be built upon the material we already have? Our wager is that the true trans-
formative potentials of much of our technological and scientifi c research 
remain unexplored.
How, then, can we distinguish between technologies that are bound by 
their limits and technologies whose properties offer potential affordances for 
a postcapitalist future? There is no a priori way to determine the potentials of 
a technology, but we can still establish broad parameters to adjudicate on the 
potentials of a technology, and to apply these in thinking through the specifi c 
aspects of individual technologies.117 In terms of criteria, one approach is to 
determine what functions constitute necessary and/or exhaustive aspects of a 
technology. For example, if a technology’s only role is that of exploiting work-
ers, or if such a role is absolutely necessary to its deployment, then it can have 
no place in a postcapitalist future. Taylorism, based necessarily on the control 
and heightened exploitation of workers, would be rejected according to these 
criteria. Nuclear weapons, requiring the capacity to infl ict mass destruction, 
would likewise have no place in a postcapitalist world.118 For the most part, 
however, technologies will be more ambiguous than that. If technology 
designed to reduce skilled labour permits domination by a managerial class, 
it also opens up spaces for job-sharing and the reduction of work. If technol-
ogy that reduces production costs reduces the percentage of people employed, 
it also reduces the need for people to work. If a technology that centralises 
decision-making over infrastructures facilitates private control, it also provides 
a nodal point for collective decision-making. These technologies embody 
both potentials at the same time, and the task of repurposing is simply one of 
how to alter the balance between them. One goal of any future-orientated left 
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could be to outline these broad parameters of adjudication, and to pursue 
further research and analysis in determining how specifi c technologies can 
be repurposed and mobilised towards a postcapitalist project. This is particu-
larly crucial for workers involved in the technology sector who are, through 
their design choices, building the terrain of future politics.119 Let us be clear, 
though: without a simultaneous shift in the hegemonic ideas of society, new 
technologies will continue to be developed along capitalist lines, and old 
technologies will remain beholden to capitalist values.
This hegemonic strategy is therefore necessary to any project to transform 
society and the economy. And in many senses, hegemonic politics is the 
antithesis to folk politics. It seeks to persuade and infl uence, rather than 
presuming spontaneous politicisation; it works on multiple scales, rather than 
just the tangible and local; it sets out to achieve forms of social power that are 
long-lasting, rather than temporary; and it operates in domains that are often 
not superfi cially ‘political’ at all, rather than focusing on the most spectacular 
political mediums, such as street protests. A counter-hegemonic strategy 
would include efforts to transform the common sense of society, revive a 
utopian social imagination, rethink the possibilities of economics, and even-
tually repurpose technological and economic infrastructures. None of these 
steps are suffi cient, but they are examples in which concrete action can be 
taken to build the social and material conditions for a post-work world. They 
prepare the ground for a moment when transformative change can occur, 
backed by a mass movement. However, the strategy of counter-hegemony as 
it has been outlined so far remains abstract. What is needed is some sense of 
exactly how a counter-hegemonic strategy might gain traction in the real 
world. Hegemony needs to be constructed, and power needs to be built. We 
turn next to how such power can be constructed, and who will be building it.
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Chapter 8
Building Power
Constructing a people is the main task of radical politics.
Ernesto Laclau
A strategy may indicate the broad direction to take, but it still leaves open the 
question of what forces exist to carry it out. Any strategy requires an active social 
force, mobilised into a collective formation, acting upon the world. But while 
putting a counter-hegemonic strategy into practice will require the use of 
power, the left has been both overwhelmed by and systematically rendered 
averse to the use of power.1 The traditional agents of leftist power (the working 
class and its associated institutional forms) have wilted under attacks from the 
right and from their own stagnation. Meanwhile, chastened by the failures of 
previous attempts at social transformation, many have mobilised behind 
marginal and defensive folk-political actions.2 Yet building a post-work world 
will involve large-scale social transformation and require building capacity for 
the use of power. This chapter argues that, in order to install a new hegemonic 
order, at least three things will be required: a mass populist movement, a 
healthy ecosystem of organisations and an analysis of points of leverage.3 The 
questions of class unity and organisational form are subjects of perennial debate 
among the left. Class unity is thought to generate networks of solidarity, strength 
in numbers, confi dence and an awareness of common interests. Likewise, 
organisational strength provides leadership, coordination, stability over time 
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and the concentration of resources. Leverage points are less often discussed, 
but no less important. These are points of political or economic power that can 
be used to compel others to adapt to the interests of a particular group.4 The 
classic tactic of the strike, for instance, aims to disrupt production in order to 
force the owners to accede to workers’ demands. Without such leverage points, 
change can only come about when it is in the interests of the powerful. This 
chapter examines these three elements for building power and outlines some 
ways forward. What follows is not intended as an exhaustive or suffi cient 
prescription for what should be done, but offers refl ections on the limits of 
historical precedents, and an argument for the signifi cance of the factors listed 
above for rebuilding the power of the left. Reconstructing this power is probably 
the most diffi cult task facing the left today, yet it is an essential task if a post-
work world is to emerge from the devastation wrought by neoliberalism.
A POPULIST LEFT
Perhaps the most important question for building power is the question of who 
will be the active agent of a post-work project. What social positions will fi nd a 
post-work society in their interest? The most obvious answer is one we have 
already seen: the expanding surplus population. Indeed, as workers in devel-
oped countries fall back into precarity, and as more and more of the global 
population is incorporated as ‘free’ labourers under capitalism, the basic prole-
tarian condition is coming to characterise a wider swathe of people. We are all, 
as Marx argued, virtual paupers. At fi rst glance, these trends therefore seem to 
support a traditional Marxist narrative, whereby the working class was supposed 
to achieve a dominant position by incorporating ever greater numbers of people 
and simplifying its economic position.5 Condensed into increasingly large 
industrial factories, the working class was forecast to unite in physical terms 
(sharing space), in terms of its interests (reduced labour, higher wages), and 
eventually in terms of consciousness (becoming aware of its position as a prole-
tariat). The deskilling of labour would eliminate hierarchies between skilled 
and unskilled labour, while high demand for labour would mean capital cared 
little about identity-based divisions (over race, gender, nationality).6 This did 
occur in some places and at some times. For instance, while the early twentieth 
century saw the US black working class violently excluded from white unions, 
after World War II these racial divisions began to break down in many areas.7 
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Distinctions based on age, sex, skill, nation and income were likewise supposed 
to fall aside as capitalism progressed.8 Perhaps most importantly, this emerging 
working class had strategic importance because of its access to a set of leverage 
points centred on production. Strikes, factory takeovers, slow-downs and simi-
lar tactics were all designed to disrupt the production process and force manage-
ment and capitalists to acquiesce to working-class demands.9 This class – para-
digmatically comprised of white, male factory workers – was therefore predicted 
to become large, homogeneous and powerful, making it the vanguard of a post-
capitalist revolution. But this did not happen. The working class fragmented, 
its organisational structures fell apart, and today ‘there is no longer a class frac-
tion that can hegemonise the class’.10
Under the combined pressures of deindustrialisation, the globalisation of 
production, the rise of service economies, the expansion of precarity, the demise 
of classic Fordist footholds and the proliferation of diverse identities,
the industrial working class has become severely fractured. Across the
world, the traditional working class is predominantly marginal in terms of its 
strength (with a few exceptions in countries such as South Africa and Brazil).11 
The Chinese labour movement has some strength, but even here the outsourcing 
of production to peripheral countries is already working to undermine its power.12 
The power of the global working class is today severely compromised, and a 
return to past strength seems unlikely. As it stands today, the classical revolutionary 
subject therefore no longer exists; there is only a diverse array of partly overlapping 
interests and divergent experiences. However, we might question the idea that 
the industrial working class was ever in a position to transform the world – today’s 
situation is not so different from the early years of the labour movement. First, the 
image of worker unity has always been more of an aspirational vision than an 
achieved reality. From its origins, the proletariat was riven by divisions – between 
the waged male worker and the unwaged female labourer, between the ‘free’ 
worker and the unfree slave, between skilled craftsmen and unskilled labourers, 
between the core and periphery, and between nation-states.13 The tendency to 
unify was always a limited phenomenon, and these differences persist today, 
exacerbated under conditions of a globalised division of labour. Perhaps more 
fundamentally, if deindustrialisation (the automation of manufacturing) is a 
necessary stage along the path towards a postcapitalist society, then the industrial 
working class could never have been the agent of change. Its existence was 
predicated upon economic conditions that would have to be eliminated in the 
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transition to postcapitalism. If deindustrialisation is required for the transition to 
postcapitalism, then the industrial working class was inevitably going to lose its 
power in the process – fragmenting and falling apart, just as we have seen in 
recent decades.
Who, then, can be the transformative subject today? Despite the growing 
size of the surplus population and common immiseration of the proletariat, we 
must accept that no answer readily presents itself. The breakdown of lines 
between employed and unemployed, formal and informal, coincides with the 
decline in a coherent transformative agent. The fragmentation of traditional 
groups of resistance and revolt and the generalised decomposition of the 
working class means that the task today must be to knit together a new collective 
‘we’. There is no pre-existing group that would embody universal interests or 
constitute the necessary vanguard of this transformative project – not the 
industrial worker, not the intellectual labourer and not the lumpenproletariat. 
How, then, to compose a people in light of the fragmentation of the proletariat?14 
In practice, there are a variety of ways to organise such a convergence. As we 
saw, the classic Marxist approach presupposed that the tendencies of capitalism 
would heighten the division between classes and lead to the unity of the 
proletariat. Others have argued for a unity on the basis of generic common 
interests – biological need, for instance – but minimal commonalities tend to 
lead to minimal demands.15 By contrast, in the Occupy movements, unity often 
emerged out of physical proximity – bodies working and living together in 
camps. Yet such unity often papered over real differences, making it nothing 
more than a fragile façade. When the physical proximity was destroyed in the 
dismantling of occupied spaces, unity rapidly collapsed. With the Arab Spring, 
meanwhile, unity was forged through opposition to shared tyrannical opponents, 
bringing together a disparate series of groups.16 However, these recent 
experiences demonstrate that a unity built solely upon opposition tends to 
break down when the opponent falls.
The problem for a post-work project is that, despite the underlying 
commonality of proletarian existence, this provides only a minimal cohesion, 
which can support a vast range of divergent experiences and interests.17 The 
challenge facing a transformative politics is to articulate this series of differ-
ences into a common project – without simply asserting that class struggle is 
the only real struggle. Under these conditions, it is no surprise to see that 
many of the most promising political struggles in recent years have identifi ed 
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themselves as populist movements rather than class movements.18 By 
‘populism’, we do not mean a sort of mindless mass movement, or a lowest-
common-denominator revolt, or a movement with any particular political 
content.19 Populism is instead a type of political logic by which a collection of 
different identities are knitted together against a common opponent and in 
search of a new world.20 From the anti-globalisation movements, to Syriza in 
Greece, Podemos in Spain, numerous Latin American movements, and 
Occupy across the Western world, these movements have mobilised large 
cross-sections of society rather than just particular class identities.21
These populist movements have originated out of the frustration of unmet 
demands. Under normal democratic circumstances, demands are dealt with 
separately and within existing institutions – for instance, minimum wage 
increases, unemployment benefi ts and healthcare provision. Small changes 
are granted, but institutional arrangements, including society as a whole, are 
never questioned. In this fashion, existing hegemonies can be reinforced and 
threats generally modulated effectively. By contrast, a populist movement 
begins to emerge when these demands – for fair pay, social housing, childcare, 
and so on – are increasingly blocked. As the leading thinker on political 
populism, Ernesto Laclau, explains:
Once we move beyond a certain point, what were requests within institu-
tions became claims addressed to institutions, and at some stage they 
became claims against the institutional order. When this process has 
overflown the institutional apparatuses beyond a certain limit, we start 
having the people of populism.22
Particular interests become increasingly general in this process, and populism 
emerges, set resolutely against the existing order. The ‘people’, unlike traditional 
class groupings, are held together by a nominal unity even in the absence of any 
conceptual unity. The people is a complex, contested and constructed actor. 
They name themselves as a coherent group, rather than having any necessary 
unity of material interests. This helps to explain why, for instance, it was so 
diffi cult to pin down the politics of the Occupy movement. The 99 per cent 
was held together more by a name than by any common politics. This nominal 
unity is complemented by populism naming the fracture in society and the 
opposition against which they set themselves.23 In naming an enemy, it becomes 
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possible for a wide range of people to see their interests and demands expressed 
by the movement. Occupy, for example, named the 1 per cent, Podemos 
named ‘the caste’, and Syriza named the Troika. As with the naming of the 
people, the naming of the antagonism has some attachment to empirical facts, 
but need not be bound by them. The division that Occupy posited between the 
1 per cent and the 99 per cent, for instance, is an antagonism that mobilised 
people despite its lack of empirical accuracy.24 The naming of the people and 
their opposition is a political act, not a scientifi c statement. Both the people 
and the antagonism in society are therefore constituted through an act of 
nomination. This represents a response to the impossibility of simply reading 
off the antagonism of society from brute historical necessity, in an era where 
class identities have fragmented and differences proliferated.
In order for the ‘people’ of populism to emerge, however, additional 
elements are necessary. First, one particular demand or struggle must come to 
stand in for the rest. The Occupy movement, for example, mobilised a range 
of local, regional and national grievances that became knotted together under 
the struggle against inequality. In such cases, it is not a particular group which 
seeks recognition from society, but rather a particular group which comes to 
speak universally for society. In order to do so, however, it must be seen to 
embody multiple interests. It must stand not only for its own self-interest but 
come to actually refl ect a broad array of interests.25 For a traditional working-
class movement, common interests would be suffi cient to secure the allegiance 
of all. But in a populist movement, the absence of an immediate unity based 
on material interests means its coherence is perpetually plagued by a tension 
between the struggle that has come to stand in for the rest and those other 
struggles. Populism thus involves a continual negotiation of differences and 
particularisms, seeking to establish a common language and programme in 
spite of any centrifugal forces. The difference between a populist movement 
and folk-political approaches lies in this stance towards differences: whereas 
the former seeks to build a common language and project, the latter prefers 
differences to express themselves as differences and to avoid any universalising 
function. The mobilisation of a populist movement around anti-work politics 
would require articulating a populism in such a way that a variety of struggles 
for social justice and human emancipation could see their interests being 
expressed in the movement. Importantly, anti-work politics provides such 
resources: for example, it is perhaps the best option for a red-green coalition, 
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insofar as it overcomes the tensions between an economic programme of jobs 
and growth and an environmental programme of decreased carbon emissions. 
The post-work project is also an inherently feminist one, recognising the 
invisible labour carried out predominantly by women, as well as the 
feminisation of the labour market, and the necessity of providing fi nancial 
independence for women’s full liberation. Equally, it links up with anti-racist 
struggles, insofar as black and other minority populations are disproportionately 
affected by high unemployment and the mass incarceration and police 
brutality associated with jobless communities. Finally, the post-work project 
builds upon postcolonial and indigenous struggles with the aim of providing a 
means of subsistence for the massive informal labour force, as well as 
mobilising against barriers to immigration.26
Articulating the character of a movement that can bring together such 
differences helps to emphasise the importance of demands to any proper 
populism. Demands form a key medium for building unity, and must there-
fore connect in multiple ways with different people.27 Such demands do not 
presume to know in advance who will be called into action by them, but they 
allow people to see their own particular interests within them while neverthe-
less maintaining their differences from each other.28 For example, the demands 
of an anti-work politics have different meanings for a university student, a 
single mother, an industrial worker, and those outside the labour force; but in 
spite of these differences, each of them can fi nd their own interests repre-
sented in the call for a post-work society. Mobilising these people together and 
under the name of a demand then becomes the work of on-the-ground poli-
tics. A movement predicated on a populist logic can therefore give consistency 
to a series of diffuse grievances and requests, without necessarily negating 
differences.29 Particular demands are inscribed into a coherent narrative artic-
ulating how various demands share a common antagonist. This is why a vision 
of the future is essential to a proper populism, and it is what many recent 
populist movements have lacked. Occupy, for instance, never translated the 
negative moment of insubordination into a positive political project around 
which the people could be organised. It never combined diverse interests into 
a project for a better future, remaining at the negative level of rejection and 
never providing an ‘autonomous focus of subjectivation’.30
In the end, while the post-work project demands that centrality be given to 
class, it is not suffi cient to mobilise only on the basis of class interests. A broad 
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spectrum of society needs to be brought together as an active and transforma-
tive force. It is to this need that populism responds. Yet the negotiation of 
commonality at the level of slogans, demands, signs, symbols and identities 
cannot remain the primary level on which such politics is conducted. A 
populist movement also needs to act in and through a series of organisations, 
as well as aiming to achieve the overturning of neoliberal common sense and 
create a new one in its place. It must seek to build hegemonic forms of power, 
in all their diverse forms, both inside and outside the state.
ORGANISATIONAL ECOLOGY
Organisation is a key mediator between discontent and effective action – it trans-
forms a certain quantity of people into a qualitatively different form of power. As 
the Occupy movement, the anti-war movement and the anti-globalisation 
movement have made clear, the problem with the left is not necessarily one of 
raw numbers. On a purely quantitative level, the left is not noticeably ‘weaker’ 
than the right – in terms of its ability to achieve popular mobilisation, the reverse 
seems to be true. Particularly in times of crisis, the left seems eminently capable 
of mobilising a populist movement. The problem lies in the next step: how that 
force is organised and deployed. For folk politics, organisation has meant a 
fetishistic attachment to localist and horizontalist approaches that often under-
mine the construction of an expansive counter-hegemonic project.31 Yet this 
organisational fetishism is one of the most detrimental aspects of recent leftist 
thought: the belief that if only the proper form of organisation is developed, 
political success will follow.32 Folk politics is guilty of this, but the same holds for 
many orthodox positions as well – the range of miracle cures advanced for the 
decline of the left’s power have included trade unions, vanguards, affi nity groups 
and political parties. In most cases, these organisational forms are advocated 
without regard for the different strategic terrains they face. Folk politics, for 
example, takes a particular organisational form built under specifi c conditions 
and attempts to transpose it across the entire social and political fi eld. Rather 
than a decontextualized approach to the problem of organisation, we need to 
think in terms of a healthy and diverse ecosystem of organisations.
The simple point to make against organisational fetishism is that a political 
project requires a division of labour. There are a variety of essential tasks to be 
carried out in a successful political movement: awareness raising, legal 
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support, media hegemony, power analysis, policy proposals, the consolida-
tion of class memory, and leadership, to name just a few.33 No single type of 
organisation is suffi cient for performing all of these roles and bringing about 
large-scale political change. We therefore do not seek to promote any single 
organisational form as the ideal means of embodying transformational 
vectors. Every successful movement has been the result, not of a single organ-
isational type, but of a broad ecology of organisations. These have operated, 
in a more or less coordinated way, to carry out the division of labour necessary 
for political change. In the process of transformation leaders will arise, but 
there is no vanguard party – only mobile vanguard functions.34 An ecology of 
organisations means a pluralism of forces, able to positively feedback on their 
comparative strengths.35 It requires mobilisation under a common vision of 
an alternative world, rather than loose and pragmatic alliances.36 And it 
entails developing an array of broadly compatible organisations:
The point is to create something more than mere alliance building (where 
the parts, understood as constituted groupings of people, are supposed to 
stay the same, only co-operating punctually) and less than a one-size-fi ts-all 
solution (e.g. the idea of the party). This is about strategic interventions 
that can attract both constituted groups and the ‘long tail’ that does not 
belong to any groups, pitched not as exclusive but as complementary, 
whose effects can reinforce each other.37
This means that the overarching architecture of such an ecology is a relatively 
decentralised and networked form – but, unlike in the standard horizontalist 
vision, this ecology should also include hierarchical and closed groups as 
elements of the broader network.38 There is ultimately no privileged organisa-
tional form. Not all organisations need to aim for participation, openness and 
horizontality as their regulative ideals. The divisions between spontaneous 
uprisings and organisational longevity, short-term desires and long-term strategy, 
have split what should be a broadly consistent project for building a post-work 
world. Organisational diversity should be combined with broad populist unity.
A quick overview of how such an ecology might operate will offer some sense 
of how these proposals might work together. This can only be highly schematic, 
given the particularities of any given struggle and the complexity of the issues at 
hand. Inevitably, an ecosystem of organisations is forged in specifi c circumstances, 
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with different decisions being made in the face of different political contexts. That 
said, a broad social movement would be essential to any anti-work politics, afford-
ing a wide range of different organisational and tactical compositions. At one end 
of the spectrum, there are transient bursts of political energy, in the form of riots 
and spontaneous protests. Urban unrest in America, for instance, was a key moti-
vating factor behind elite support for a basic income in the 1960s.39 Such erup-
tions may not make intricate demands, but they demand a response. In slightly 
more organised modes, social movements take on the folk-political approaches 
seen in recent decades. Operating under principles of direct democracy can be 
conducive to certain objectives, such as giving people a voice, creating a powerful 
sense of collective agency and enabling different perspectives to be articulated.40 It 
can foster the creation of a populist identity and empower people to start to see 
themselves as a collective. But what these folk-political organisations lacked was 
the strategic perspective to transform spectacular scenes of protest and broad 
populist movements into effective long-term action.41 It is often the ability of other, 
more long-term institutionalised organisations to hegemonise around the 
demands, tactics and strategies of relatively ephemeral movements that deter-
mines the ultimate effect of their protests. The most successful occupation move-
ments in recent years have been those that have fostered ties to labour movements 
(in Egypt, for example) and/or to political parties. In Iceland, for instance, the 
greatest protest successes were achieved when a red-green coalition was voted in 
after forcing the conservative administration out;42 as we write, Spain is showing 
the potential that arises when social movements engage in a dual strategy both 
within and outside the party system. If a major social transformation such as the 
post-work project is to occur, it will come on the back of a mass movement rather 
than simply decreed from on high. Populist movements on the street will be one 
of its essential elements.
It has already been hinted at in earlier chapters, but media organisations are an 
essential part of any emergent political ecology aimed at building a new 
hegemony. The tasks involved in such a strategy demand a healthy media 
presence – creating a new common language, giving voice to the people, naming 
the antagonism, raising expectations, generating narratives that resonate with 
people and articulating in clear language the grievances we feel. It is these 
elements that provide the anchors for media narratives to be changed over time. 
Foundations and journalists are particularly well placed to make efforts at 
changing media narratives.43 It was no accident that the Mont Pelerin Society 
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included numerous journalists among its members. This communication also 
has to be achieved in a way that resonates with everyday conversation. The jargon 
of academics is rightly deemed useless by most people. Leftist media organisations 
should not shy away from being approachable and entertaining, gleaning insights 
from the success of popular websites. At the same time, the left has typically 
focused on creating media spaces outside the mainstream, rather than trying to 
co-opt existing institutions and leaking more radical ideas into the mainstream. 
Too often, these news organisations end up simply preaching to the choir, push-
ing narratives that never escape their own insular echo-chamber. The internet 
has enabled everyone to have a voice, but it has not enabled everyone to have an 
audience. Mainstream media sources remain indispensable for this and will 
continue to do so in the future. Their ability to infl uence and alter public opinion 
through framing what is and is not ‘realistic’ remains surprisingly strong. If a 
counter-hegemonic project is to be successful, it will require an injection of 
radical ideas into the mainstream, and not just the building of increasingly 
fragmented audiences outside it. Indeed, one of the key lessons from the US 
experience with a basic income policy is that the framing of such issues in the 
media is central to its prospects of success.44 It is for these reasons that existing 
media organisations constitute a key battleground in the project set out here.
Alongside the media, intellectual organisations are indispensable compo-
nents of any political ecology. These extend from bodies like think tanks, to 
captive university departments and other educational institutions, through to 
more loosely organised training and consciousness-raising bodies. But build-
ing hegemony does not necessarily mean sending down decrees from vanguard 
intellectual organisations. It is no accident that it is Gramsci, the key thinker 
of hegemony, who also struck upon the idea of the ‘organic intellectual’ – the 
intellectual closely linked to and emerging from key material and economic 
forces within society.45 Organic intellectuals are participants in practical life, 
organisers and constructors.46 A properly functioning leftist intellectual 
infrastructure would operate to support those institutions identifi ed as broadly 
in line with their own worldviews by participating in them, spreading their 
work and, where possible, providing resources. In a world of complexity, no 
one has a privileged view of the totality, and thus a healthy intellectual sphere 
will involve intellectuals with multiple perspectives. This will combine with 
on-the-ground inquiries carried out by workers – examining, for instance, the 
way in which retail logistics function and the potentials for their disruption,47 
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or the detailed analysis of local power networks as a means to bring about 
change.48 In addition to that of organic intellectuals, certain kinds of valuable 
work can only be carried out in specialist bodies that are able to retain a certain 
distance from the hurly-burly of everyday politics. As the Mont Pelerin Society 
understood, some intellectual efforts need to be devoted less to immediate and 
pressing concerns, and more to the development of long-term proposals. 
These would include such vital endeavours as the development of new ways 
of organising and understanding the economy, which requires highly technical 
knowledge and long-term research. But such work always needs to be fed back 
into the networks of political actors and social narratives to gain its full effect.
Labour organisations have traditionally been signifi cant forces of social 
transformation, but today they fi nd themselves on the back foot. At the same 
time, deeply entrenched habits and infl exible – if not outright corrupt – union 
leaderships have made the revitalisation of these organisations an uphill battle. 
Yet they remain indispensable to the transformation of capitalism, and any 
effort to imagine a new union structure must learn lessons from both the 
failures of older models and the changing economic conditions facing them 
today. These include basic things such as enriching the connection between 
leadership and members, building support across traditional sectoral boundaries 
(academics supporting cleaners in a university, for example), learning from 
innovative and often worker-led unions (those around immigrant labourers, for 
example), radicalising existing unions and building new unions in areas devoid 
of this organisational lever. In broad terms, the adequacy of a union depends on 
the alignment of its political form with economic and infrastructural conditions. 
As we saw in earlier chapters, these conditions are currently defi ned by the 
emerging crisis of work. The rise of surplus populations, the return of precarity, 
the stagnation of wages and the painfully slow recovery of employment all 
present key challenges for the traditional model of trade unionism. As the 
work–life distinction breaks down, job security dwindles and rising personal 
debt lurks in the background, issues around work have effects far beyond the 
workplace. These shifting social conditions alter the relationship between the 
union, its members and the wider community. This requires, fi rst of all, a 
recognition of the social nature of struggle, and the bridging of the gap between 
the workplace and the community.49 Problems at work spill over into the home 
and the community, and vice versa. At the same time, crucial support for union 
action comes from the community, and unions would be best served by 
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recognising their indebtedness to the invisible labour of those outside the 
workplace.50 These include not only domestic labourers, who reproduce the 
living conditions of waged workers, but also immigrant workers, precarious 
workers and the broad array of those in surplus populations who share in the 
miseries of capitalism. The focus of unions therefore needs to expand beyond 
supporting only dues-paying members. To be sure, there is a history of worker 
organisations establishing such connections with the broader community, but 
today this needs to be made an increasingly explicit goal of union organising. 
This process can work both ways. For instance, France has seen ‘proxy strikes’ 
in which workers declare themselves not to be on strike (and therefore continue 
to get paid), yet allow people to blockade or occupy their workplace.51 In 
addition, workers’ movements have always relied upon the local community for 
moral and logistical support, and if solidarity is built up, communities will 
come out to defend workers against state repression.52 Unions can involve 
themselves in community issues like housing, demonstrating the value of 
organised labour in the process.53 Rather than being built solely around 
workplaces, unions would therefore be more adequate to today’s conditions if 
they organised around regional spaces and communities.54
In expanding the spatial focus of union organising, local workplace 
demands open up into a broader range of social demands. As we argued in 
Chapter 7, this involves questioning the Fordist infatuation with permanent 
jobs and social democracy, and the traditional union focus on wages and job 
preservation. An assessment must be made of the viability of these classic 
demands in the face of automation, rising precarity and expanding 
unemployment. We believe many unions will be better served by refocusing 
towards a post-work society and the liberating aspects of a reduced working 
week, job sharing and a basic income.55 The West Coast longshoremen in the 
United States represent one successful example of allowing automation in 
exchange for guaranteeing higher wages and less job cuts (though they also 
occupy a key point of leverage in the capitalist infrastructure).56 The Chicago 
Teachers’ Union offers another example of a union going far beyond collective 
bargaining, and instead mobilising a broad social movement around the state 
of education in general. Moreover, shifting in a post-work direction overcomes 
some of the key impasses between ecological movements and organised 
labour. The deployment of productivity increases for more free time, rather 
than increased jobs and output, can bring these groups together. Changing 
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the aims of unions and organising community-wide will help to turn unions 
away from classic – and now failing – social democratic goals, and will be 
essential to any successful renewal of the labour movement.
Lastly, the state remains a site of struggle, and political parties will have a 
role in any ecology of organisations – particularly if the traditional social demo-
cratic parties continue to collapse and enable a new generation of parties to 
emerge. Ensuring a post-work society for all will require more than just indi-
vidual workplaces; it demands success at the level of the state as well.57 While 
parties are frequently denounced for their cynical consent to electoralism and 
the limits posed by international capital, this changes within an ecology of 
organisations. Rather than making them the impossible vehicle of revolutionary 
desires – associated with the hopeless prospect of ‘voting in’ postcapitalism – 
they can instead take on the more realistic task of forming the ‘tip of the iceberg’ 
in terms of political pressure, as well as developing the ability to bring together 
a widely varied constituency.58 The state can complement politics on the street 
and in the workplace, just as the latter two can broaden the options for parties. 
The avoidance of the state – common to so many folk-political approaches – is 
a mistake. Mass movements and parties should be seen as tools of the same 
populist movement, each capable of achieving different things. At their most 
general level, parties can integrate various tendencies within a social move-
ment – from reformist to revolutionary – into a common project. While inter-
national capital and the inter-state system make radical change virtually impos-
sible from within the state, there are still basic and important policy choices to 
be made about austerity, housing support, climate change, childcare, 
demilitarisation of the police and abortion rights. Simply to reject parliamentary 
politics is to ignore the real advances these policies can make. It takes quite a 
privileged position to not care about minimum wage regulations, immigration 
laws, changes to legal support or rulings on abortion. At their best, electoral 
entities can act as a disruptive force (stalling, publicising controversies, 
articulating popular outrage), and even act as a progressive force in some 
situations. This does not imply that social movements should simply be turned 
into the vote-mobilising wings of political parties. The relationship between 
parties and social movements should extend far beyond this, into a process of 
two-way communication. On the one hand, fi nancial support can be given 
from the party to community initiatives, and various policies – such as laws on 
public protest – can be amended to facilitate the activities of social movements. 
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In Venezuela, for instance, the state supported the creation of neighbourhood 
communes as a way to embed socialism in everyday practices.59 On the other 
hand, resources for new parties can be mobilised collectively – Podemos, for 
example, got started through crowd-funding €150,000 – and the vitality of the 
party can be maintained through constant institutionalised negotiations 
between local movements, party members and central party structures.60
Podemos, for instance, has aimed to build mechanisms for popular 
governance while also seeking a way into established institutions.61 It is a multi-
pronged approach to social change and offers greater potential for real 
transformation than either option on its own.62 Meanwhile, Brazil’s Partido dos 
Trabalhadores has maintained openness to multiple groups (liberation theology 
groups, peasant movements) while still organising around an essentially union-
based core. In the words of one researcher, ‘this combination of grassroots and 
vanguard constituted a Leninism that was not very Leninist’.63 What all these 
experiences show, however, is the mass mobilisation of the people is necessary 
in order to transform the state into a meaningful tool of their interests, and to 
overcome the blunt division between the power of movements and the power 
of the state. The aim must be to avoid both ‘the tendency to fetishise the state, 
offi cial power, and its institutions and the opposing tendency to fetishise 
antipower’.64 In a context of widespread discontent with the political system, 
this remains possible – though, again, the importance of having a discursive 
framework in place to channel this discontent is obvious. In the end, parties 
still hold signifi cant political power, and the struggle over their future should 
certainly not be abandoned to reactionary forces.
It should be clear how far away we now are from the folk-political fetishism 
of localism, horizontalism and direct democracy. An ecology of organisations 
does not deny that such organisational forms may have a role, but it rejects 
the idea that they are suffi cient. This is doubly true for a counter-hegemonic 
project that requires the toppling of neoliberal common sense. What we are 
calling for, therefore, is a functional complementarity between organisations, 
rather than the fetishising of specifi c organisations or organisational forms.
POINTS OF LEVERAGE
If a populist movement successfully built a counter-hegemonic ecosystem of 
organisations, in order to become effective it would still require the capacity 
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to disrupt. Even with a healthy organisational ecology and a mass unifi ed 
movement, change is impossible without opportunities to leverage the move-
ment’s power. Historically speaking, many of the most signifi cant advances 
made by the labour movement were achieved by workers in key strategic 
locations. Regardless of whether they had widespread solidarity, high levels of 
class consciousness or an optimal organisational form, they achieved success 
by being able to insert themselves into and against the fl ow of capitalist accu-
mulation. In fact, the best predictor of worker militancy and successful class 
struggle may be the workers’ structural position in the economy.
For example, within the early logistics infrastructure, dockworkers found 
themselves occupying a key point in the circulation of capital. Intermodal 
transport – the transferring of goods between ships, trains and trucks – was 
labour-intensive and costly.65 Lodged in a key passage through which goods 
had to circulate, the longshoremen who carried out the work controlled a 
major point of leverage. The result was that dockworkers were incredibly 
militant and lost more work days to labour disputes than almost any other 
industry.66 The famed strength of unions like the United Automobile Workers 
also arose from their structural position in the production process and the 
importance of the car industry to the national economy. Their power 
emerged, moreover, in a time of high unemployment and low levels of 
organisation – it turned out that neither a supportive labour market nor 
organisational strength was necessary for success.67 A similar point of leverage 
was held by coalminers. Working in mines lent itself to greater autonomy 
from management in an environment where work stoppages were particularly 
potent. The consequence was that ‘their position and concentration gave 
them opportunities, at certain moments, to forge a new kind of political 
power’.68 The same holds for mining today, which is resistant to the threat of 
capital fl ight, since the resource supply is itself immobile. The mining areas 
of South Africa present a contemporary example, revealing both the potency 
of the unions and the violence of capital. When miners went on a wildcat 
strike in 2012, the state was called in and over thirty workers were killed in 
the Marikana massacre. Less violent, but no less signifi cant, is the monopoly 
position of certain suppliers. Strikes at these points, such as in the Pou Chen 
Group in China, pose a real threat to capitalist interests by blocking off an 
entire supply chain.69 At the other end of that chain, retail distribution is also 
primed for signifi cant militant action, providing rich opportunities for the 
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disruption of contemporary capitalism’s reliance on just-in-time logistics.70 
The signifi cance of such points of leverage can hardly be overestimated.
But the past century has seen the conscious and unconscious winnowing 
away of these points of leverage. The development of shipping containers 
enabled the automation of intermodal transport;71 the globalisation of logistics 
facilitated capital’s ability to move factories in response to strikes; and the shift 
to oil as the primary energy source drastically reduced the number of choke-
points available for political action. Today, the classic points of leverage have 
largely disappeared, necessitating a new round of experimentation and 
strategic refl ection. Experimentation is necessary precisely because politics is 
a set of dynamic systems, driven by confl ict, and by adaptations and counter-
adaptations, leading to tactical arms races. This means that any one type of 
political action is highly likely to become ineffective over time, as its opponents 
learn and adapt. Thus, no given mode of political action is historically 
inviolable. Indeed, over time, there has been an increasing need to discard 
familiar tactics as the forces they are marshalled against learn to defend against 
and counter-attack them more effectively. Secrecy is met by undercover 
infi ltrators; the use of masks is met by new legislation against it; kettling is met 
by apps that track police movements; the recording of police violence is met 
by its criminalisation; mass protest is met by heavy regulation that renders it 
boring and sterile; non-violent civil disobedience is met by violent police 
brutality. Political tactics are a dynamic fi eld of forces, and experimentation is 
essential in working around new state and corporate impediments to change.
The history of the labour movement provides an exemplary picture of such 
an approach. One of its primary tactics has been to limit the supply of labour, 
thereby making it more powerful and valuable.72 Early efforts towards this end 
often operated by withholding the training for particular jobs by discriminating 
on the basis of skills, gender and race.73 Early typesetters, for example, organised 
to protect a male-centred skilled workforce against the threatened introduction 
of relatively unskilled female labourers.74 However, deskilling by capital and 
the industrialisation of production made it possible to undermine many of the 
skilled labour unions and opened up the labour supply to a much wider extent. 
The result was the breakdown of many traditional craft unions that were based 
around particular skill sets, with the emergence instead of industrial unions 
organising both skilled and unskilled workers along industry lines.75 Another 
possible tactic for reducing the labour supply is one that we examined earlier: 
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moving towards the reduction of working hours. This produces a reduction of 
the labour supply, as was achieved by the exclusionary unions above, but with 
an important difference. Rather than relying on excluding particular groups 
from skilled trades, the tactic of reducing working hours relies on withdrawing 
a portion of everyone’s labour time.76 For various reasons, though – not least 
because of the postwar consensus between capital and labour – this tactic fell 
out of favour, and the labour movement’s attention instead turned towards 
collective bargaining over pay. As we argued earlier, however, this tactic has the 
potential to be revived in the effort to transform our socioeconomic system. 
Another key tactic has been strikes, whose logic is to infl ict costs on capital and 
force its hand in negotiations. But this approach was limited by the fact that 
unskilled labour could be easily replaced with new (and more docile) scab 
workers. Strikes also allow employers to use the downtime to bring in new 
machinery – precisely the changes which workers may be struggling against. As 
a response, a new tactic of sit-down strikes and factory occupations emerged in 
the early twentieth century – making it impossible for replacement workers to 
operate and threatening to demonstrate that management was superfl uous.77 
What we see here is a dynamic arms race occurring between opponents as each 
seeks to leverage new tactics and technologies for its own purposes.
Today, the terrain of these struggles is again changing, indicated by at least 
two broad and emerging problems with classic workplace disruption. In the 
fi rst place, there is the tendency towards automation. Just as the automation of 
logistics took away some of the leverage points occupied by dockworkers, so too 
does the automation of factories, transportation, and eventually service work 
portend a signifi cant decline in the potential for workplace struggles. The 
emergence of self-driving vehicles, for instance, will rapidly diminish the points 
of leverage contained within transportation systems. The National Union of 
Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers in the UK will have to face this problem 
directly in the near future, with self-driving trains already in operation and 
further expansion planned. The mayor of London, Boris Johnson, has explic-
itly stated that automation should be used to destroy one of the few remaining 
militant British unions.78 Crucially, however, leverage points remain, and new 
ones will emerge in the wake of restructuring and automation. For instance, as 
one author pointed out – in 1957! – ‘a strike by a very small number of workers 
is liable to hold up an entire automated factory’.79 A decline in the number of 
workers overseeing a process also means a concentration of potential power 
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within a smaller group of individuals. Likewise, while an automated transport 
system may not be subject to driver strikes, it may be open to strikes by program-
mers and IT technicians, as well as being more susceptible to blockades, 
because of the technical limitations of self-driving cars. These vehicles func-
tion by reducing environmental variation, making them ‘more akin to a train 
running on invisible tracks’.80 The intentional manipulation of the environ-
ment is therefore likely to be particularly disruptive. Equally, the use of pattern 
recognition algorithms in various tasks (e.g., diagnostics, emotion- and face-
detection, surveillance) is highly susceptible to disruption.81 A technical under-
standing of machines like these is essential to understanding how to interrupt 
them, and any future left must be as technically fl uent as it is politically fl uent. 
In the end, what is required is an analysis of the automation trends that are 
restructuring production and circulation, and a strategic understanding of 
where new points of leverage might develop.
The second related limitation of classic disruptive tactics is that they might 
falter in the face of mass unemployment and struggles organised around 
surplus populations rather than the working class. If there is no workplace to 
disrupt, what can be done? Again, the repertoires of contention were trans-
formed in response to changing social, political, technological and economic 
conditions. As precarity, zero-hour contracts, temporary work and internships 
spread throughout society, movements of the unemployed and movements 
based around social reproduction offer important and instructive examples of 
resistance. These struggles have never had a workplace to disrupt, so they 
have always had to invent new means of leveraging power. It is one of the 
myopias of many on the left to only see workers’ power coming from disrupt-
ing production, when in fact contesting the existing order has taken numer-
ous forms outside the workplace. In Argentina, for instance, unemployed 
workers’ movements blockaded major streets in order to make themselves 
heard and were central to the overthrow of the government.82 Expelled from 
the wage, shorn of a workplace, blockading urban arteries becomes a primary 
means of exerting political power.83 The surge in freeway blockades in the 
wake of the August 2014 police killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, demonstrates the increasing prevalence of this type of struggle.84 
Similar tactics take on other aspects of capitalist reproduction with the same 
basic objective, including rent strikes and debt strikes. Port blockades also 
have potential as a tactic, and computer modelling can offer insights into 
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how to avoid scattershot and ineffective political action.85 These new tactics 
must, of course, be situated within a larger strategic plan, or risk becoming so 
many temporary movements that erupt only to disappear without a trace.
The classic basis of power for the labour movement, then, has been diffused 
and weakened. Yet this need not herald the death-knell of class struggle. 
Automation and precarity may spell the decline of interruptions at points of 
production, but they do not mean the end of disruption in total. Just as traditional 
points of leverage have been effaced in the context of a fl exible, global infrastruc-
ture, this shift has also increased the vulnerability of that infrastructure in other 
ways. Well-positioned local struggles can immediately become global.86 The task 
before us must be to have a sober reckoning with changed material realities and 
to strategise over new spaces for action. There are precedents and lessons to be 
learned in existing practices like the ‘power structure analysis’ undertaken by 
unions and community organisers, which maps local social networks and key 
actors, determining their weaknesses, strengths, allies and enemies.87 The argu-
ment we are making here is for the construction of a complement to this process, 
emphasising the material conditions of struggle rather than just its social networks. 
In either approach, though, on-the-ground knowledge must be linked up with 
more abstract knowledge of changing economic conditions.
A post-work world will not emerge out of the benevolence of capitalists, the 
inevitable tendencies of the economy or the necessity of crisis. As this and the 
previous chapter have argued, the power of the left – broadly construed – 
needs to be rebuilt before a post-work society can become a meaningful 
strategic option. This will involve a broad counter-hegemonic project that 
seeks to overturn neoliberal common sense and to rearticulate new 
understandings of ‘modernisation’, ‘work’ and ‘freedom’. This will necessarily 
be a populist project that mobilises a broad swathe of society and that, while 
being anchored in class interests, nevertheless remains irreducible to them. It 
will involve a full-spectrum approach to organisations that seeks to use different 
organisational advantages in combination – not according to a pragmatism of 
loose alliances, but under the aegis of a vision for a better world. And these 
organisations and masses will have to identify and secure new points of leverage 
in the circuits of capitalism, with its increasingly barren workplaces. In the 
face of a globalised capitalism that is always on the move, opposition to it must 
pre-empt the transformations of tomorrow in a supple politics of anticipation.
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Conclusion
You live the surprise results of old plans.
Jenny Holzer
Where, then, do we stand? The latest cycle of struggles has been exhausted, 
undone by their tendencies towards folk politics, and everywhere today mass 
outrage combines with mass impotence. We have argued that the most prom-
ising way forward lies in reclaiming modernity and attacking the neoliberal 
common sense that conditions everything from the most esoteric policy 
discussions to the most vivid emotional states. This counter-hegemonic 
project can only be achieved by imagining better worlds – and in moving 
beyond defensive struggles. We have outlined one possible project, in the 
form of a post-work politics that frees us to create our own lives and commu-
nities. Triumph in the political battles to achieve it will require organising a 
broadly populist left, building the organisational ecosystem necessary for a 
full-spectrum politics on multiple fronts, and leveraging key points of power 
wherever possible.
Yet the end of work would not be the end of history. Building a platform 
for a post-work society would be an immense accomplishment, but it would 
still only be a beginning.1 This is why conceiving of left politics as a politics 
of modernity is so crucial: because it requires that we not confuse a post-work 
society – or indeed any society – with the end of history. Universalism always 
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undoes itself, possessing its own resources for an immanent critique that 
insists and expands upon its ideals. No particular social formation is suffi cient 
to satisfy its conceptual and political demands. Equally, synthetic freedom 
compels us to reject contentment with the existing horizon of possibilities. To 
be satisfi ed with post-work would risk leaving intact the racial, gendered, 
colonial and ecological divisions that continue to structure our world.2 While 
such asymmetries of power would hopefully be unsettled by a post-work 
world, the efforts to eliminate them would undoubtedly need to continue. 
Further, we would still be seeking a systemic replacement for markets and 
facing the task of building new political institutions. We would still not know 
what a sociotechnical body can do, and we would still have to unfetter tech-
nological development and unleash new freedoms. Transcending our reli-
ance on waged labour is important, but we would still be faced with the 
immense tasks of undoing other political, economic, social, physical and 
biological constraints. A project towards a post-work world is necessary but 
insuffi cient.
Yet a post-work platform does provide us with a new equilibrium to aim at, 
completing the shift from social democracy to neoliberalism to a new post-
work hegemony. We believe it focuses the tasks of the present and provides a 
stable point from which to seek out further emancipatory gains. As with any 
platform, those who create it cannot fully predict how it will be used. While 
certain constraints and opportunities are built into a platform, they do not 
exhaustively determine the ways of life it will enable. A platform leaves the 
future open, rather than presuming to close it.3 When it is designed correctly, 
it succeeds precisely by allowing people to build further developments on top 
of it. With a post-work platform, people may begin to participate more in 
political processes, or perhaps they will retreat into individualised worlds 
formed by media spectacles. But there are reasons for hope, given the shift in 
work ethic required for a post-work society. Such a project demands a subjec-
tive transformation in the process – it potentiates the conditions for a broader 
transformation from the selfi sh individuals formed by capitalism to commu-
nal and creative forms of social expression liberated by the end of work. 
Humanity has for too long been shaped by capitalist impulses, and a post-
work world portends a future in which these constraints have been signifi -
cantly loosened. This does not mean that a post-work society would simply be 
a realm of play. Rather, in such a society, the labour that remains will no 
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longer be imposed upon us by an external force – by an employer or by the 
imperatives of survival. Work will become driven by our own desires, instead 
of by demands from outside.4 Against the austerity of conservative forces, and 
the austere life promised by anti-modernists, the demand for a post-work 
world revels in the liberation of desire, abundance and freedom.
Such a future is undoubtedly risky, but so is any project to build a better 
world. There are no guarantees that things will work out as expected: a post-
work world may generate immanent dynamics towards the rapid dissolution 
of capitalism, or the forces of reaction may co-opt the liberated desires under 
a new system of control. Concerns about the risks of political action have led 
parts of the contemporary left into a situation where they desire novelty, but 
a novelty without risk. Generic demands to experiment, create and prefi gure 
are commonplace, but concrete proposals are all too often met with a wave 
of criticism outlining every possible point at which things might go wrong. In 
light of this dual tendency – for novelty, but against the risks inherent in 
social transformation – the allure of political ideas celebrating spontaneous 
‘events’ becomes clearer. The event (as revolutionary rupture) becomes an 
expression of the desire for novelty without responsibility. The messianic 
event promises to shatter our stagnant world and bring us to a new stage of 
history, conveniently voided of the diffi cult work that is politics. The hard 
task ahead is to build new worlds while acknowledging that they will create 
novel problems. The best utopias are always riven by discord.
This imperative runs in opposition to the kind of precautionary principle 
that seeks to eliminate the contingency and risk involved in making deci-
sions. On strong readings, the precautionary principle aims to convert epis-
temic uncertainty into a guardianship of the status quo, gently turning away 
those who would seek to build a better future with the imperative to ‘do more 
research’. We might also consider here that the precautionary principle 
contains an almost inherent lacuna: it ignores the risks of its own application. 
In seeking to err always on the side of caution, and hence of eliminating risk, 
it contains a blindness to the dangers of inaction and omission.5 While risks 
need to be reasonably hedged, a fuller appreciation of the travails of contin-
gency implies that we are usually not better off taking the precautionary path. 
The precautionary principle is designed to close off the future and eliminate 
contingency, when in fact the contingency of high-risk adventures is precisely 
what leads to a more open future – in the words of conceptual artist Jenny 
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Holzer, ‘You live the surprise results of old plans.’ Building the future means 
accepting the risk of unintended consequences and imperfect solutions. We 
may always be trapped, but at least we can escape into better traps.6
AFTER CAPITALISM
The post-work project and, more broadly, the project of postcapitalism are 
progressive determinations of the commitment to universal emancipation. In 
practice, these projects involve ‘a controlled dissolution of market forces . . . 
and a delinking of work from income’.7 But the ultimate trajectory of univer-
sal emancipation is towards overcoming physical, biological, political and 
economic constraints. This ambition to undo constraints is one that, taken to 
its limits, leads inexorably towards grand and speculative frontiers. For the 
early Russian cosmists, even death and gravity were obstacles to be overcome 
through future ingenuity.8 In these post-planetary speculations, we see the 
project of human emancipation transformed into an unceasing one that 
winds its way along two highly intertwined paths of development: technologi-
cal and human.
Technological development follows a recombinant path, bringing together 
existing ideas, technologies and technological components into new combi-
nations. Simple objects are united into increasingly complex technological 
systems, and each newly developed piece of technology forms the basis for a 
further technology. With this expansion, the combinatorial possibilities rapidly 
proliferate.9 It would appear that capitalist competition has been a signifi cant 
driver of this technological advancement. Under a popular narrative, inter-
capitalist competition is seen as driving technological changes in the produc-
tion process, while consumer capitalism demands an increasingly differenti-
ated set of products. But at the same time, capitalism has placed substantial 
obstacles in the way of technological development. While the carefully 
curated image of capitalism is one of dynamic risk-taking and technological 
innovation, this image in fact obscures the real sources of dynamism in the 
economy. Developments like railways, the internet, computing, supersonic 
fl ight, space travel, satellites, pharmaceuticals, voice-recognition software, 
nanotechnology, touch-screens and clean energy have all been nurtured and 
guided by states, not corporations. During the golden postwar era of research 
and development, two-thirds of research and development was publicly 
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funded.10 Yet recent decades have seen corporate investment in high-risk tech-
nologies drastically decline.11 And with neoliberalism’s cutback in state 
expenditure, it is therefore unsurprising that technological change has dimin-
ished since the 1970s.12 In other words, it has been collective investment, not 
private investment, that has been the primary driver of technological 
development.13 High-risk inventions and new technologies are too risky for 
private capitalists to invest in; fi gures such as Steve Jobs and Elon Musk slyly 
obscure their parasitical reliance on state-led developments.14 Likewise, multi-
billion-dollar megascale projects are ultimately driven by non-economic goals 
that exceed any cost–benefi t analysis. Projects of this scale and ambition are in 
fact hindered by market-based constraints, since a sober analysis of their 
viability in capitalist terms reveals them to be profoundly underwhelming.15 In 
addition, some social benefi ts (those offered by an Ebola vaccine, for example) 
are left unexplored because they have little profi t potential, while in some 
areas (such as solar power and electric cars) capitalists can be seen actively 
impeding progress, lobbying governments to end green-energy subsidies and 
implementing laws that obstruct further development. The entire 
pharmaceuticals industry provides a particularly devastating illustration of the 
effects of intellectual property monopolisation, while the technology industry 
is increasingly plagued by patent trolling. Capitalism therefore misattributes 
the sources of technological development, places creativity in a straitjacket of 
capitalist accumulation, constrains the social imagination within the param-
eters of cost–benefi t analyses and attacks profi t-destroying innovations. To 
unleash technological advancement, we must move beyond capitalism and 
liberate creativity from its current strictures.16 This would begin to liberate 
technologies away from their current purview of control and exploitation, and 
towards the quantitative and qualitative expansion of synthetic freedom. It 
would enable the utopian ambitions of megaprojects to be unleashed, invoking 
the classic dreams of invention and discovery. The dreams of space fl ight, the 
decarbonisation of the economy, the automation of mundane labour, the 
extension of human life, and so on, are all major technological projects that 
fi nd themselves hampered in various ways by capitalism. The boot-strapping 
expansionary process of technology, once liberated from capitalist fetters, can 
potentiate both positive and negative freedoms. It can form the basis for a fully 
postcapitalist economy, enabling a shift away from scarcity, work and exploita-
tion, and towards the full development of humanity.17
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Intertwined with this picture of liberated technological transformation is 
therefore the future of human beings. The pathway towards a postcapitalist 
society requires a shift away from the proletarianisation of humanity and 
towards a transformed and newly mutable subject. This subject cannot be 
determined in advance; it can only be elaborated in the unfolding of practical 
and conceptual ramifi cations. There is no ‘true’ essence to humanity that 
could be discovered beyond our enmeshments in technological, natural and 
social webs.18 The idea that a post-work society would simply inculcate further 
mindless consumption neglects humanity’s capacity for novelty and creativity, 
and invokes a pessimism based upon current capitalist subjectivity.19 Likewise, 
the development of new needs must be distinguished from their 
commodifi cation. Whereas the latter locks new desires into a profi t-seeking 
framework that constrains human fl ourishing, the former denotes a real form 
of progress. The ‘extension and differentiation of needs as a whole’ is to be 
lauded over any folk-political dream of returning to a ‘primitive natural state 
of these needs’. The complexifi cation of needs is disfi gured under capitalist 
consumer society, to be sure, but, unbound from this mutation, ‘their aim is 
necessarily the development of a “rich individuality” for the whole of 
mankind’.20
The postcapitalist subject would therefore not reveal an authentic self that 
had been obscured by capitalist social relations, but would instead unveil the 
space to create new modes of being. As Marx noted, ‘all history is nothing but 
a continuous transformation of human nature’, and the future of humanity 
cannot be determined abstractly in advance: it is fi rst of all a practical matter, 
to be carried out in time. Nevertheless, some general notions might be enter-
tained. For Marx, the primary principle of postcapitalism was the ‘develop-
ment of human powers which is an end in itself’.21 Indeed, the fundamental 
aim of his project was universal emancipation. The various ideas that Marxists 
have advanced to get there – the socialisation of production, ending the 
value-form, eliminating wage labour – are simply means towards achieving 
this end. The immediate question is: What does this aim entail? The synthetic 
construction of freedom is the means by which human powers are to be 
developed. This freedom fi nds many different modes of expression, including 
economic and political ones,22 experiments with sexuality and reproductive 
structures,23 and the creation of new desires, expanded aesthetic capabili-
ties,24 new forms of thought and reasoning, and ultimately entirely new 
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modes of being human.25 The expansion of desires, of needs, of lifestyles, of 
communities, of ways of being, of capacities – all are invoked by the project 
of universal emancipation. This is a project of opening up the future, of 
undertaking a labour that elaborates what it might mean to be human, of 
producing a utopian project for new desires, and of aligning a political project 
with the trajectory of an endless universalising vector. Capitalism, for all its 
appearances of liberation and universality, has ultimately restrained these 
forces in an endless cycle of accumulation, ossifying the real potentials of 
humanity and constricting technological development to a series of banal 
marginal innovations. We move faster – capitalism demands it; yet we go 
nowhere. Instead, we must build a world in which we can accelerate out of 
our stasis.
BEFORE THE FUTURE
The argument of this book has been that the left can neither remain in the 
present nor return to the past. To construct a new and better future, we must 
begin taking the necessary steps to build a new kind of hegemony. This runs 
counter to much of our political common sense today. The tendencies 
towards folk politics – emphasising the local and the authentic, the tempo-
rary and the spontaneous, the autonomous and the particular – are explicable 
as reactions against a recent history of defeats, of partial, ambivalent victories, 
and of surging global complexity. But they remain radically insuffi cient for 
achieving broader victories against a planetary capitalism. Rather than seek-
ing temporary and local relief in the various bunkers of folk politics, we must 
today move beyond these limits. Against ideas of resistance, withdrawal, exit 
or purity, the task of the left today is to engage the politics of scale and expan-
sion, along with all the risks such a project entails. Doing so requires us to 
salvage the legacy of modernity and reappraise which parts of the post-
Enlightenment matrix can be saved and which must be discarded; for it is 
only a new form of universal action that will be capable of supplanting 
neoliberal capitalism.
Without tabulae rasase or miraculous events, it is within the tendencies 
and affordances of our world today that we must locate the resources from 
which to build a new hegemony. While this book has focused on full 
automation and the end of work, there is a broad palette of political options 
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for a contemporary left to choose from. This would mean, most immediately, 
rethinking classic leftist demands in light of the most advanced technologies. 
It would mean building upon the post-nation-state territory of ‘the stack’ – 
that global infrastructure that enables our digital world today.26 A new type of 
production is already visible at the leading edges of contemporary technol-
ogy. Additive manufacturing and the automation of work portend the possi-
bility of production based on fl exibility, decentralisation and post-scarcity for 
some goods. The rapid automation of logistics presents the utopian possibility 
of a globally interconnected system in which parts and goods can be shipped 
rapidly and effi ciently without human labour. Cryptocurrencies and their 
block-chain technology could bring forth a new money of the commons, 
divorced from capitalist forms.27
The democratic guidance of the economy is also accelerated by emerging 
technologies. Famously, Oscar Wilde once said that the problem with social-
ism was that it took up too many evenings. Increasing economic democracy 
could require us to devote an overwhelming amount of time to discussions 
and decisions over the minutiae of everyday life.28 The use of computing 
technology is essential in avoiding this problem, both by simplifying the deci-
sions to be made and by automating decisions collectively deemed to be irrel-
evant. For example, rather than deliberating over every aspect of the econ-
omy, decisions could instead be made about certain key parameters (energy 
input, carbon output, level of inequality, level of research investment, and so 
on).29 Social media – divorced from its drive to monetisation and tendency 
towards narcissism – could also foster economic democracy by bringing 
about a new public. New modes of deliberation and participation might 
emerge from a postcapitalist social media platform. And the perennial prob-
lem facing postcapitalist economies – that of how to distribute goods effi -
ciently in the absence of market prices – can also be overcome through 
computers. Between the early Soviet attempts at economic planning and 
today, computing power has grown exponentially, to become 100 billion 
times more powerful.30 The calculation of how to distribute our main produc-
tive resources is increasingly viable. Equally, data collection on resources and 
preferences through ubiquitous computing means that the raw data for 
running an economy are more readily available than ever before. And all of 
this could be mobilised towards the implementation of the Lucas Plan on 
national and global scales – redirecting our economies towards the 
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self-conscious production of socially useful goods like renewable energy, 
cheap medicine and the expansion of our synthetic freedoms.
This is what a twenty-fi rst-century left looks like. Any movement that 
wishes to remain relevant and politically potent must grapple with such 
potentials and developments in our technological world. We must expand 
our collective imagination beyond what capitalism allows. Rather than 
settling for marginal improvements in battery life and computer power, the 
left should mobilise dreams of decarbonising the economy, space travel, 
robot economies – all the traditional touchstones of science fi ction – in order 
to prepare for a day beyond capitalism. Neoliberalism, as secure as it may 
seem today, contains no guarantee of future survival. Like every social system 
we have ever known, it will not last forever. Our task now is to invent what 
happens next.
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